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Certainly I hope that Found, Featured, then Forgotten reaches and 
pleases some of the surviving antiwar veterans and newscasters of 
the era and that they find it a valuable addition to the historic record. 
I recognize that the book casually slides across the disciplines of 
journalism, broadcasting, political science, sociology, public opin-
ion, and history, by necessity giving insufficient attention to the full 
breadth each area of study has to offer. Yet, I believe this book holds 
value in that it cuts across disciplines—and may even, by its telling 
story, have some popular appeal. 
This nerdy optimism, at its heart, is an act of faith in each reader. 
I believe a good story can survive academic silos, jargon, detours, and 
even preconceived notions. So, if you read this book casually or as 
an undergraduate or graduate supplemental assignment in history, 
media, political science, or sociology, please bear with the quirky 
mix. In the end, the antiwar veterans and those who covered them 
will tell us a lot about ourselves and our institutions, offering time-
less lessons for those willing to listen and to reflect.
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Coming to terms with the Vietnam War hasn’t been easy for Ameri-
cans, and in many ways we still haven’t come to terms with it. The 
aging warriors of that generation have been left to their own sense 
of what that history means and portends. For some people, nota-
bly neoconservatives, the Vietnam War represents a lost cause and 
an untaken opportunity—a missed chance to spread democracy by 
warfare. To them, the lessons learned are strategic and tactical: muz-
zle the news media, ignore dissent, and escalate as much as needed. 
The slowly growing levels of war since then (Grenada, Panama, the 
Gulf War) reestablish in their minds the notions of an undefeatable 
America, always in the right. This attitude played a large role in the 
folly that was and is the Iraq War.
To liberals, progressives, and many moderates, the Vietnam War 
is a lesson in healthy distrust of official reasons. The war, sold as 
a crusade to halt the spread of global communism, actually had a 
strong overlay of nationalism and colonialism. It became more of 
a civil and guerilla war, with no front, little reliable local popula-
tion, and frequent clashes between “lifer” officers and disgruntled 
draftees. Many soldiers saw no good purpose beyond surviving to 
go home—what the soldiers in the documentary World of Charlie 
Company called “back in the world.”  
A 1970 Herblock cartoon parodied well the circular logic of the 
war. It showed two U.S. soldiers sitting on a log in a jungle clearing. 
One is reading a newspaper that features Richard Nixon on the front 
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page. He says to his buddy, “You see, the reason we’re in Indochina is 
to protect us boys in Indochina” (Block 1972).
For many Americans, the war in Vietnam was best forgotten: 
put in the past as quickly as possible. Many veterans returned from 
the war unwilling to talk about their experiences, except among 
themselves. There was no celebration; there was little to celebrate. 
The civilian population seemed more than willing to join Vietnam 
veterans in this move-on-with-our-lives approach. Psychologist 
Dr. Robert Lifton called it a “psychologically illegitimate” war 
(MacPherson, 2001, 55).
The popular mythology of Hollywood did little to reconcile the 
war in Vietnam with our national sense of self. Films that featured 
the war include the hyper-patriotic and simplistic The Green Berets 
with John Wayne, the gritty and troubling Platoon, the difficult and 
depressing Coming Home, the tragicomic Good Morning Vietnam, 
and the shocking and disturbing Apocalypse Now and Full Metal 
Jacket. They also include the historical revisionism of First Blood, 
the first of the Rambo movies, a muscular claim that valiant soldiers 
were not allowed to win in Vietnam and were sabotaged by their own 
country.
One film, Born on the Fourth of July, highlights a key compo-
nent for understanding those times: the great difficulty, shared by 
the general public and news organizations, in accepting the reality 
of substantial numbers of veterans returning to protest a war still in 
progress. 
Although these retrospective entertainment films are some-
what instructive about our national cognitive dissonance about the 
Vietnam War, they pale in comparison to contemporaneous news 
coverage of the war and its protest movements. Found, Featured, 
then Forgotten examines that news coverage, focusing on how U.S. 
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television news organizations treated a very significant antiwar 
group, the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW).
This book is not a history of the VVAW. Several authors have 
done a good job with that task. I recommend Richard Stacewicz’ 
Winter Soldiers: An Oral History of the Vietnam Veterans Against 
the War, Andrew E. Hunt’s The Turning, and Gerald Nicosia’s Home 
to War. Nor is this book a history of the Vietnam War. Among the 
many choices, I recommend beginning with Stanley Karnow’s Viet-
nam. Finally, this book is not a history of U.S. broadcast news. Now 
the News, by Ed Bliss, serves as a good starting point for that.
This book draws from these three histories to illuminate one 
specific and important U.S. broadcast news form: network televi-
sion newscasts and their coverage of a very unusual and significant 
social movement, thousands of veterans returning to protest a war 
still in progress. Along the way, readers may discover certain points 
that validate or challenge social movement theory as well as assump-
tions about mass media, the Vietnam War, veterans, and the antiwar 
movement.
Chapter One introduces readers to the key players, antiwar vet-
erans and network TV newscasters, and explores their interactions 
during the 1960s and 1970s. The chapter highlights the huge audi-
ence and political significance of the U.S. network television news-
casts of the era. It also explains how the VVAW emerged from a long, 
elaborate, and little-known history of veteran and soldier resistance 
to the Vietnam War.
Chapter Two assembles the scattered record (predating the August 
1968 Vanderbilt Television News Archive) of early protest to the Viet-
nam War and television attention to it. Mostly, but not exclusively, 
that television coverage supported official U.S. policy in Vietnam, al-
though it was not as jingoistic or hostile to protesters as the lingering 
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newsreels of the mid-to-late 1960s. Chapter Three explains how I tri-
angulated interviews, polls, and archived videotapes of network TV 
news coverage to critically analyze treatment of antiwar veterans in 
the news.
Chapter Four presents the sharp contrast between the scanty 
news attention to antiwar “testimony” in Detroit in January 1971 and 
the extensive coverage of VVAW events in late April 1971 in Wash-
ington, D. C. Chapter Five reconstructs large VVAW protests at the 
1972 Republican National Convention, and Chapter Six explores the 
paucity of coverage for those protests.
Chapter Seven documents the fracturing of public opinion about 
the Vietnam War, even as the public retained its distrust of antiwar 
protesters. Government attempts to harass and discredit the VVAW, 
combined with a news frame that “the war was winding down,” 
worked to diminish VVAW coverage. Chapter Eight updates readers 
on the continuing contributions of VVAW members and draws some 
conclusions about the long-term significance of the group.
Serving as background to the study, the Appendix cautiously tries 
to place the VVAW and its news coverage in the context of social 
movement theory. The chapter authors, Dr. Catherine Luther and I, 
recognize that this theory has a long history and several compet-
ing approaches that at times prove contradictory. This work may stir, 
but certainly will not settle, those differences. The historical record, 
nonetheless, should illuminate journalistic tendencies in dealing 
with a highly credible and heretical social movement. It holds value 
as a fascinating case study.
1
A Powerful Medium Meets a 
Stereotype-Shattering Source 
Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) formed shortly after an 
antiwar parade, the 1967 Spring Mobilization in New York City. Six 
Vietnam veterans found themselves marching together in the throng 
of a hundred thousand (Kendrick 1974). A contingent of about two 
thousand people among that throng represented a group called Vet-
erans for Peace. One of the marchers, Jan Barry, accepted the help of 
Veterans for Peace, even though he realized that many in the group 
were not veterans and that the organizational structure was weak. 
He and five other antiwar Vietnam veterans met on June 1, 1967, to 
create the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (Prados 2002, 403-404).
An early VVAW banner and march. Photo courtesy VVAW.
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Other returning service men and women who were disillusioned 
with the war efforts soon joined the original six. By 1972, VVAW 
membership numbered twenty thousand (Zastrow 1984; Hunt 1999, 
143), including about twenty-five hundred soldiers overseas and still 
on active duty (Zastrow 1984; Prados 2002, 409). The membership 
had increased significantly after Playboy ran a free, full-page ad for 
the group in its February 1971 edition (Urgo et al. 1997; Lindquist 
1997).
David Cortright (1999) tallied antiwar sentiments during that 
time, using survey data in a two-volume report compiled by the Re-
search Analysis Corporation for the U.S. Army. The survey found 
that one in four enlisted men had participated in dissident activities, 
such as attending a protest or receiving an underground GI newspa-
per. One in four had engaged in equipment sabotage or insubordi-
nation. Some 47 percent of the lower-ranking enlisted soldiers had 
been involved in some act of war resistance, and 32 percent had done 
so more than once. If frequent drug use is tallied as resistance, the 
number climbs to 55 percent, an unprecedented level of soldiers opt-
ing out or protesting.
That same government report drew a distinction between dissi-
dents and disobedients. Dissidents had some college education and 
were more likely to volunteer—but some only days ahead of being 
drafted; disobedients were draftees. Dissidents followed a protest 
model. Disobedients preferred direct and personal action, such as 
going Absent Without Leave (AWOL), confronting a commander, 
or sabotaging equipment. In extreme cases of rebellion within the 
ranks “fragging” (using a fragmentation grenade, usually against an 
offending officer) could occur. By mid-1972, the total number of such 
incidents reached 551, with eighty-six soldiers dead and more than 
seven hundred injured (Cortright 1999, 228, 238, 239). 
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John Helmer (1974) conducted extensive survey research on re-
turning Vietnam veterans and reviewed surveys conducted by oth-
ers; he estimated that in 1971 roughly half of returning veterans op-
posed continuation of the war and President Nixon’s conduct of it. 
One telling moment occurred during the November 1969 Morato-
rium when District of Columbia police officer Jim Andrews was on 
duty outside the National Gallery of Art. Among protesters carrying 
nameplates of the war dead to put in a coffin at the Pentagon, a Viet-
nam veteran carried the nameplate of Andrews’ brother. The police-
man and the protester talked. The vet had been in the brother’s unit. 
Andrews was grateful. “I was all about getting out of the middle of 
someone else’s war,” he recalled. He also remembers thinking about 
the massive number of protesters: “If all these people had put on 
coats and ties, the war would have been over in 48 hours” (Andrews 
2009). Middle America didn’t see itself in the protest and had yet to 
realize the scope of war opposition among Vietnam veterans. 
GI protest, resistance, and revolt were real and became wide-
spread. The documentary Sir! No Sir! traced the growth from isolated 
incidents to a serious threat to the reliability of the army (Zeiger 2005).
CLICK TO VIEW VIDEO
Trailer for Sir! No Sir! Available as an open source movie at www.archive.org. 
From Link Media, Inc
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On March 8, 1965, the first U.S. combat troops entered Vietnam. 
Three months later, Richard R. Steinke, a Special Forces lieutenant 
who opposed the war, refused an order to go into a combat zone 
(Ostertag 2006, 123). 
In late 1965, Donald Duncan, a Green Beret who quit in revulsion 
about the war, began speaking out. His article “The Whole Thing 
Was a Lie” appeared in the February 1966 issue of Ramparts. Army 
dermatologist Dr. Howard Levy refused to train others; he cited the 
duplicity of curing minor diseases while bombing the villages of the 
same people. Three GIs at Fort Hood refused to go to Vietnam. Fed-
eral agents arrested them on their way to a press event at a church, 
but supporters read their message. Army Lieutenant Henry Howe 
carried a protest sign: “End Johnson’s Fascist Aggression in Viet-
nam.” The military men were convicted at court-martial and given 
long sentences. In 1967, Andy Stapp, when found to have antiwar 
literature in his footlocker, declined a minor charge and insisted on 
a full court-martial. The military judge was shocked to see both sol-
diers and civilians shouting antiwar slogans at those Fort Sill pro-
ceedings, likely the first antiwar demonstration on a U.S. military 
base (Zeiger 2005; Ostertag 2006, 123-126).
Inspired by the Fort Hood Three, Ronald Lockman, a black GI 
and the son of a steelworker, also refused to go to Vietnam. Captain 
Dale Noyd refused to train bomber pilots for duty over the skies of 
Vietnam (Ostertag 2006, 126). 
In July 1968, nine AWOL members of the U.S. military took 
sanctuary in a San Francisco church. One of them, Oliver Hirsch ex-
plained, “We essentially called the press and said to them, ‘We’re not 
going to Vietnam. We’re refusing orders and, in fact, we’re resigning 
from the military. Come and get us.’” The nine were sent to the Pre-
sidio stockade, and soldiers in the Bay Area responded by putting to-
gether the first antiwar protest organized by GIs and veterans. Navy 
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nurse Susan Schnall appeared in uniform and was court-martialed 
for doing so. Meanwhile, at the Presidio, tensions ran high after a 
19-year-old private was shot and killed, reportedly while trying to 
escape a work detail. Prisoners tore apart the interior of the military 
jail and, at a roll call, sat down in protest and sang “We Shall Over-
come.” Thousands of people then marched in protest in support of 
the Presidio 27. A large GI Movement had begun (Zeiger 2005).
Keith Mather, interviewed while AWOL from the U.S. Army, 
said that around that time, “A majority of the men that I met in the 
service were opposed, but didn’t know how to voice their opinion.” 
The opposition found voice in antiwar GI coffeehouses and in an 
underground antiwar GI press. Jeff Sharlet, a veteran of two tours 
in Vietnam, including time in Army intelligence during which he 
was trained in Vietnamese, edited an early underground GI paper, 
Vietnam GI. His publication began in January 1968 and specialized 
in interviews with just-released soldiers. While occasionally includ-
ing a pro-war voice or two, the paper took a largely—and proud—
antiwar stand. Dozens of Chicago volunteers got the paper into the 
hands of soldiers in Vietnam through plain envelopes and a rotat-
ing set of real and respectable return addresses such as charities and 
churches. Vietnam GI circulation peaked at 10,000; it had both “in-
country” and stateside editions.
In 1967, only three GI Press titles existed, but by 1972, the Pen-
tagon estimated the number at 245. Usually, these were base-specif-
ic papers with titles like A Four-year Bummer, Fatigue Press, Rap, 
Shakedown, The Short Times, Now Hear This! and Fed Up! (Zeiger 
2005; Ostertag 2006, 117-159). A typical GI underground newspa-
per consisted of a simple black-and-white set of pages with no ads 
but plenty of articles assailing the military and promoting GI rights. 
Cartoons showed soldiers turning their guns on war plutocrats or 
gung-ho officers. “Demand and disciplinary action ran neck and 
neck” (Peck 1985). 
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CLICK TO VIEW VIDEO
VVAW’s Barry Romo at event commemorating the 30th anniversary of the  
end of the Vietnam War. He speaks as well about the GI Press.  
Video courtesy of VVAW.
Until 1968, the majority of U.S. newspapers accepted the validity 
of the U.S. war in Vietnam and the military’s assertions of victory; 
thus, the GI papers served as an outlet for the stories the GIs believed 
were squelched (Tischler 1992). Antiwar soldiers and GI press edi-
tors ran a big risk of reprisal. Between 1966 and 1969, the average 
sentence imposed by court-martial on GI activists for antiwar ac-
tions was five and one-quarter years at hard labor (Lewes 2003).
In those GI papers and elsewhere, the army’s own recruiting slo-
gan “Fun, Travel, Adventure” (FTA) often was modified to “Fuck The 
Army.” Actors Jane Fonda and Donald Sutherland adapted FTA for 
Free Theatre Associates, a series of off-base performances, the anti-
war counterpoint to a Bob Hope show (Zeiger 2005). Even soldiers 
not holding an antiwar attitude adopted the slogan (Hart 2001).
Cartoons, covers, and photographs from the GI Press may be 
found linked here:
http://www.sirnosir.com/archives_and_resources/galleries/gi_papers.html
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Other forms of protest also occurred. Soldiers held at Long Binh 
Jail in Vietnam were brought back under control only after a vio-
lent conflict with fellow Americans. African American troops at Fort 
Hood met to discuss whether they should accept riot-control duty at 
the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago. Military police, some 
using their bayonets, beat up some of the meeting participants. The 
army, forced to purge its planned Chicago roster of “subversives,” 
deployed a contingent to Chicago, but kept them off the streets. One 
could make a case that it was no longer certain which side the GIs 
were on (Zeiger 2005). Indeed, Joe Miller (2000) claims that nearly 
five hundred VVAW members were among the protesters on the 
streets of Chicago. VVAW had been planning an orderly peace pro-
test featuring one clean-cut, antiwar vet “delegate” from each of the 
fifty states. “That action would be mooted by the police violence and 
demonstrator anarchy that subsumed protest in Chicago in 1968,” 
wrote Prados (2002, 405).
Significance of the VVAW
From the very start, VVAW and its predecessor groups recognized 
the importance of public perception, media, and visuals. In 1967, 
early member Sheldon Ramsdell told one of the founders, Jan Barry, 
“We’ve got to do media. I’ve been trained in the military and at 
Union Carbide.” Ramsdell had studied at the Carnegie Endowment, 
held a job in public relations, and also had studied photography. He 
proposed, “Let’s put it to work against this war policy” (Ramsdell 
1997a). The first media event came on November 19, 1967, when 
VVAW had pulled together enough money and signatures for a full-
page New York Times ad opposing the war. Immediately, the FBI, at 
the direction of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, began prob-
ing the background of anyone who signed the VVAW ad (Prados 
2002, 405).
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Despite shared FBI concerns, the VVAW also had to maintain a 
separate identity from other protest groups, and it strove to maintain 
a peaceful identity. The Madison Veterans for Peace formed in 1967. 
Regarding their own history, they wrote, “At our meetings in 1967 
and 1968, we debated what our tactics should be; some favored sup-
porting any and all efforts for peace, others counselled caution and 
the strategic use of our reputation in an effort to persuade the public 
that it was respectable to be for peace.” Not all were satisfied, but a 
majority agreed on a statement of purpose. It read:
Therefore be it resolved: That dissent having come 
to be unfairly and unfortunately confused in the 
public mind with lack of concern for democratic 
processes, lack of patriotism, lack of support for our 
fighting men, and lack of fortitude, that we, as vet-
erans who oppose the war in Vietnam, should deal 
with the situation as it is realistically, and not as it 
should be in some wholly idealistic framework. We 
see little purpose in talking solely to ourselves or to 
others who share our views; we see real potential to 
be in leading the uncommitted and confused por-
tions of the public to recognize that dissent cannot 
be categorized in this unfortunate manner. . . . We as 
veterans should take every possible advantage of the 
special consideration our society holds for those who 
have served their country in the armed forces, in or-
der to communicate our concern to the community 
at large. We see as potentially very harmful to our ac-
ceptance by the community any action which would 
associate members of Madison Veterans For Peace in 
Vietnam with other forms of protest, however righ-
teous and justified these protests may be, but which 
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have objectives other than persuasion of the public 
through education and discussion. (Madison Veter-
ans for Peace 2009)
The VVAW gathering in Detroit for “Winter Soldier” testimony 
about war crimes was one of the more peaceful outlets for soldier 
outrage against the war. Television barely covered the event, even 
though it tied in well to the simultaneous war crimes trial of Lieu-
tenant William Calley. A lot of people, including those connected 
with news organizations, did not let themselves believe that many 
of the VVAW actually were Vietnam veterans (Thorne and Butler 
1971, 10).
Given the historical significance of the VVAW, the group de-
serves a closer look at its organization and its depiction in the media. 
VVAW still exists. Ironically, as its membership has shrunk, recogni-
tion of its historical significance has grown. An early VVAW leader, 
John Kerry, became a U.S. Senator and Democratic Party presiden-
tial nominee in 2004. The book Born on the Fourth of July (1976) by 
one early and active VVAW member, Ron Kovic, became a major 
motion picture (Ho and Stone 1989). 
Former VVAW member David Cline laid out the persuasive po-
tential of antiwar veterans during the war:
The Vietnam War caused a lot of the conditions that 
were accepted generation after generation to become 
no longer what they were in the past. The veteran of 
the last war has historically been used to convince 
young people to fight in the next war. Well, Vietnam 
began to change that when the veterans came home 
and said, “Whoa, they’re lyin’ to you people.”
That played a major role in getting America to change 
its opinion against the war. It’s easy to dismiss college 
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students or intellectuals. For middle America, if the 
blacks, or the hippies, or the Chicanos don’t like it, 
who cares, but when the guy [who] came home was 
like your own son and daughter, it had an impact. 
(2007, 131-132)
Charles DeBenedetti (1990, 310), reflecting on the day VVAW 
members threw away medals, said, “The VVAW protest carried the 
weight of tested patriotism, seeming to arise from the Vietnam con-
flict itself. It conveyed no ideology except love of country. It did not 
represent a political demand so much as it expressed disillusionment 
and the anguish of anger turned inward: [from a popular Walt Kelly 
cartoon, “Pogo”] “. . . the enemy . . . he is us.” 
The VVAW could have served as a media gateway to understand-
ing post-Vietnam veteran adjustment issues. In December 1970, psy-
chiatrists Robert Lifton and Chaim Shatan held the first of many vet-
eran rap sessions in the New York City offices of VVAW. More than 
two hundred people attended these sessions over the next four years, 
two-thirds learning about the sessions through contact with VVAW 
(Egendorf 1975). 
Furthermore, VVAW and its many protest events could have 
provided important clues to the press for understanding the govern-
ment misdeeds collectively known as Watergate. John W. Dean III 
told the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activi-
ties that President Nixon’s paranoia about antiwar demonstrations 
was first revealed to Dean during a VVAW demonstration in the 
spring of 1971 [Dewey Canyon III]. Nixon wanted a firsthand report 
from Dean, then White House Counsel. Nixon also asked to be kept 
abreast of developments, and Dean responded by sending very fre-
quent status reports (Gold 1973, 267; Dean 1976, 42).
Watergate burglar and former CIA agent James McCord told the 
same committee that during the last two weeks of May 1972 he was 
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receiving almost daily reports from the Internal Security Division 
of the Justice Department on VVAW-McGovern links and supposed 
plans for violence at the Republican National Convention. McCord 
further testified to his belief that in the summer of 1972 Washington, 
D.C.’s Democratic National Committee offices also held VVAW of-
fices (Gold 1973, 166, 169-170, 177). McCord was caught burglarizing 
those offices in the Watergate building on July 17, 1972.
Later that summer, another connection between the Watergate 
burglars and the VVAW was revealed during the Republican Con-
vention. The Miami Police Department recruited Pablo Fernandez, 
a Cuban exile who had worked for burglar Bernard Barker, with in-
structions to infiltrate the VVAW and provoke the group to violence. 
Watergate burglars Bernard Barker and Frank Sturgis also recruited 
a freelance spy named Vincent Hannard to disrupt and discredit 
VVAW protest actions by inciting trouble or riots (Holder 1973; 
Lembcke 1998, 64-65).
The VVAW was a nearly forgotten impetus for the White House 
“plumbers.” Furthermore, the VVAW was singled out as an “enemy” 
organization by White House special counsel Charles Colson, who 
ordered an inquiry into withdrawing VVAW’s tax-exempt status 
(Facts on File 1973, 683). White House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman 
put it bluntly in an internal memo to Colson: “The President should 
know that we are continuing the effort to discredit VVAW” (Brinkley 
2004, 364).
Significance of U.S. Network Television News  
regarding Vietnam 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, CBS, NBC, and ABC evening 
newscasts were very significant within people’s lives. There was no 
internet, almost no cable TV. A typical home, even in a large market, 
may have had only five over-the-air viewing options: the big three 
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plus a public TV signal and maybe an independent station. The big 
three networks had an audience of nine of ten homes with the set on, 
and TV Guide had the largest circulation among magazines in the 
country. David Halberstam (1979, 407) pointed out that the big three 
network TV newscasts reached a combined sixty million Americans 
every night. 
The year 1963 was a key one for U.S. network television news. In 
late November that year, the nation grieved together the assassina-
tion of President John F. Kennedy, and much of that grief was shared 
through TV coverage. On September 2nd of 1963, CBS extended 
the CBS Evening News with Walter Cronkite from fifteen to thirty 
minutes a night (minus commercials, of course). NBC followed suit, 
going to a thirty-minute format a week later. The first of those ex-
tended CBS broadcasts, incidentally, included an interview segment 
with President Kennedy that included a question on the faltering 
Diem government in South Vietnam (Zaroulis and Sullivan 1984, 
52; Cronkite 1996, 244-246).
Furthermore, a 1963 Roper Poll for the first time found more peo-
ple responding “television” to its oft-asked question, “I’d like to ask 
you where you get most of your news about what’s going on in the 
world today—from the newspapers, or radio, or television, or mag-
azines, or talking to people, or where?” (Mayer 1993; Roper 2009) 
One could quibble that the wording emphasis on “today” and “the 
world” (as opposed, for instance, to the county courthouse) tilts in 
television’s favor. Since that time, we have learned that when people 
say “TV” that does not necessarily mean a local or network news-
cast; it could mean anything from sports programs to chat shows 
to comic monologues. Certainly, it’s also possible that “television” is 
the default answer for those who don’t have a regular source of news 
information.
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Nevertheless, it’s clear that during the time period under study—
the growth of antiwar veteran protest in late 1960s through the fall of 
Saigon at the end of April 1975—TV newscasts were a very important 
source of news information, a touchstone for a shared understand-
ing of what was happening. All the key players knew the stakes. An-
tiwar demonstrators at the 1968 Democratic National Convention 
shouted, often while being pummeled by police, “The whole world 
is watching.” 
       
                         
                         
                        CLICK TO LISTEN
Pacifica Radio’s coverage of the 1968 Democratic 
National Convention in Chicago. Reported by Steve 
Bookshester and Dale Minor, interviews by Julius 
Lester. Features Julius Lester’s interviews with Black 
delegates on the confusion and corruption of the pro-
cess, as well as his reports on the clash between police 
and demonstrators. Includes reports by Elsa Knight 
Thompson about the demonstrations, and Alan Gins-
berg’s address to demonstrators and the Chicago po-
lice. BROADCAST: KPFK, 28 Aug. 1968. (60 min.) 
Courtesy of Pacifica Radio Archives.
Audio coverage of the convention and demonstrations. 
Courtesy of Pacifica Radio Archives (Creative Commons).
F o U N D ,  F e A T U r e D ,  T H e N  F o r g o T T e N
18
                           
                           CLICK TO LISTEN
A Night in Chicago, reported by Dale Minor, Phil 
Watson, and Bob Fass. Produced by Elsa Knight 
Thompson. Documentary report on the demon-
strations at the 1968 Democratic National Con-
vention in Chicago. Includes comments of Bobby 
Seale, Black Panther Party co-founder outside 
the Convention Center at a Black Panther rally; 
Dick Gregory at President Lyndon Johnson's 
“birthday” party; and reports from Allen Ginsberg 
and Studs Terkel about police brutality at a reli-
gious prayer vigil. RECORDED: Chicago, 27 Aug. 
1968. BROADCAST: KPFA, 19 Dec. 1968. (60 min.)  
BB2159. Courtesy of Pacifica Radio Archives.
             
                           CLICK TO LISTEN
Interview of Dr. Quentin Young by Elsa Knight 
Thompson, about Young’s voluntary medical team 
who treated injuries during the 1968 Democratic 
National Convention in Chicago. (50 min.) BB2160. 
Courtesy of Pacifica Radio Archives.
Politicians certainly knew the importance of television through 
events such as Richard Nixon’s Checkers Speech, the Kennedy-Nixon 
Debates, and the LBJ “daisy” commercial. The network TV reporters, 
many of them first- or second-generation “Murrow Boys,” absorbed 
from Edward R. Murrow strong standards of accuracy, ethics, chal-
lenging authority, and seriousness of purpose.
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Network television’s Vietnam documentaries, of course, were 
important. Charles Collingwood, on March 8, 1965, presented an 
overview of the conflict and featured opposing views from Senators 
Gale McGee and George McGovern. Michael Murray (1994, 115) re-
ports the documentary has been credited “for legitimizing dissent 
on the issue of American involvement and providing an alternative 
view on official Vietnam policy, but from within the government.” 
Four months later, CBS presented a dialogue on Vietnam in which 
McGeorge Bundy presented the Johnson Administration view and 
a panel of professors led by Columbia’s Zbigniew Brezinski repre-
sented the opposition. This debate was followed by four Vietnam 
Perspective documentaries, the first three on State Department and 
Pentagon perspectives and the last on a day in the life of soldiers in 
the field (M. Murray 1994, 115).
The Vietnam Perspective piece on the air war drew the ire of 
Michael Arlen (1969, 45-50). He accused CBS of a “fundamentally 
chicken” piece of journalism that uncritically presented the military 
view for roughly fifty-eight minutes, before giving passing mention 
of serious reasons for doubting the effectiveness. Arlen (1969, 61-65) 
had kind words for the gritty reality of the CBS hour-long special 
Morley Safer’s Vietnam. He also praised John Laurence, then a 27-
year old gung-ho radio reporter pressed into telling the TV story 
of Vietnam. His growing skepticism of the war and growing em-
pathy for the “grunts” (Arlen 1969, 86-102) later came through in 
his Emmy-winning World of Charlie Company. That documentary’s 
story concerned a GI revolt because a “troops first” captain had been 
replaced with a “by-the-book lifer” who immediately ignored the life 
Lyndon B. Johnson’s “daisy” commercial is avail-
able on the Museum of Moving Image’s, Living 
Room Candidate website at  
http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1964.
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lessons of his predecessor (M. Murray 1994, 117). The troops were or-
dered to go down a road. The soldiers knew they should avoid trails, 
much less roads, because of snipers and ambushes (Laurence 2002). 
The parallel to the national road taken in Vietnam is unspoken but 
clear, and the similarities to the plot of Platoon are eerie.
Documentaries offered something rare in the overall television 
coverage—context. Hoskins (2004) lamented that the individual 
mini-dramas, such as air raids and attacks on ammunition dumps, 
gave an illusion of military progress that may well have been out-of-
sync with the reality of the wider war.
The interactions between government officials and network TV 
news leaders reflected a mutual understanding of the significance of 
the form, especially regarding nightly newscast words about and im-
ages of Vietnam. One of those shocking visual moments happened 
in August 1965, when CBS reporter Morley Safer and his cameraman 
encountered American Marines on patrol in the Vietnamese village 
Cam Ne. One Marine put his cigarette lighter to the dry thatch of a 
roof, catching the home and the village on fire, as the Vietnamese 
fled. In a voice-over, Safer says, “This is what the war in Vietnam is 
all about.”
CLICK TO VIEW VIDEO
Morley Safer, interview by Dr. Ralph Engelman, Archive of American Television, 
October 26 and November 13, 2000. Excerpt courtesy of Archive of American 
Television. http://emmytvlegends.org/
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CLICK TO VIEW VIDEO
Morley Safer, interview by Dr. Ralph Engelman, Archive of American Television, 
October 26 and November 13, 2000. Excerpt courtesy of Archive of American 
Television. http://emmytvlegends.org/
Walter Cronkite and his producer viewed the footage, were 
shocked, and agonized for hours about whether to use it. They chose 
to air it, and the backlash arose almost immediately. Phone calls and 
telegrams denounced CBS News and Safer. Outraged writers claimed 
that our Marines never would do that, therefore the footage had to be 
faked (Schoenbrun 1989; Gates 1978). As Gary Paul Gates wrote, “In 
1965, the prevailing image of the American fighting man was still 
an idealized one. After all, these young Marines in Vietnam were 
the sons of the GIs who had passed out candy bars to street urchins 
in Europe, and the grandsons of doughboys who marched off to the 
trenches merrily singing ‘Over There.’ Most Americans had not yet 
lost their innocence about Vietnam” (1978, 161).
Official reaction also came swiftly. A Defense Department official 
stopped just short of accusing CBS News of treason. President Lyn-
don Johnson awakened CBS President Frank Stanton with a phone 
call, yelling, “Yesterday your boys shat on the American flag.” CBS 
and its news division stood firm (Schoenbrun 1989; Gates 1978).
Another major early clash came out of the normally sedate 1966 
Fulbright hearings on Vietnam. Early war opponent Senator Wayne 
Morse was questioning General Maxwell Taylor: 
F o U N D ,  F e A T U r e D ,  T H e N  F o r g o T T e N
22
MORSE:  You know we are engaged in historic de-
bate in this country, where there are honest differ-
ences of opinion. I happen to hold the point of view 
that it isn’t going to be too long before the American 
people as a people will repudiate our war in South-
east Asia.
TAYLOR: That, of course, is good news to Hanoi, 
Senator. 
MORSE:  I know that that is the smear that you mili-
tarists give to those of us who have honest differ-
ences of opinion with you, but I don’t intend to get 
down in the gutter with you and engage in that kind 
of debate, General…. If the people decide that this 
war should be stopped in Southeast Asia, are you 
going to take the position that is weakness on the 
home front in a democracy?
TAYLOR:  I would feel that our people were badly 
misguided and did not understand the consequences 
of such a disaster. (Zaroulis and Sullivan 1984, 72)
Taylor’s equating dissent with disloyalty was a tactic that anti-
war protesters encountered frequently. Thus, war images on TV and 
the firsthand experiences of antiwar veterans proved critical for per-
suasion regarding the folly of the war. The Fulbright Hearings took 
one casualty at CBS News. Fred Friendly, former Murrow producer, 
stepped down from leading the news division after the company re-
fused to pre-empt mid-day sitcom reruns to continue to carry the 
hearings live (Friendly 1967).
At NBC and ABC the stunning war moment came during the 
1968 North Vietnamese and Vietcong Tet Offensive. Both networks 
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carried video of South Vietnamese marines taking a prisoner to 
General Nguyen Ngoc Loan. NBC cameraman Vo Suu kept filming 
as General Loan shot the prisoner in the head. The network showed 
the shooting to twenty million viewers. ABC missed that moment, 
but substituted a still photo. That still from Associated Press’s Eddie 
Adams appeared on the front pages of many newspapers and won a 
Pulitzer Prize (Pach 1998; Frank 1991).
Tet also prompted a Vietnam visit by Walter Cronkite, a trusted 
and popular newsman well regarded in American living rooms. His 
half-hour special on February 27th concluded with the commentary: 
“But it is increasingly clear to this reporter that the only rational 
way out then will be to negotiate, not as victors but as an honor-
able people who lived up to their pledge to defend democracy, and 
did the best they could” (Zaroulis and Sullivan 1984, 152). Cronkite 
was surprised to receive no White House feedback. He later learned 
that President Johnson, after watching the broadcast, turned off the 
television set. Presidential press aide Bill Moyers quoted Johnson as 
saying, “If I’ve lost Cronkite, I’ve lost middle America.” Five weeks 
later Johnson announced he would not seek re-election (Cronkite 
1996,  258). David Halberstam called it “the first time in American 
history a war had been declared over by an anchorman” (Halberstam 
1979, 514).
Peter Braestrup (1983, 491-505) pointed out that before the Tet 
Offensive overt hawks were rare, except at Time magazine, and that 
overt doves also were rare, except at the New York Times. The bulk 
of editorial reaction reflected impatience at the war’s length and 
concern about its horrors. Tet heightened both. Cronkite, in his ra-
dio commentary, asked pointed questions about whether President 
Johnson had become a prisoner of his own policies. Eric Severeid, in 
his television commentary, dismissed popular support for the war in 
light of what was being learned. On March 10th, NBC ran a special 
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in which Frank McGee methodically challenged the administration’s 
war claims. On the other hand, NBC’s Chet Huntley, on radio, relied 
on captured documents to claim that military results would force the 
enemy to the bargaining table. 
ABC Anchor Howard K. Smith remained a hawk, advocating es-
calation on a massive scale. Time’s views never faltered, and became 
so strong that the magazine routinely attacked antiwar reporters in 
its “Press” column (Halberstam 2003, 123).  
Certainly, much attention has been paid to the Cronkite conclu-
sion, the Cam Ne village burning, and the prisoner shooting. One 
could add the 1972 footage of an errant napalm strike in which South 
Vietnamese pilots mistook their own civilians for North Vietnamese 
troops. Yet, we must remember that these events were atypical of the 
coverage. As Daniel Hallin (2009) pointed out, “Blood and gore rare-
ly were shown. A bit less than a quarter of film reports from Vietnam 
showed images of the dead or wounded, most of these fleeting and 
not particularly graphic.” He also noted that most early coverage was 
upbeat, beginning with a battlefield map update based mostly on the 
dubious claims of the daily press briefing. “These reports had a World 
War II feel to them—journalists no less than generals are prone to 
‘fighting the last war’—with fronts and ‘big victories’ and a strong 
sense of progress and energy.” Michael Arlen (1969, 105) argued that 
one might expect this situation when reporters are on a six-month 
rotation, don’t speak Vietnamese, and must chase whatever “fire en-
gine” story the New York editors and producers are pushing. Pre-Tet, 
few reporters questioned the war beyond quibbling over tactics; post-
Tet, reporters who questioned the war still had to battle the usually 
hawkish editors back home (Moorcraft and Taylor 2008, 85).
Bob Schieffer (2004) reexamined the CBS program Face the Na-
tion and discovered that half of its programs in 1967 were devoted 
to Vietnam. What struck him was how many official and unofficial 
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pronouncements and predictions in that year, and others, proved to 
be so wrong. Although the post-Tet environment was difficult to de-
scribe as heavily “dove” or “hawk,” Americans definitely still sought 
answers in official sources. Peter Braestrup (1983, 490) tallied the 
guests on Sunday talk shows in February and March 1968. Nearly all 
of the guests were elected or appointed officials, but Braestrup found 
them evenly divided between pro- and anti-Administration. 
The Vietnam War certainly was an important topic for the net-
work newsrooms. For years, the Saigon bureau was the third largest 
of any network, eclipsed only by New York and Washington. Typically, 
five camera crews were on duty in Vietnam, and it was dangerous 
duty. Nine network personnel died in Indochina; many more were 
wounded. It took days for the film to reach the New York editors, so 
the reporters got lots of “bang-bang” footage, but also compelling 
stories of the soldiers themselves. Contrary to popular mythology, 
network TV news did not lead the way to disillusionment with the 
war. Public opinion already had turned by the time reporters began 
ignoring the claims in the “Five O’Clock Follies” press briefings. Do-
mestic protest and soldier disaffection with the futility of the war 
had the curious effect of legitimizing one another, leading reporters 
to more stories on the human cost of the war. Vietnam may have 
been, in Michael Arlen’s famous phrasing “the living room war,” but 
the pictures in that room were a lagging indicator of other factors 
happening elsewhere (Hallin 2009; Bliss 1991; M. Murray 1994). 
Johanna Neuman (1996) properly cautioned against overstating 
the role of television. Newspaper coverage played a role, but so did 
escalating U.S. casualties and President Johnson’s failure to spend 
political capital in the early selling of the war. To that list, one could 
add Life magazine. In 1969, the magazine published an issue con-
taining page after page of photos of U.S. soldiers killed in Vietnam 
in a single week (Deane 1983).  
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Amid the rising doubts after the Tet Offensive, public support for 
the war remained remarkably steady, even as job approval for Lyndon 
Johnson fell. These factors led Peter Braestrup (1983, 505) to conclude 
that no evidence exists of a direct relationship between post-Tet me-
dia themes and changes in public opinion about the war.
Attempts at historical revisionism already were underway. Gen-
eral William Westmoreland, appearing at a conference at the Univer-
sity North Carolina ten years after Tet, asserted that if it weren’t for 
television no one would have known about the war. Robert North-
shield, then at CBS, shouted in rebuttal, “Then thank God for televi-
sion!” (Lichty and Fouhy 1987). Paul Moorcraft and Philip Taylor 
(2008, 214) quite properly questioned the media “stab in the back” 
thesis. They wrote, “Few who believe that the United States lost the 
war in the living rooms of middle America seem to question how a 
democracy could wage war for another five years [post-Tet]—longer 
than U.S. involvement in World War II—with such alleged hostile 
media coverage. Nonetheless, the myth of ‘the Vietnam syndrome’ 
has informed debates about the relationship between war and the 
media ever since.” 
Morley Safer lamented that young military officers were being 
trained based on the myth that the only mistake the U.S. military 
made was in allowing press access (2003). As the nation readied for 
the Gulf War, it was taken as a given that the press would not be al-
lowed to tell an independent story for fear of what was imagined to 
have happened in Vietnam (Garfinkle 1995, 252).     
As the Vietnam War dragged on into the Nixon administra-
tion, antiwar U.S. Senators recognized the need to use television to 
rally support for their cause. On May 12, 1970, Senators Mark Hat-
field and George McGovern bought a half-hour on NBC to make 
a nationwide appeal for their amendment asserting congressional 
authority over the war-making process. Viewers were asked for 
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donations to cover the cost of the air time and promotional ads. The 
effort raised $480,000, enough to cover costs and donate $110,000 to 
charity (Zaroulis and Sullivan 1984, 331). On the other side, Presi-
dent Nixon pre-empted prime time network television seven times 
between November 1969 and April 1971 to explain and defend his 
war policies (Donovan and Scherer, 1992). At the end of that period, 
VVAW members positioned themselves on the mall outside the Cap-
itol, compelling TV coverage by the power of their message and the 
credibility of their messengers.
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Highlights
GI opposition to the Vietnam War arose early and grew rapidly, 
sometimes expressed through a vibrant underground press. In 1967, 
much of that opposition took the form of Vietnam Veterans Against 
the War (VVAW).
The VVAW quickly developed strategies of non-violence and main-
taining a separate identity from other antiwar groups. These meth-
ods fit into a media strategy that took advantage of VVAW credibil-
ity with the public on Vietnam War matters.
The VVAW could have been a gateway link to other news stories 
such as veteran adjustment problems, official suppression of antiwar 
groups, and even Watergate. News media, however, arrived rather 
late to those stories.
Network television evening newscasts were a dominant U.S. news 
source in the 1960s and 1970s. However, contrary to popular my-
thology, television news generally did not lead the way on question-
ing the war. Major questioning emerged only after the Tet Offensive 
and with validation of that criticism through official sources.
2
The Past as Prologue: Antiwar 
Coverage before the VVAW 
Since August 1968, Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee, 
has maintained a Television News Archive. Every ABC, CBS, and 
NBC nightly newscast has been videotaped and an outline prepared 
of the newscast stories and segments. The outline is not a transcript, 
and the timing is kept only in ten-second increments. The tapes 
themselves, however, are a valuable historical tool and are, by defini-
tion, a primary record of the coverage—a videotape time capsule of 
live newscasts that poured into millions of American living rooms. 
Found, Featured, then Forgotten relies on these recordings as a re-
cord of network TV newscast coverage from the fall of 1968 onward.
Link to the Vanderbilt Television News Archive,  
http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/
Sadly, records preceding August 1968 are scattered and incom-
plete, leaving researchers to piece together what they can from the 
recollections, surviving documents, comments about coverage con-
troversies, and incidental references. Certainly, network television 
news reports of the very early antiwar protests were skeptical, if not 
hostile. Peter Jennings introduced an October 27, 1965, ABC report 
with these words: “While Americans fight and die in Vietnam, there 
are those in this country who sympathize with the Viet Cong.” Of 
course, protesters could, and did, object to the war without support-
ing the enemy (Streitmatter 2008).   
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Jan Barry, a member of Vietnam Veterans Against the War, re-
calls that as early as April 1968 antiwar veterans were developing a 
sense of the power of their visual image, making a deliberate choice 
to wear dress uniforms at protests. “You can imagine the effect this 
had upon cops and lots of other people. Holy shit! These people are 
for real—a whole bunch of medals” (Barry 1997a). The use of mili-
tary dress was not entirely new. For instance, the documentary Sixth 
Side of the Pentagon (Marker 2007), shows Veterans for Peace mem-
bers in military-style caps, clean cut, some in suits, on their way to 
toss pamphlets at the feet of MPs in an October 21, 1967, clash at the 
Pentagon. 
Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan (1984) date the first antiwar 
protest regarding the U.S. and Vietnam as August 1963. In Phila-
delphia, members of the Student Peace Union marched in front of 
the federal building, carrying signs protesting U.S. foreign policy re-
garding Vietnam. In New York City, two young members of Catholic 
Workers, Thomas Cornell and Christopher Kearns, walked up and 
down in front of the Manhattan residence of Vietnam’s observer 
to the United Nations. For nine days, Kearns and Cornell walked 
alone. On the planned final day, about 250 people from other New 
York peace groups joined them. ABC filmed the protest, showing the 
demonstration on the evening news. The authors were not specific 
as to whether the film aired on the New York local newscast or the 
network program.
Arlen (1969, 6-9, 84) described and critiqued much of that early 
Vietnam War coverage. He lambasted the early war newscasts for 
“their almost unvarying implicit deference to the importance of 
purely military solutions” and an emotional, excessively simple “our 
guys versus their guys” theme. Few people questioned bombing or 
“sweep” effectiveness or body counts; few asked about civilian casu-
alties. Domestic coverage concentrated more on doubt and anxiety 
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than on protest or opposition. As Herbert Gans (1979, 58-59, 280) 
pointed out, antiwar protest was treated in the news as a social dis-
order question. It was a national story because of the public institu-
tion it targeted, but it would take an establishment source to lead 
the networks to broader antiwar questions. NBC’s Sander Vanocur 
summarized the congressional mood at the end of 1965: “There is a 
kind of bipartisan uneasiness over the war in Vietnam, and it is per-
haps more pronounced among Democrats than among Republicans. 
At the same time there is no war fever of jingoism. Congress regards 
the war in Vietnam as unpleasant but perhaps necessary, and it sees 
no honorable way out that is going to be quick and easy” (Hill 1967).
Though President Johnson frequently and loudly condemned 
news coverage of Vietnam, only rarely did network reports question 
his decision to fight. Most stories emphasized the scale and sophisti-
cation of American military technology. Johnson and his Secretaries 
of State and Defense were virtually guaranteed a minute or two on 
all network newscasts every time they gave a press conference or ma-
jor speech. ABC commentator Howard K. Smith, who later became 
an anchorman, defended the war policies in college speeches and in 
a July 1966 broadcast, concluding, “It is entirely good what we’re do-
ing” (Pach 2002).
The executive producer of NBC’s Huntley-Brinkley Report, 
Robert Northshield, did not like reporters using the construction 
“our” soldiers, ships, or planes; but reporters and even anchors rou-
tinely used it. Anchor Chet Huntley objected to his reputation as 
a hawk, but he did insist, in 1966, that “there is no alternative in 
Vietnam to fighting it out.” Anchor David Brinkley insisted that he 
despised the war and regularly said so, but little that he said in 1965 
or 1966 would lead one to that conclusion. CBS anchorman Walter 
Cronkite went to Vietnam in the summer of 1965 and told military 
briefers he “was impressed with our effort” and embarrassed by the 
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“rude challenges” of “younger reporters” covering military briefings 
(Pach 2002).
From 1965 through 1967, public opinion began to turn against 
the war, while most TV news reporting still favored administration 
policies. By 1968, however, antiwar protest became simply too big to 
ignore. Between January and June of that year, at least 221 demon-
strations occurred at 110 colleges, and a total of 3,463 separate acts 
of campus protest took place. Ten campuses were firebombed. A mil-
lion students boycotted classes on April 26th. The next day, a hun-
dred thousand people marched in New York City (J. K. Davis 1997). 
Perhaps the mistake of viewing television as a leading, rather than 
trailing, factor is influenced by memory of the power of the images 
themselves (Hallin 1986, 163). And not all images were used. CBS 
had footage of GIs cutting off the ears of a dead Viet Cong soldier, 
but showed footage that did not include the mutilation. NBC told 
the story of a Marine colonel with a shattered leg without showing 
his wound or surgery. But some of the images the networks chose to 
show are indeed haunting. CBS carried a story in September 1965 
about Vietnamese civilians scavenging in a garbage dump contain-
ing live ammunition. Two months later, CBS showed a tearful widow 
at Fort Benning, Georgia, holding her baby and reading a letter from 
her fallen husband. ABC’s Ed Needham wrapped up a report on a 
heavy-casualty battle with the image of a helmet on the ground with 
a hole ripped through it. “It hardly seems worth it,” he said (Pach 
2002).  
Television news film, of course, was a technological cousin to 
its predecessor, newsreels. The rapid growth of antiwar protests in 
1967 coincided with the last year of Universal Newsreels (1929-1967). 
Newsreels were very different forms compared to television news re-
ports. Movie production houses created newsreels for showing in 
theatres. No reporter was seen, just images of the serious, shocking, 
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and silly accompanied by the voice-over announcer and a musical 
score. Three surviving newsreels from that year foreshadow some of 
the coverage problems later faced by antiwar protesters in general 
and VVAW in particular.
An April 18, 1967, newsreel had the full-screen title “Peace March.” 
Following a crescendo of ominous music, announcer Ed Herlihy tells 
of a hundred twenty-five thousand people marching from New York’s 
Central Park to the United Nations. He describes them as “students, 
housewives, beatnik poets, doctors, businessmen, teachers, priests, 
and nuns.” Providing pictures to match, he proclaims, “Makeup and 
costumes were bizarre.” The newsreel shows demonstrators burning 
draft cards, and the narration tries to minimize the impact by first 
saying that demonstrators claimed [vocal emphasis on “claimed”] 
that two hundred cards were burned but that no accurate count 
could be determined and that “reporters and onlookers were jostled 
away on purpose.” 
The narrator admits the event was mostly peaceful, but then says, 
“Shouted confrontations were frequent and fiery,” as the film shows 
a U.S. Army logo on a jacket and then pulls out to show a clean-cut 
young man yelling at a hooded demonstrator. Following brief footage 
of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. walking to the U.N. to protest the war, 
the newsreel shifts to fifty thousand “pacifists and hippies together” 
in a San Francisco protest. Protesters carry the blame as the narrator 
states, “Antiwar songs and speeches trigger a short scuffle between 
pro and con factions.” The event is described as “sponsored by a loose 
coalition of left-wing pacifist and moderate antiwar groups.”
The story ends with the official line and implicit threat: “Presi-
dent Johnson meanwhile let it be known that FBI is closely watching 
all antiwar activity.” The newsreel then transitions to antiwar pro-
tests in Rome where the announcer lapses into casual, almost gleeful, 
chatter as he describes police and firemen turning hoses on sit-down 
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protesters. “The solution H-Two-O applied freely under high pres-
sure. . . . The strong water jets bowled over demonstrators one after 
another. They dried out in the pokey.”
CLICK TO VIEW VIDEO
“Peace March: Thousands Oppose Vietnam War” by Universal Newsreel, voiced 
by Ed Herlihy, April 18, 1967, Public Domain (Creative Commons)
A May 5th Universal Newsreel entitled “Protests Galore!” starts 
in London with footage of police and crowd pushing one another as 
the announcer states that four thousand Londoners “were decrying 
British support for U.S. action [note that the word “war” is not used] 
in Vietnam.” The announcer admits to only a “few minor scuffles, 
but no arrests” and states that the demonstrators were stopped [by 
whom not stated] from approaching Prime Minister Wilson’s Down-
ing Street home. The newsreel makes no mention that the home is the 
official residence of all prime ministers, likening the event to White 
House protests. That segment concludes with news that “mimics of 
Queen Elizabeth presented mock medals, and said the war was a 
wicked obscenity.”
The themes of disrespect and danger carry on when the scene 
switches to protests at Madrid University. Ed Herlihy bellows, “Post-
ers, leaflets, slogans, and student speeches all carried a virulence 
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seldom seen here before,” a statement at odds with scenes of happy, 
clapping crowds. The audio and video come back into match as the 
copy and film both address the burning of an American flag. The 
announcer wraps the segment by declaring, “Both President Johnson 
and Francisco Franco were vilified, a new low in public protest added 
strain on Spanish-American relations.” The last phrase, of course, 
is both an unsubstantiated assertion and blatant editorializing. The 
segment is accompanied by alarming horn sounds.
 The newsreel abruptly shifts to upbeat music and pictures of 
people wearing balloons and flowers. Now, viewers are in Detroit at 
a “social phenomenon sweeping the country.” The Love-In is a “close 
relative to the be-in, sort of a happy happening laced with the rites 
of spring.” The narration and video align in showing hippies, would-
be hippies, colorful scenes, high frolic, and folks dancing. The an-
nouncer notes, “Group therapy like this outdrew the Detroit Tigers 
that day. The end, man.” Any protest in this “Protests Galore!” seg-
ment was missing.
The newsreel then shifts to official aerial footage of Vietnam air 
raids. The narration states that the bombers “blasted” communi-
cation and boat repair and “annihilated” targets, and then asserts, 
“Our pilots hit only military targets.” Maintaining the illusion of a 
front and a traditional war, the newsreel states that the jets struck 
close to North Vietnamese capital Hanoi once again and that ground 
troops moved to within ten miles of the North Vietnam border. To 
drive home the Cold War connection, the newsreel closes with foot-
age of soldiers, weapons, and Soviet leaders in the annual Moscow 
May Day parade, complete with reference to speeches by Kremlin 
leaders accusing the U.S. of “criminal war in Vietnam.”  
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CLICK TO VIEW VIDEO
“Protests Galore!” by Universal Newsreel, voiced by Ed Herlihy, May 5, 1967, 
Public Domain (Creative Commons)
The October 24th, 1967, newsreel, “Antiwar Demonstrators Storm 
Pentagon,” starts with ominous music. Protesters carry a “Support 
Our Troops . . . Bring Them Home” banner, but the camera only 
shows “Support Our Troops . . . Bring.” The narrator mentions scuf-
fles and calls the organization a “loose confederation of some 150 
groups” that “included adults, students, even children.” Subtle status-
quo shading can be found in both film and narration. The stand-off 
at the Pentagon is described as a “test of strength,” an odd phrasing 
when one side is armed. Military police “contain” the crowd, and the 
MP perimeter is described as a “protective line.” In the subsequent 
clashes, the narrator intones, “Two soldiers are injured [no mention 
of injured protesters] and tear gas is used” [passive voice hiding the 
military as the actor using the tear gas].
Newsreel coverage of the second day begins with a crowd kicking 
around garbage that looks like books or pamphlets and with a camp-
fire. The narrator notes that the fires are to hold off the autumn chill, 
while the footage shows a smaller crowd, focusing on a bearded pro-
tester and a clean-cut MP. As the music changes to an upbeat swell, 
the narrator talks about nationwide demonstrations supporting GIs 
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in Vietnam taking place the same weekend. Abandoning any pre-
tense of objectivity, Ed Herlihy concludes, “The two-day protest ends 
with over six hundred arrested and the widespread opinion that the 
demonstration made everyone a loser.”
CLICK TO VIEW VIDEO
“Anti-War Demonstrators Storm Pentagon” by Universal Newsreels,  
voiced by Ed Herlihy, Oct. 24, 1967, Public Domain  
(Creative Commons)
British Pathé  newsreels of the Pentagon protests, unfortunately 
retained as silent footage, present two of the same protest days with 
some intriguing differences. The British film of the October 1967 
protests uses more extreme long shots showing the large size of the 
gathering in front of the Lincoln Memorial. Like the U.S. newsreel, 
Pathé  71984 shows minor scuffles and arrests. Unlike the American 
counterpart, the British film shows the entire banner “Support Our 
G.I.s . . . Bring Them Home.” The British newsreel also notes that 
“[A]t the same time a peaceful anti-Vietnam demonstration [is] tak-
ing place in San Francisco. Ex-army organizations take part along 
with ordinary public.” The video appears to be standard parade-for-
mation of American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars members 
and their flags, and may actually be a pro-war parade.
Link to British Pathé : http://www.britishpathe.com/ 
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The British Archive erred in its listing regarding the April 1967 
protests, mistakenly listing them as 1966. Once again the British 
used wider shots than Universal Newsreel had done to show the 
large crowds. Universal only showed Dr. Martin Luther King walk-
ing toward the U.N., while Pathé  83341 showed him speaking to 
microphones and cameras. The first moments of the newsreel, how-
ever, give a lot of time to the counter-demonstrators, their placards 
visible in medium shots and close-ups. One demonstrator calls the 
protesters cowards. Another proclaims, “Victory, Bomb Hanoi,” and 
another echoes “End Hanoi Sanctuary.” Some antiwar signs are seen 
in long shots, only one quick medium shot shows an antiwar sign, 
which reads: “Vietnam for Vietnamese. Let’s Get Out.” Later, the 
Pathé  film does show large numbers of people marching, and view-
ers see additional placards in the San Francisco march. That footage 
also shows the large Kezar Stadium crowd, but a “Support Our Men 
in Vietnam” banner is center screen.
British Pathé  Newsreels also had footage and sound of several 
British antiwar protests: a March 21, 1968, demonstration that ended 
in chaos and became known as the Grosvenor Square riots (45122); 
a March 28, 1968, “Mothering Sunday” march (45136); color footage 
[all other newsreel footage examined is black and white] of a July 25, 
1968, demonstration in front of the American Embassy (45365); an 
October 31, 1968, march to Downing Street (45509); an April 1969 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament march (45754). The newsreel 
archive also contains a color collection of “offcuts, selected scenes, 
out-takes, [and] rushes” from various Vietnam demonstrations 
(45366).
The Grosvenor Square narration had such strong editorializing 
that the archive added a “[c]ataloguer’s note: commentary very bi-
ased in favour of police—in contrast with the actual footage showing 
shocking examples of police brutality.” Indeed, the footage begins 
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with the most inflammatory posters: Mao, a hammer and sickle, 
and Ho Chi Minh. The film devotes attention to the presence of ac-
tress Vanessa Redgrave. Then the narrator warns about hate-makers, 
hard-core troublemakers, determined to “drag the majority of well-
intentioned demonstrators to their sickening level.” As snare drums 
increase tempo, viewers hear, in passive voice, “Riot was being in-
cited.” The footage then just offers natural sound and shows inci-
dents of tear gas, demonstrators wrestled to the ground by groups of 
police, and at least one instance of police kicking the prone demon-
strator. The narrator concludes with praise for the police restraint. 
In contrast, the “Mothering Sunday” march was presented with 
fewer machinations, though the peaceful march to the U.S. embassy 
was paired with a Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament youth anti-
war rally in Trafalgar Square. The narrator reminds viewers of the 
previous week’s violence, and as footage shows police pushing back 
against the crowd, the narrator opines, “The police had reason to 
fear another flare-up.” He concludes with the glib statement, “Lon-
don had not suffered more violence in the cause of peace.” 
The march from Trafalgar Square to the U.S. embassy on July 25, 
1968, followed a similar route and a similar pattern of newsreel cov-
erage. It begins with the narrator describing the protesters as young 
and sincere, withholding the implied and condescending term 
“naïve.” Most of the banners shown are ones with Soviet or com-
munist icons. At the embassy, the mood shifts abruptly as viewers 
are warned that there are “hawks, aggressors, troublemakers, and 
anarchists” in the crowd. Their offense appears to be stepping over 
some bushes and a small garden-style mesh fence about a foot tall. 
As police grab offenders and push them back, strong editorial narra-
tion begins: “There are those who complain that the police use un-
due violence. Others more likely compliment them on their restraint 
when faced with thugs, bullies, and flaunters of the law. How can 
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anyone ever hope to have pleas for peace seriously considered when 
their terms are so violently and wrongly presented?” The film ends 
with a musical flourish and the burning of an American flag.
The October 31, 1968, demonstration shows the large crowd as 
the narrator tells listeners what side they were on: “It was a day that 
many Londoners had dreaded for many weeks. Past experience had 
shown that bitter violence could take control.” Viewers see an Aus-
tralian flag in flames as the narrator says, “Flag burning hurts na-
tional pride, but breaks no heads.” After praising police and the ma-
jority of demonstrators, the camera follows a breakaway group that 
the narrator at various times calls “fringe fanatics,” “self-described 
Maoists,” “troublemakers,” “hooligans,” “anarchists,” and “an un-
controllable faction.” This newsreel spends 60 percent of its time on 
clashes between this group and police, the narrator boldly asserting, 
“Nobody, not even the troublemakers themselves, could condemn 
the police for standing their ground and giving as good as they got.” 
The narrator concludes that the other protesters thus “lost some of 
the sympathy and understanding they might have earned.”  
The April 1969 CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) rally 
took place on Easter weekend. The crowd at Trafalgar Square looks 
larger than the narrator-provided number of five thousand. The nar-
ration praises the march to the square as done by “orderly sober citi-
zens.” A handful of young anarchists who “tried to stir up trouble” 
were “quickly dealt with before the mass reached Trafalgar Square.” 
How? Viewers are not told. The crowd heard from the woman who 
was the North Vietnamese delegate to the Paris Peace Talks. Viewers 
see her at the microphone, but do not hear her in this newsreel. The 
crowd shots include one with a banner of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and 
Mao. 
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The newsreels provide coverage clues for all antiwar protesters, 
but they highlight news habits particularly informative for U.S. an-
tiwar veterans:
•	 Reporters will assume all veterans support the war and that 
only pro-war demonstrators “support the troops.”
•	 Negative actions by police will be lessened by blaming the 
victim or by using passive voice—no subject doing the nega-
tive action.
•	 Conflict, no matter how unrepresentative or minor, will get a 
lot of camera time.
•	 Default news themes for antiwar protests are ones of protest-
er disrespect and danger to the community.
•	 Reporters will seek out a pro-war speaker, even if only a few 
are present or if one who did not attend has to be found for a 
quote. These pro-war speakers almost invariably will equate 
war opposition with cowardice or support for an enemy.
•	 Great effort must be sustained to separate highly credible 
voices such as antiwar veterans. The news tendency will be 
simply to list participating groups.
•	 No matter how well organized the protest may be, it likely 
will be presented as a convenient, if naïve, casual assemblage 
of groups.
News coverage generally will comment often on the behavior of 
the protesters rather than on the merits of the protest’s argument. 
Thus, the news conundrum for social movements is established and 
maintained. No threat of conflict likely means little coverage, but if 
conflict occurs, the conflict gets covered instead of the group and its 
message. 
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Highlights
Since August 1968, Vanderbilt University has maintained a Televi-
sion News Archive, making it possible to search for stories by topic 
and to examine actual video of every ABC, CBS, or NBC evening 
newscast from that point forward.
Records from before August 1968 are sporadic and often anecdotal, 
but generally point to coverage relatively uncritical of Administra-
tion war policies. The dying gasps of the newsreel industry certainly 
reacted negatively to early antiwar protests.
The early coverage gives clues to the news obstacles to be faced by 
VVAW. Reporters initially tend to assume all veterans groups sup-
port the war and that only pro-war demonstrators “support the 
troops.”
Conflict, disrespect, and danger are default protest coverage themes, 
and protest generally will be treated as a confusing social disorder.
3
Documenting the Coverage 
The author conducted in-depth interviews with four leaders of the 
Vietnam Veterans Against the War and also searched for and ob-
tained poll data from the era. The key element of the research, how-
ever, was a search of the Television News Archive maintained at 
Vanderbilt University, using keywords such as “VVAW,” “Vietnam 
Veterans Against the War,” “vets,” and “antiwar veterans.” The re-
sulting stories then were copied onto videotape for review and criti-
cal analysis.
The Television News Archive has videotaped, indexed, and made 
available for scholarly use every network TV (ABC, CBS, and NBC) 
evening newscast since October 1968. Thus, the archive covers the 
time period of nearly every significant VVAW activity.
A quick summary of those activities will help the reader under-
stand what is covered and what is not:
•	 February 1970—In its first major event, VVAW held hear-
ings on American war crimes in Vietnam. Vietnam veterans 
assembled in Annapolis, Maryland, and Springfield, Massa-
chusetts, to testify to atrocities they had participated in or 
observed (Lembcke 1998, 57).
•	 August 1970—VVAW members confronted American Le-
gionnaires at that group’s national convention in Portland, 
Oregon (Thorne and Butler 1971, 8).
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•	 September 4-7, 1970—Operation RAW (Rapid American 
Withdrawal) was a four-day “military sweep” across New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania. The 100 to 150 antiwar veterans, 
outfitted in combat fatigues and carrying plastic M-16 rifles, 
staged mock combat patrols and war atrocities along the 
eighty-mile route from Morristown, New Jersey, to Valley 
Forge, Pennsylvania. The route replicated much of Washing-
ton’s retreat to Valley Forge; the vets then joined fifteen thou-
sand other antiwar demonstrators in a Labor Day rally (De-
Benedetti 1990, 293-294; Prados 2002, 407). Vietnam Veteran 
Ed Damato (2000) recalled seeing Jane Fonda on a late-night 
talk show commenting on the upcoming Valley Forge march 
by VVAW. Damato joined the march. Later, he related that 
he “began a life of fighting against the war that I thought was 
wrong. Up to this point my big antiwar statement was giving 
the finger to President Richard Nixon while he rounded 50th 
Street in his limousine” on his way to a New York City event.
•	 January 31 to February 2, 1971—Winter Soldier Investigation: 
At a Howard Johnson’s motel in Detroit, a hundred soldiers 
and sixteen civilians testified about Vietnam War crimes 
that they themselves committed or observed other U.S. sol-
diers committing. VVAW leader Bill Davis (2007) later said 
that Winter Soldier “broke open the atrocities and the level 
of genocide that was being carried out in the name of the 
American people in Vietnam. It was so effective that it is still 
being attacked to this very day by the people it diminished.” 
As Tod Ensign (1999) pointed out, the road to a successful 
investigation was not easy; competing groups had different 
ideas about how to proceed and even celebrity supporters, 
such as actors Donald Sutherland and Jane Fonda as well as 
JFK assassination lawyer Mark Lane, had to be dissuaded 
from distracting missteps. 
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The road to national coverage was even tougher. Senator Mark 
Hatfield entered the proceedings into the April 6-7, 1971, Congres-
sional Record, but news media paid little attention (Zaroulis and Sul-
livan 1984, 355; Gitlin 1987). Jan Barry spoke at Winter Soldier and 
recalled that CBS sent a camera crew but never used the material. 
A New York Times reporter was there for the whole event, but only 
one brief story appeared. On the first day of the event, the Detroit 
News challenged the vets, relaying a statement that the Pentagon 
didn’t even have any information that these people were real veter-
ans. Barry recalls that after the first day much better newspaper cov-
erage appeared in Detroit, Chicago, and the Midwest (Barry 1997b). 
The Chicago Tribune ran a seven-paragraph wire story summarizing 
some of the stated atrocities, minimized under the headline “Viet 
Nam ‘Crimes’ Told at Mock Probe” (Associated Press 1971). 
Just before Winter Soldier, the Chicago Tribune also carried, in 
its “Action Express” column (1971), responses to reader questions, 
the following inquiry: “I wonder if you could supply Jane Fonda’s 
address for me. I’m fed up with these ‘sob sisters’ and ‘do-gooders.’ I 
think it’s about time for at least one member of the silent majority—
me—to go into action!” The paper then explained its search process 
and gave 967 Emerson Street, Detroit, as the address, describing it 
as “the office of the Winter Soldier Investigation, an unofficial ‘war 
crimes trial’ being planned to condemn United States ‘war crimes’ 
in Viet Nam.” One is struck immediately with the poor judgment 
of providing to an angry person determined to “go into action” a 
street address for the focus of that rage. The column also shows how 
easily VVAW events could be commingled with disdain for support-
ers. The VVAW message could have been lost by opponents redirect-
ing the discussion to personal attacks on a controversial supporter, a 
technique honed to perfection in much of today’s talk radio.
John Zutz (2008) recalls that despite sporadic media coverage of 
the Winter Soldier testimony, soldiers in the field in Vietnam got 
F o U N D ,  F e A T U r e D ,  T H e N  F o r g o T T e N
46
enough news to know what was happening. “The Neanderthals in 
the company were beating on their chests to show how tough they 
were,” he wrote. “At the same time, a number of my buddies men-
tioned they were ashamed to be a member of the military. I believe 
they had good reason to feel that way.” Nearly three thousand GIs, 
just like John Zutz, joined VVAW in 1971 while still serving in Viet-
nam (Miller 2000).
In 1972, a documentary called Winter Soldier came out. The dra-
matic testimony was shown primarily on U.S. college campuses. 
In Europe, it became a hit, winning awards and appearing both on 
television and in theaters. The film’s director, Lucy Phenix (2009), 
declared, “We independent filmmakers were filming because we 
knew that the mainstream media would NOT cover what was go-
ing on there—which was, I think, epic and groundbreaking—young 
American soldiers willing and brave enough to tell the truth about 
a war against civilians.” The 2004 John Kerry presidential campaign 
brought renewed interest in the documentary. In Chicago, the film 
showed eight nights to packed houses at the Gene Siskel Film Center, 
followed by long question-and-answer sessions with VVAW mem-
bers (Romo 2005). 
From April 19 to 24, 1971, Dewey Canyon III, a series of VVAW 
protests in and around Washington, D.C., took place. These protests 
included flinging away medals on the steps of the Capitol, throwing 
medals over the White House fence, marching to the Pentagon, and 
attending congressional hearings. Vets roamed congressional office 
buildings to make their case. One “suit” yelled, “Get a job and make 
something of yourself” to a one-armed combat vet who proceeded 
to chase the man into the rotunda, where the coward found safety 
behind a guard (Hartford 2001; Longley 2008). Several congressmen, 
mostly without publicity, came to the veterans’ campground to listen 
to them.
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Dewey Canyon III in front of the Capitol.  
Photo courtesy of VVAW.
On April 23rd, some seven hundred vets marched from their 
mall campsite to the west side of the Capitol. Each man solemnly 
announced his name and unit, and then threw his medals over a 
makeshift fence (DeBenedetti 1990, 309-310). The vets originally had 
considered putting their medals in a body bag but—“to our everlast-
ing credit”—opted to toss the medals. This decision reflected well on 
the democratic operation and choices of the organization (Damato 
2000).
George Moss (2010, 313) and Kyle Longley (2008) relay that 
VVAW membership at the time topped twenty thousand. Some of 
the thousand to two thousand vets participating in Dewey Canyon 
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III came in wheelchairs; some were missing arms or legs. With emo-
tions that ranged from quiet weeping to angry rage, the hundreds 
of vets who tossed medals directed their actions toward a govern-
ment that would not end this war. Carl Rogers recalled, “The words 
and emotions that poured out were the most poignant and angry 
words I had ever heard in opposition to that dirty stinkin’ rotten 
little war. . . . I walked away from that moment in tears, but never 
more proud to have been part of the founding group of brothers who 
created VVAW” (Barry 2007c). These Dewey Canyon III events had 
the added topicality in that less than three weeks earlier a military 
court had sentenced Lieutenant William Calley for mass murder for 
his role in the My Lai massacre (Moss 2010, 313).
Other events followed:
•	 May 31, 1971—Four hundred Vietnam Veterans inverted the 
Paul Revere ride and trekked twenty miles from Bunker Hill 
to Boston Common for a Memorial Day rally. Later, roughly a 
hundred vets and three hundred sympathizers were arrested 
for violating curfew in Lexington by sleeping on Lexington 
Green, the largest mass arrest in state history; it appears that 
riot police detained another hundred people, but no charges 
were filed (Kaledin 1999).
•	 July 4, 1971—Five hundred VVAW and supporters marched 
in a three-mile antiwar candlelight parade in Kansas City, 
Missouri.
•	 December 24, 1971—Vets rallied at Saint Patrick’s Cathedral 
in New York City to read aloud the names of the war dead. 
VVAW members also carried out simultaneous encamp-
ments at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania; Berkeley, California; 
Killeen, Texas; and Chicago, Illinois (Prados 2002, 409). 
•	 December 26-29, 1971—Fifteen VVAW members barricaded 
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themselves inside the Statue of Liberty, leaving only after a 
U.S. district judge ordered them to open the doors. While 
that protest was underway, twenty-five protesters, mostly 
VVAW, occupied the Betsy Ross house in Philadelphia for an 
hour. Eighty-seven veterans were arrested in Washington for 
blocking the Lincoln Memorial entrance. In San Francisco, 
a group barricaded themselves inside the South Vietnamese 
consulate (DeBenedetti 1990, 322; Prados 2002, 409).
Setting out for the Statue of Liberty protest, Don Bristow-Carrico 
asked Vin Maclellan from the Boston Phoenix what media coverage 
the protesters could expect. The answer was downbeat: arrested in 
fifteen minutes and maybe page nine of the New York Times, if they 
were lucky. The protesters planned to stay in the “Lady” for only a 
few minutes. They had to fashion a statement to satisfy the press 
when they ended up staying for three days, eating food found in the 
lounge refrigerator. “A reporter from France told us that if we took 
a flag up to the head he would get it in every paper in the world. We 
put it there and he did it! He rented a helicopter and got a great shot,” 
said Bristow-Carrico. “Our lawyers told us we could stay and get ar-
rested or walk out free. They felt we had milked the press as much as 
we could and that it would end up costing a lot to defend the ‘Liberty 
Fifteen.’ We walked out to a press conference and a good meal.” The 
protesters later received Christmas cards from John and Yoko Len-
non (Bristow-Carrico 1999). The flag photo even made it to the pages 
of Stars and Stripes (Longley 2008). 
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Numerous protests took place over the next few years:
•	 April 19, 1972—VVAW members occupied the U.S. Naval 
Reserve Center in North Hollywood for seven hours. Later in 
the month, sixteen VVAW members took over the Air Force 
recruiting office in San Francisco. A crowd of two thousand 
served as a buffer between the vets and police while the vets 
A second Statue of Liberty protest with a banners displayed from the crown. 
Photo courtesy of VVAW.
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watched recruiting films. Two days later, at the Naval District 
Headquarters in San Diego, fifteen members turned them-
selves in as war criminals (Hunt 1999, 145; “We Are Every-
where” 1972, 10).
•	 April 29, 1972—Four hundred people attended a VVAW rally 
at Fort Ord, California. The vets demanded an end to intensi-
fied bombing in Vietnam (Hunt 1999, 145; “We Are Every-
where” 1972, 10).
•	 May 10, 1972—In Fresno, California, VVAW’s Gary Alexan-
der carried a flag as he led eight hundred protesters decrying 
the mining of Vietnamese harbors (Hunt 1999, 145; “We Are 
Everywhere” 1972, 10).
•	 May 11, 1972—Eight VVAW members and supporters took 
over the King County Republican Party Headquarters. They 
were charged with criminal trespass. Two days later, in Se-
attle, a thousand demonstrators marched in opposition to the 
mining of Vietnamese harbors. Earlier in the month, VVAW 
members from Western Washington State College “mined” 
Bellingham harbor with a hundred multicolored balloons 
(Hunt 1999, 145; “We Are Everywhere” 1972, 10).
•	 May 1972—Eight hundred members of the Potsdam, New 
York, chapter of VVAW led a takeover of a federal building. 
VVAW members in New England seized the captain’s quar-
ters on the USS Constitution. A VVAW blockade in Boulder, 
Colorado, led to the closing of Highway 36 for twenty-four 
hours. Police used tear gas. The Greeley, Colorado, VVAW 
held a “forced march” forty miles to Denver to participate in 
a rally. In Laramie, Wyoming, thirty-five members partici-
pated in a silent vigil (Hunt 1999, 145; “We Are Everywhere” 
1972, 10).
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•	 July 6-14, 1972—Workshops and candidate education events 
took place at the Democratic National Convention in Miami 
Beach. The non-delegates were assigned to the Par 3 Golf 
Course for accommodations; VVAW selected a portion of 
the course separate and distinct from other demonstrators 
(“Come to Miami!” 1972, 6). At the Democratic convention, 
“the veterans were lionized, afforded opportunities to make 
public statements, [and] admitted to the convention floor” 
(Prados 2002, 410).
•	 July 29-August 23, 1972—Last Patrol. A series of VVAW con-
voys converged on Miami Beach to protest at the Republican 
National Convention. The VVAW’s Bill Davis said that one 
Last Patrol event, the march to the Fountainbleu, “is con-
sidered one of the all-time famous antiwar marches” (2007). 
For that reason, a detailed account of it appears in the next 
chapter.
•	 July 1972-August 1973—The Tallahassee Six, later the Gaines-
ville Eight. Seven VVAW members and a supporter were ac-
cused of a plot to disrupt the Republican convention using 
bombs and violence. Indictments, pre-trial maneuvers, and a 
trial followed. Several embarrassing government tactics were 
revealed, not the least of which were two FBI agents found sit-
ting in a closet next to the defense attorney’s office with elec-
tronic surveillance equipment. The judge refused to dismiss 
the case, but the jury acquitted all eight accused.
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Officially, the jury took four hours, but reports indicate that ju-
rors actually needed only ninety minutes and that they spent the re-
maining time playing with a slingshot that was a prosecution exhibit 
(Shunas 2008). One juror said, “What was there to deliberate? They 
never showed us any evidence. We could have come back with a ver-
dict in 10 minutes.” Another said, “I wish I had understood all these 
things about the government 20 years earlier” (“Gainesville 8 Inno-
cent” 1973, 3). As Charles DeBenedetti (1990, 361) wrote, “This was 
the eighth major antiwar conspiracy case brought to trial and lost by 
the Justice Department’s Internal Security Division. It became in-
creasingly clear that the administration’s attack on antiwar critics 
was only part of a broader pattern of arbitrary, secretive, and illegal 
activity.” 
The Gainesville 8.  
Photo courtesy of VVAW.
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•	 January 20, 1973—VVAW joined other peace groups on a 
cold, muddy day in a giant protest of Nixon’s second inaugu-
ration (B. Davis 2007). Some demonstrators pelted the Nixon 
motorcade with tomatoes. The VVAW also chose to partici-
pate in the Nixon Administration’s “Peace with Honor” pa-
rade in New York City two months later. The selected mili-
tary in the review stands turned their backs on the protesting 
“grunts” in the streets, inadvertently but effectively assisting 
the VVAW point (Prados 2002, 411).
•	 Fourth of July weekend, 1974—Five thousand VVAW mem-
bers marched in Washington, D.C. to demand amnesty for 
war resisters (Moser 1996, 125). 
•	 Dewey Canyons IV and V were held in Washington, D. C. 
Protests in later years were designed to draw attention to in-
adequate veteran benefits and the health problems from the 
war defoliant Agent Orange (B. Davis 2007).
1981 demonstration for veteran benefits and victims of Agent Orange.  
Photo courtesy of VVAW.
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These events represent a set of antiwar veteran protests around 
which media could fashion news stories. The resulting coverage of-
fers valuable insight not only about journalistic habits but also about 
the interaction of a heretical social movement with established and 
powerful news media.
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Highlights
The VVAW began major antiwar protests in 1970, though most of 
these events received only sporadic and skeptical coverage, generally 
restricted to the local media at the protest site.
The VVAW made an important historical record of Vietnam War 
atrocities at the Winter Soldier hearings in Detroit in early 1971. A 
film documentary of the event reached European audiences, but U.S. 
coverage of Winter Soldier was minimal.
The VVAW’s greatest protest success was Dewey Canyon III, a week-
long series of events in Washington, D.C., in April 1971. Established 
sources validated coverage by their reaction to the vets.
As quickly as media attention rose during Dewey Canyon III, it fell 
off almost immediately afterwards. Some news attention came to the 
Gainesville Eight, a failed government attempt to prosecute VVAW 
members on very dubious charges.
In the mid-1970s, VVAW turned its attention to veterans issues, no-
tably Agent Orange exposure and health problems.
4
No Winter Soldiers but a Spring of 
News Discovery  
Based on the Vanderbilt Television News Archive, U.S. network TV 
newscasts did forty-four stories involving Vietnam Veterans Against 
the War or other antiwar veterans during the period of the war. 
Notably, however, twenty-six of the forty-four stories occurred in 
April 1971, when antiwar veterans went to Washington, D.C. and 
tied themselves to traditional news sources (Congress, Pentagon, Su-
preme Court) within shouting distance of the network Washington 
bureaus. The protest title “Dewey Canyon III” was designed to draw 
attention to not-so-secret U.S. and South Vietnamese military inva-
sions of Laos, Dewey Canyons I and II (B. Davis 1996). 
Network TV newsrooms, of course, get some story ideas and seek 
validation of their own news judgment in what is covered by the New 
York Times. Jerry Lembcke (1998, 106) pointed out that in February 
1971 that paper ignored the Winter Soldier event and turned down 
an op-ed piece on post-Vietnam health syndromes. Events of March 
29th, however, drew media attention. Lt. William Calley was con-
victed for the premeditated murder of civilians at My Lai. Veterans, 
atrocities, and reconsidering Vietnam then became acceptable, but 
still faced push back. When CBS’s Mike Wallace interviewed one 
of the U.S. soldiers who participated in the My Lai massacre, one 
viewer accused him of “pimping for the protesters” (Zaroulis and 
Sullivan 1984, 350). 
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Much like the New York Times, network TV news ignored Winter 
Soldier but covered many of the Dewey Canyon events of April 19-24, 
1971. The networks generally did not pick up on clues in the name or 
even use the name Dewey Canyon. NBC Nightly News, however, on 
Sunday April 18th, did an “advancer” story on the upcoming VVAW 
protests. Vet Brownie Carlson talked about how the U.S. really was 
taking Vietnam from the Vietnamese. Veteran Robert Bilger showed 
ears cut from dead enemy soldiers and talked about that policy. Re-
porter Ron Nessen closed by asserting that the VVAW represented a 
small percentage of those in Vietnam but that the group knew what 
they were demonstrating against. The same day, in the third news 
block, CBS ran a pair of advancer stories. Tony Sargent reported that 
a thousand veterans were expected and that they might give their 
medals back to the government. John Kerry spoke about the cred-
ibility of veterans. Reporter Bruce Morton covered the Concerned 
Officers Movement, one that included active duty officers opposed 
to the war. Three officers who were quoted stressed their effort to 
work within the system. They also noted that high-ranking officers 
could say whatever they pleased but that lower-ranking officers got 
harassed for antiwar dissent. 
On the first day of Dewy Canyon III, more than a thousand veter-
ans marched to the gates of Arlington National Cemetery. The moth-
ers of GIs killed in Vietnam, Gold Star Mothers, were not allowed to 
place wreaths on soldier graves. The Reverend Jackson Day, who had 
resigned just days earlier as a military chaplain, led a brief ceremony 
for the war dead on all sides. The ceremony took place on a small 
plot of grass outside the cemetery and beneath John F. Kennedy’s 
grave and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. The Gold Star Moth-
ers laid two wreaths at the gate. Some vets tried to scale the gate, but 
others pulled them down and cautioned patience; a lot of protest lay 
ahead. The march re-formed, went to Congress, heard from three 
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congressmen, and then VVAW member Jan Crumb presented a se-
ries of sixteen demands to Congress. A three-judge panel rejected a 
government request to bar the vets from camping on the Mall (Hart-
ford 2001; Thorne and Butler 1971, 26-27). 
All three networks did reporter packages (field reports), and the 
antiwar events became the lead story on the CBS Evening News. Ger-
ald Nicosia (2001, 116) described the story as a short but sympathetic 
piece by Walter Cronkite, an anchor who spoke as something of a 
national conscience. 
The CBS field report from Bruce Morton included a sound bite 
from John Kerry, characterizing as disgraceful the failure to allow 
the grieving at Arlington. The anchor tag to the report was a claim 
by Pennsylvania’s U.S. Senator Hugh Scott that the demonstrators 
were only a fraction of a percent of the total Vietnam Veterans. NBC 
and ABC both placed the story in the second news block and relayed 
congressional sound bites about the events. ABC used Congressman 
Paul McCloskey. NBC used McCloskey and Bella Abzug. The NBC 
report was preceded by a troop withdrawals package, citing how 
such withdrawals depressed business for the Vietnam hotels, bars, 
and bar girls. A trailing copy story relayed charges of rampant South 
Vietnamese corruption and GI heroin use. 
The second day, Tuesday April 20th, featured guerilla theater, 
mock search-and-destroy missions on the steps of the Capitol. Sin-
gle-file, the vets crossed the Lincoln Memorial Bridge and returned 
to Arlington. This time, after some initial reluctance from the cem-
etery superintendent, they were allowed to conduct a memorial 
service. Some two hundred vets attended Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee hearings on antiwar bills. Senators Claiborne Pell and 
Phillip Hart held a fundraising party for the veterans. During the 
party, the vets got word that Chief Justice Warren Burger had lift-
ed the Court of Appeals injunction. The veterans now supposedly 
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had until 4:30 p.m. the following day to leave the camp (Thorne and 
Butler 1971, 27-28).
  All three networks did packages. None were lead stories. CBS 
quoted Senator George McGovern praising the antiwar veterans. 
Veteran Gordon Gillies said that anyone who served in Vietnam 
really was a casualty. Arlington Cemetery Superintendent, John 
Metzler, claimed the previous day’s refusal had been a misunder-
standing. The anchor tag relayed that there had been 209 “fragging” 
incidents in the last year, according to Senator Mike Mansfield. ABC 
also quoted McGovern at the hearings, but showed a bit of the mock 
search-and-destroy missions and mentioned the return to Arling-
ton for a memorial service. NBC reporter Paul Duke stuck to cover-
ing the hearings, using clips from antiwar Senators Jacob Javits and 
Mark Hatfield.
On day three, Wednesday April 21st, some seventy-five vets 
marched to the Pentagon to turn themselves in for war crimes, tying 
themselves to the Calley story. A California VVAW member, Sam 
Schorr, was one of three members who, accompanied by the press, 
were allowed into the building. Daniel “Chappie” James, the first 
black general, met them. 
Schorr recalls that the conversation went as follows:
JAMES:  What do you want?
VETS:  We want to turn ourselves in. We’re war 
criminals.
JAMES:  We don’t accept war criminals here. That’s 
a police matter.
SCHORR:  What do you mean? You’ve got Calley 
in jail.
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JAMES:  Let’s go to my office.
[They go down the hallway.]
PRESS MEMBERS:  Keep working him! Keep work-
ing him!
JAMES:  Well, we can’t accept you as war criminals.
SCHORR:  Who can accept us?
JAMES:  If you really think you’ve committed a 
crime, you should turn yourselves in to the police.
SCHORR:  Do you have any representatives of the 
Hague Court here? Maybe an international court 
will accept us.
JAMES:  We don’t commit war crimes.
SCHORR:  Well, you better let Calley go then.
JAMES:  We can’t do that because he’s under mili-
tary criminal law.
SCHORR:  You’re just full of shit, you know that? 
We’re getting out of here. (Nicosia 2001, 127)
 
  Backlash quotes began to emerge at this point. An unidentified 
woman in ABC’s lead story whined that the vets should get jobs and 
go to work. An argument between an unidentified vet and General 
James played out on ABC. CBS used General James to reply to an un-
identified vet’s claim that the war was racist and imperialistic. CBS 
and ABC each did an impressive trio of lead story reporter packages, 
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totaling about five and a half minutes on each network. Also, CBS 
and ABC both concluded with commentaries, by Eric Severeid and 
Howard K. Smith respectively. NBC gave significantly less atten-
tion—one story on the congressional hearings, more than eleven 
minutes into the newscast, and after two commercial breaks.
CBS and ABC also led with the newest angle on the story—the 
Supreme Court. Congress had validated VVAW coverage in the first 
two days, including visits by some members (Edward Kennedy, Ron 
Dellums, Shirley Chisholm, and others) to stay with their local vets 
(Romo 2000).  By day three, however, the Supreme Court inadver-
tently had validated further coverage.
Thursday’s coverage is best understood after something of a judi-
cial backtrack. Late in the day on Tuesday April 20th, Chief Justice 
Warren Burger, on his own, had heard an emergency petition from 
the Justice Department. The government wanted to reinstate a lower 
court order to evict the vets. The Solicitor General argued that the 
protesters had a stated intent of shutting down the government. For-
mer Attorney General Ramsey Clark appeared for the vets; he argued 
that the government had no business anticipating unlawful conduct 
(Woodward and Armstrong 1979, 133-134). Burger sided with the 
government but delayed his order until the next day. On Wednesday, 
the following day, the full court heard the matter again. Court po-
lice arrested a dozen vets who had delivered a letter to Burger. The 
other justices reluctantly chose not to embarrass the Chief Justice by 
overruling him. The order was signed by 5 p.m. The vets voted 480 
to 400 to stay on the Mall, but the administration, after using over-
stated claims to force a dubious precedent, backed down on evicting 
the vets (Woodward and Armstrong 1979, 134-135). The Washington 
Star headlined the clash “Vets Overrule Supreme Court” (Halstead 
1978, 606).
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Vets camped near the Capitol for Dewey Canyon III.
Photo courtesy of VVAW.
The next morning, Thursday, April 22nd, vets once again ap-
peared on the Supreme Court steps to demand that the Court rule 
on the constitutionality of the war. The vets sang “God Bless Ameri-
ca,” recited the Pledge of Allegiance, and waved American flags and 
toy M-16s. Chief Justice Warren Burger ordered the Marshal of the 
Court to clear the steps, even though the vets maintained a corridor 
on the steps. For the first time on a day the court was open, the thir-
teen massive bronze doors slammed shut. As D.C. riot police moved 
to arrest the vets, they turned and waved to former Chief Justice 
Earl Warren as he watched from his office window (Woodward and 
Armstrong 1979, 135). A total of 108 vets were arrested and charged 
with disturbing the peace and were led off with their hands clasped 
behind their heads. That evening, VVAW members conducted a can-
dlelight march around the White House, carrying an upside-down 
American flag as a sign of distress (Thorne and Butler 1971, 30).
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The big event that day, however, occurred when John Kerry gave 
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Kerry’s 
remarks are best remembered for his phrase “How do you ask a man 
to be the last man to die for a mistake?” His closing words, however, 
were just as dramatic:
Finally, this Administration has done us the ulti-
mate dishonor. They have attempted to disown us 
and the sacrifices we made for this country. In their 
blindness and fear they have tried to deny that we 
are veterans. Or that we served in Nam. We do not 
need their testimony. Our own scars and stumps of 
limbs are witness enough for others and ourselves.
We wish that a merciful God could wipe away our 
own memories of that service as easily as this Ad-
ministration has wiped away their memories of us. 
But all that they have done and all that they can do 
by this denial is to make more clear than ever our 
own determination to undertake one last mission—
to search out and destroy the last vestige of this bar-
baric war, to pacify our own hearts, to conquer the 
hate and the fear that have driven this country these 
ten years and more, so when thirty years from now 
our brothers go down the street without a leg, with-
out an arm, or a face, and small boys ask why, we 
will be able to say “Vietnam” and not mean a desert, 
not a filthy obscene memory, but mean instead the 
place where America finally turned and where sol-
diers like us helped it in the turning. (Kerry 1971, 
24)
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The three leading networks covered the arrests and testimony, 
but not as the lead story. All three began with the death of Haitian 
dictator Francois Duvalier. ABC and CBS both carried protest back-
lash stories. ABC showed Veterans of Foreign Wars commander 
Herbert Rainwater accusing the media of overplaying the VVAW. 
Rainwater also noticed young women, likely not combat veterans, 
among the VVAW. An unidentified protester retorted that non-vet 
supporters were there and that they readily admitted so. An uniden-
tified vet estimated that three-quarters of vets opposed the war and 
said that Rainwater didn’t know what he was talking about. ABC 
anchor and war hawk Howard K. Smith tagged the story with the 
explicitly prejudicial aside that North Vietnam’s negotiators at the 
Paris peace talks expressed support for the protesting veterans. CBS 
also used Rainwater’s comments and the Kerry testimony. NBC 
showed the arrests, but reporter Liz Trotta’s story derived mostly 
from Kerry’s testimony.
Certainly, the VVAW presence was making the Nixon Admin-
istration nervous. “VVAW’s very existence frustrated Nixon,” noted 
Horace Coleman (2004). “VVAW was the real thing, controversial 
but undeniable people who’d been there, done that, fought and bled.” 
Nixon, of course, would not acknowledge the vets; he made it a point 
to watch football instead (Dzagulones 2004). He held a long morning 
meeting with aides about how to handle the Supreme Court action 
on the veterans and camping on the mall (Haldeman 1994, 278). On 
the evening of April 22nd, the Nixon Administration had Opinion 
Dynamics do a nationwide telephone poll of 541 adults. Seventy-
seven percent of respondents had “heard, or read about the Vietnam 
Veterans Against the War demonstration in Washington D.C. this 
week.” When asked, “In general, do you approve or disapprove of this 
demonstration?” 32 percent approved, 42 percent disapproved, and 
26 percent had no opinion (Opinion Research Corporation 1971a).
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Day Five, April 23rd, featured the famous footage of VVAW 
members throwing away their medals. The story was the lead item 
on NBC as a voice-over story with sound bites. Later in the newscast, 
NBC carried a report correcting the rank of VVAW’s Al Hubbard, 
who had stated it falsely on Meet the Press. ABC’s Stephen Geer re-
ported on the medal tossing, but the story was placed after a Bob 
Windsor lead package about Attorney General John Mitchell de-
nouncing demonstrators as worse than spies and predicting violence 
in the large, upcoming antiwar events. ABC concluded with Harry 
Reasoner’s commentary praising Kerry’s testimony. CBS led with a 
Soviet space launch and then carried a Bruce Morton package on 
the medals being thrown away. Morton’s package included taps be-
ing played by the father of a GI killed in Vietnam. CBS then carried 
Mitchell’s claims and ominous predictions.
The medals toss included plastic toy weapons as well.  
Photo courtesy of VVAW. 
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Jeffrey Kimball (1998, 251) wrote, “Of all the demonstrations in 
the spring of 1971, this one unnerved Nixon the most. It was well 
covered by the news media, and Nixon sensed that the veteran’s an-
tiwar message was getting across to the public. This point was driven 
home on April 23, when the Administration’s own quick poll showed 
a three-point drop in Nixon’s approval rating, which to them was in-
explicable but for the VVAW’s demonstrations.” The administration 
indeed attributed to the VVAW the downtick in presidential popu-
larity, blamed the media, and considered sending out Agnew with 
more media and protester bashing (Haldeman 1994, 278). 
Also on Friday, April 23, 1971, Congressman Jonathan Bingham 
held hearings with former intelligence and public information of-
ficers regarding the distortion of news and information during the 
war. Senators George McGovern and Philip Hart held hearings 
on U.S. Vietnam War atrocities. The veterans broke camp. David 
Thorne and George Butler (1971, 31) summarized the situation: “A 
tree, donated by the veterans is planted as a symbolic plea for the 
preservation of all life and the environment. The quadrangle on the 
Mall is vacant. Not one act of violence has been committed. They 
came in peace. The war in Indochina continues.”
Only CBS had an evening newscast Saturday, April 24th. The 
reporter packages from Bruce Morton and Bob Schieffer totaled 
five minutes and forty seconds and dealt with the transition from 
the vets to a larger, general antiwar protest in D.C. John Kerry was 
shown calling on the crowd to demonstrate until the war’s end and 
to make politicians end the war or vote them out of office. Anchor 
Roger Mudd then introduced a report from Richard Threlkeld on 
an antiwar protest in San Francisco where vets led college students, 
trade union workers, and others. Crowd estimates ranged as high as 
250,000. CBS closed the newscast with Nelson Benton’s report on a 
National Cathedral service for GIs killed in Vietnam. Three hundred 
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GIs in uniform attended. The Reverend Channing Phillips explained 
the church’s “exchange of peace” ritual. The overflow crowd heard 
the service close with taps. The event had been sponsored by the 
Concerned Officers Movement, and included not only VVAW but 
also Gold Star mothers (Halstead 1978, 607). 
President Nixon stayed at Camp David and communicated with 
H. R. Haldeman in Washington to keep track on the protests. Dur-
ing one phone call, Nixon told Haldeman of the need to counteract 
the effect of the veterans and talked about how the media had “super-
covered” them (Haldeman 1994, 279). During the following week’s 
May Day demonstrations, Nixon’s paranoia about the war protest 
ran so deep that he was demanding updates every half hour from 
White House counsel John Dean (Dean 1976, 42).
VVAW Media Sophistication and Dewey Canyon III
Throughout Dewey Canyon III, many VVAW members were almost 
giddy not only at how media events had changed in their favor but 
also at how well they were outmaneuvering an increasingly angry and 
desperate Nixon Administration. Bill Branson recalled, “A bunch of 
guys from California went down to the Pentagon and tried to turn 
in a bunch of guys as war criminals. We took over everything—the 
Lincoln Memorial, the Rotunda—we walked in the streets. Nobody 
stopped us.” Terry DuBose confirmed that Michigan Senator Philip 
Hart helped by providing a room that served as a place to congregate 
and a great spot for making media contacts.
Jan Barry said, “When Nixon was quoted as saying he didn’t think 
these were real Vietnam veterans, one group decided they were go-
ing to parade at night around the White House with the flag upside 
down. It was tremendously dramatic.” Sheldon Ramsdell added that 
“Ron Ziegler [press secretary] had said, from Nixon, that this was 
just a bunch of hippies. A woman came down to the Mall from the 
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AP or UPI, [and] collected nearly 1,000 combat cards—you know, 
military service cards (DD-214s). She put that in the paper the next 
day. Nixon was totally discredited” (Romo et al. 1997, 246).  White 
House aide Dick Howard tried to discredit the VVAW as a “group 
that are apparently not veterans, who are apparently trying to com-
pensate for some guilty feelings” (Brinkley 2004, 364).
Barry Romo recalled the larger media strategy. Americans “saw the 
war on TV. They had to see us on TV. People’s experience was not being 
in a rice paddy, but watching someone in a rice paddy. We had to inter-
rupt their seeing the war on TV with their seeing veterans demonstrat-
ing against the war on TV. . . . We know, and they don’t. We’re telling 
you that what you see on TV is not it. It’s part of it, but it’s not it, and 
it’s wrong and you’ve got to bring people home” (Romo et al. 1997, 247).
In the same interview, Jan Barry cited a Time magazine retro-
spective that declared Dewey Canyon III probably the most memo-
rable demonstration of the peace movement. Barry also recalled, 
with glee, getting an advance copy of what Walter Cronkite would 
say that night. “It was very positive and made this a major nation-
wide and international news story, because the Cronk was it. Cronk 
says, Take notice of this, America. This was the guy who had written 
what the Cronk was to read, and he rushed over there to hand it to 
us. At that point, I knew that the White House had lost the public on 
this issue” (Romo et al. 1997, 250).
Bill Davis (1996) was ecstatic that “the VVAW emblem became 
a mighty fixture on national network news.” The CBS truck on 
the scene and the VVAW logo as an over-the-shoulder graphic for 
Cronkite were very important to Sheldon Ramsdale. “It all changed, 
just like that,” he said. “Look how far we had to go to get any kind of 
credibility at all. A reporter from a news service collected our cards, 
and suddenly we’re real. What the hell’s been going on all this time? 
Nobody’s been wanting to believe it!” (Romo et al. 1997, 251). 
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Scott Camil (2009) joined VVAW during Winter Soldier, was 
involved in the planning for Dewey Canyon III, and later became a 
defendant in the Gainesville Eight trial. He notes that Dewey Can-
yon planning revolved around the missions of raising public aware-
ness of the truth about Vietnam and influencing elected representa-
tives to stop the war. The media were to be used as much as possible 
to achieve these goals. He also recalls that the vets understood the 
following about media:
•	 We	needed	the	media	to	get	our	message	out	to	the	country.
•	 The media needed us to provide them with news.
VVAW member Mark Hartford in San Bernardino, California,  
organizing for Dewey Canyon III. Photo courtesy of VVAW.
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•	 The more graphic our demonstrations were the better chance 
that the media would cover them.
•	 They used us to get good stories, and we used them to get our 
message out.
•	 Most important is that without our credibility we have noth-
ing! Never lie to the public or the press.
Camil also observed that when the government said something, 
it was depicted as true, but when VVAW said something, it was “al-
leged.” He said, “As time went on we cultivated friendly relationships 
with reporters and our credibility grew. We also learned which press 
and which reporters were sympathetic and which ones would distort 
what we would say. We learned that the more we said the more they 
could chop it up and distort it so we learned to say what we wanted 
them to print and hold the rhetoric down.” 
Camil cultivated a good relationship with reporters. He tipped 
them about upcoming events and took them along as he dealt with 
the FBI. They helped him get in to see reluctant congressmen. He ob-
served, “We were the ones who had the most direct knowledge of the 
war. It was hard for the government to blow us off with the usual spin 
they laid on the rest of the antiwar movement: unpatriotic, unwilling 
to serve our country, not knowing what they are talking about, com-
munist sympathizers.”
The protest on the Capitol Mall clearly broke through most past 
coverage obstacles. The vets had come to Washington with greater 
media savvy after Winter Soldier. They had made media coverage 
more likely by making it easier, visual, and dramatic. The high-water 
mark came the day they took to the Capitol steps, standing in front 
of a ramshackle wire fence that kept them from going no farther. 
The medals and ribbons that some five hundred vets threw over that 
fence (Longley 2008) plunked down at the feet of a statue of John 
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Marshall, the first Chief Justice of the United States. Veterans from 
all branches of the service would offer “their names, units, and cita-
tions, and then rid themselves of their mementos in disgust” (Brin-
kley 2004, 374).
Neil Olsen, a vet one observer described as having a small-town, 
gentle face, lifted his trumpet to blow taps, holding the last note as 
long as he could for the newspaper and television cameramen jock-
eying for position. One by one, vets came forward to the standing 
microphones. “I hope someday I can return to Vietnam and help 
rebuild the country we tore apart,” said one vet as he threw his med-
als over the fence. Another hurled his Bronze Star at the symbol of 
power and said, “I wish I could make them eat it!” One man threw 
away his cane. Another said, “Here’s my merit badges for murder.” 
One vet said softly, “I just want to ask for the war to end, please.” An 
ex-sergeant from New York threw away his medals but held aloft two 
Purple Hearts, saying, “I’m keeping these in memory of my friends” 
(Bryan 1976).
Paul F. Winter prayed for forgiveness as he hurled a Silver Star, 
Bronze Star, and Distinguished Service Cross over the fence, and 
limped away. Another vet calmly stated, “Robert, New York, I sym-
bolically return all Vietnam medals and other service medals given 
me by the power structure that has genocidal policies.” One soldier 
shouted, “Here’s a bunch of bullshit,” as he slung away a handful of 
medals (Brinkley 2004, 375).
Former helicopter pilot Rusty Sachs tossed his Bronze Star over 
the fence but noticed one newsman and then another picking up the 
medals. He started yelling some loud objections, only to be held back 
and calmed by another vet, Ron Ferrizzi. Then Ferrizzi explained 
that his disapproving wife would divorce him and his parents would 
disown him if he turned in his medals. He looked down at those 
medals, and said, “I’m not proud of these medals . . . of what I did 
73
N o  W I N T e r  S o l D I e r S  b U T  A 
S P r I N g  o F  N e W S  D I S c o V e r y
to receive them.” He spoke of dead colleagues as Rusty Sachs started 
to cry. Ferizzi stepped back and flung his medals as far as he could. 
Sachs and Ferrizzi wept and clung to each other as news photogra-
phers shouted to the other vets to move because they were blocking 
the shot. Just days earlier, the Nixon Administration anonymously 
suggested that fewer than 30 percent of the vets had ever seen service 
in Vietnam. That wholly false concoction fell apart at that moment 
(Bryan 1976).
For three hours, the vets paraded by the fence, tossing decorations 
earned with bravery and blood back at the federal government that 
had sent them to Vietnam. Some were silent. Others spoke into the 
microphone. “My name is Peter Branagan,” one said. “I got a Purple 
Heart, and I hope to get another one fighting these motherfuckers.” 
An African American veteran said, “I pray that time will forgive me 
and my brothers for what we did.” Another young man spat out the 
names of friends who had died and the medals they had earned. He 
concluded, “I got a Silver Star, a Purple Heart, an Army Commenda-
tion Medal, eight Air Medals, National Defense, and the rest of this 
garbage. It doesn’t mean a thing.” He plunked a heavy handful of 
medals over the fence, walking away in tears. The pile grew bigger; 
no official spoke to the vets (Ostertag 2006, 117-118).  
The vets, engaged in a cat-and-mouse game with the Nixon Ad-
ministration, clearly got the better of the exchange. Nixon’s Justice 
Department had forced the issue of camping on the Washington 
Mall by taking it to the Supreme Court. Thus, the administration 
brought into the coverage each network’s Supreme Court reporter 
and provided a fresh angle to the story. Nixon, however, was unwill-
ing to evict the vets by force. Before the Supreme Court ruling, he 
made it “perfectly clear” to presidential aide John Dean that, regard-
less of the court case outcome, nothing was to be done to the vets. 
“Get a hold of the District Police,” he ordered Dean. “They’re not to 
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touch them. They’re to do nothing. Just let them raise hell” (Nixon 
1971). 
Certainly, some troops or police could have been found to en-
force the eviction, but many people clearly were grateful that the or-
der never came. When Fred Halstead (1978, 606) walked through the 
VVAW camp that night, he found visitors from all around the area, 
including many active-duty GIs. One young man with close-cropped 
hair introduced himself and some others nearby as part of the honor 
guard at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. He spoke of solidarity 
with the vets. “If they try to call the troops out against you, there’ll be 
hell to pay,” he predicted. Douglas Brinkley (2004, 367-368) conclud-
ed that D.C. Police sympathies rested largely with the vets, thanks to 
the courtesy of the vets as well as to a friendly letter to “our brothers 
in blue” written by VVAW member Mike Oliver and posted widely 
in D.C. police stations.
In his biography of John Kerry, Brinkley (2004, 364) described 
the scene on the Mall as beginning to resemble a mini-Woodstock. 
Eight-track players inside custom vans blared Phil Och’s “Draft 
Dodger Rag” and the Crosby, Stills, Nash, and Young’s “Ohio” pro-
test song about the shootings at Kent State almost a year earlier. Vets 
and supporters played with plastic machine guns in some impromp-
tu guerilla theatre. Disabled vets joined in, pointing their crutches at 
pedestrians. Banners declared “End the War.” Neil Olsen of Russell, 
Pennsylvania, played “Taps” all day long to mourn his son’s death in 
Vietnam. A member of the Daughters of the American Revolution 
confronted a Vietnam vet: “Son, I don’t think what you’re doing is 
good for the troops.” He replied, “Lady, we are the troops.”
Veteran Jack Smith contends that the Nixon Administration was 
feeling incredible pressure from the presence of the VVAW and thus 
the administration was capable of irrational behavior and violent 
outbursts. Smith states the VVAW leaders at the time were thinking 
75
N o  W I N T e r  S o l D I e r S  b U T  A 
S P r I N g  o F  N e W S  D I S c o V e r y
a lot about the Bonus March of 1932. That year, World War I vet-
erans were camped in D.C. to demand promised service bonuses. 
President Hoover sent General Douglas MacArthur, whose troops 
used tear gas, bullets, bayonets, and torches to destroy the veterans’ 
camp and drive them away. Smith believed that Middle America 
likely sided with the police against hippies on the streets of Chicago 
in 1968, “but the veterans, longhaired and shabby as many of them 
were, touched the heartstrings of America in a way the hippies never 
had. That these men had the guts to speak out about what they had 
seen earned them even more approval from the general public” (Nic-
osia 2001, 116-117). 
Smith relished the fact that Nixon had focused attention on the 
campsite itself and on what that said to the general public:
A nation that for almost a decade had felt belea-
guered by a war it could not win, and ostracized 
by much of the world community for its actions in 
South Vietnam, now found itself identifying with 
those weary-looking veterans, who apparently had 
no home except that pitiful cluster of pup tents, bed-
rolls, and lean-tos outside the Capitol, and whose 
own government had now raised its hand against 
them. (Nicosia 2001, 125)
 
Nixon soft-pedaled the whole question when asked about it at a 
press conference. He contended that the lawsuit was only to estab-
lish the principle against camping on the Mall. “Having established 
that principle, there was only 36 hours left in which to remove them, 
and thereby, of course, to engage in a confrontation which could 
have been, we thought, rather nasty,” he said. “I saw no reason to go 
in and to arrest the veterans and to put them into jail at that time” 
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(“Transcript” 1971). Nixon had decided not to speak directly to pro-
tester claims, but to use Vice President Spiro Agnew and adminis-
tration speechwriters to attack both news media and protesters. The 
themes were simple: support for the president was patriotic; opposi-
tion to his policies was not (Halberstam 1972). Agnew’s 1969 attacks 
on the networks yielded an unprecedented one hundred thousand 
contacts to the networks from viewers agreeing with Agnew. The re-
action was fleeting; a poll taken a month after Agnew’s first speech 
found 52 percent agreeing with him, but six in ten people saying that 
the networks overall had been fair to the White House (Gans 1979, 
263).
After fumbling the campsite issue, all the Nixon Administra-
tion could do was to have pro-war Veterans of Foreign Wars spokes-
people ask for “equal time” from the television networks, be turned 
down, and then use that rejection as a talking point against both the 
press and the antiwar movement (Kimball 1998, 251-252; Haldeman 
1994, 278).
Dewey Canyon III even inspired coverage on public television. 
David Susskind, interviewer for noncommercial television, went to 
veterans’ hospitals and elsewhere to find six veterans willing to go 
on television for a freewheeling two-hour conversation airing on 
WNEW-TV, New York (Robinson 1971). “They all agreed the South 
Vietnamese Army could not hack it and that the North Vietnamese 
were filled with an almost evangelical fervor,” he said. “In 13 years 
in this business, I can’t ever remember a show that racked me up so.”
The VVAW also responded quickly to a problem that could have 
undercut credibility. Both John Kerry and Al Hubbard appeared on 
Meet The Press, the Sunday morning television interview program. 
The interview was repeated later in the day on NBC-affiliated radio 
stations (“Radio” New York Times, April 18, 1971). Hubbard, how-
ever, claimed to be an Air Force pilot and captain. He was a sergeant, 
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and his claimed time in Vietnam could not be documented. Host 
Lawrence Spivak complained to Kerry about the deceit. Kerry at-
tacked Hubbard mercilessly in front of the other leaders of the group, 
but at the same time, argued against drumming him out. Hubbard 
later appeared on the Today Show, where he admitted to lying about 
his rank but insisted he had been in Vietnam as a flight engineer. 
Fellow VVAW reacted nonchalantly to the news, but some members 
worried privately about backlash. They decided the on-air humilia-
tion was enough and that no further reprimand was needed. Hub-
bard would become a less visible spokesman as VVAW went forward 
(United Press International 1971; Hunt 1999, 111-112; Nicosia 2001, 
128-129).
In one of the more surreal moments of Dewey Canyon III, sev-
eral VVAW members attended a fundraiser for them, a Georgetown 
cocktail party courtesy of Senator Phil Hart. Brinkley noted, “It was 
an odd event. Blue-collar veterans with mud on their boots—men 
who were sleeping on the Mall—walked around on plush oriental 
rugs, with old Harper’s Weekly covers framed hanging on the wall. 
They were mixing with lobbyists and politicians in Brooks Broth-
ers suits” (2004, 366-367). Scott Camil pressed antiwar Senator J. 
William Fulbright about his vote for the Gulf of Tonkin resolution 
authorizing the war. Yet, even that tense moment rebounded in the 
VVAW’s favor. Fulbright was impressed by the calmer approach 
taken by Kerry, and that likely played a role in an invitation for 
Kerry to give his powerful statement to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. 
Overall, Dewey Canyon III was a success for the VVAW message. 
The vets clearly had a sharper notion than the Nixon Administration 
as to what makes good television. Barry Romo (2000) credits the pro-
tests with a quick turn in public opinion against the massive bomb-
ing of North Vietnam. “The reality of our experience overwhelmed 
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the force of his [Nixon’s] office,” he said. Yet, after Dewey Canyon III, 
the press attitude became one of “we covered you, so why do we have 
to cover you again?” As Romo expressed it, “ If you don’t do some-
thing spectacular the media don’t want to cover you . . . and you can’t 
throw your medals away every week.”
 
Dewey Canyon III, aftermath of the medals toss.  
Photo courtesy of VVAW.
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Dwindling TV Reports of VVAW
Seven of the eighteen network TV newscast stories outside the realm 
of Dewey Canyon III were about the Gainesville Eight trial. ABC 
and CBS did packages about the veterans’ trek after the 1972 Repub-
lican National Convention to protest at the arraignment. ABC did 
an anchor reader story about the opening of the trial and a package 
about the shaky testimony of an informant named William Lemmer. 
All three networks ran packages on the not-guilty verdicts, using 
much of the same post-trial statements on the courthouse steps—
and also mentioning frequent government losses in protest-related 
prosecutions.
On August 24, 1972, ABC and CBS each ran field reports on the 
trial, from David Snell and Bruce Hall respectively. Both relayed the 
same statement from defendant Scott Camil that they were only try-
ing to tell the truth to the American people and that the govern-
ment’s “only way to try to discredit us is by building up these phony 
charges.” On August 31st, ABC also carried a Bill Wordham trial re-
port. The report included several courtroom drawings and the state-
ment from Camil to the jury: “They came for us in the summer of 
1972. When will they come for you?”
The varied protests of December 28 to 29, 1971, got some atten-
tion. NBC and CBS ran voice-over stories of the Statue of Liberty and 
Lincoln Memorial arrests. The CBS report, read by anchor Charles 
Collingwood, curiously had no natural sound of the Lincoln Memo-
rial protest. The same type of story ran on NBC, but with the sound 
of the protest audible. Anchor John Chancellor noted that the vets 
surrendered with their hands on their heads in imitation of prison-
ers of war. ABC presented a Stephen Geer package using the two 
sets of arrests and incorporating the camp out at Valley Forge. In 
what had to be a setback following Dewey Canyon III, Geer referred 
to a “group calling itself the Vietnam Veterans Against the War” 
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and opined, “These veterans trying to revive the antiwar movement 
apparently have chosen new tactics.” The following day, ABC ran a 
package from affiliate KGO and reporter Van Amburg on the brief 
VVAW takeover of the South Vietnam consulate in San Francisco. 
All these reports mentioned the peaceful and orderly arrests.
Five news items involving the VVAW can be considered miscella-
neous in nature. CBS’s Nelson Benton ran a long and thorough piece 
in 1969 on the G. I. Underground Press, a surprisingly early recogni-
tion of antiwar veterans from a press corps otherwise oblivious to 
the phenomenon. CBS also did a June 1971 David Culhane pack-
age on the VVAW giving the antiwar movement a new look. Critics 
are mentioned in passing in the filmed report, but the anchor “tag” 
quotes the Vets for Just Peace. An ABC profile piece in 1972 covered 
John Kerry’s bid for Congress. While the piece mentioned VVAW, it 
concentrated on the district, its politics, and the opponent. 
On June 1, 1971, NBC, the network with the least Dewey Canyon 
III coverage, felt compelled to carry a rambling 110-second sound 
bite from John O’Neill. CBS also carried O’Neill’s statement. His ex-
aggerated claims for his newly created pro-war Vietnam veterans’ 
organization went unchallenged. O’Neill also was one of four pro-
Nixon sources in a curious July 28, 1972, ABC piece on the presiden-
tial election. The piece briefly mentioned that many VVAW members 
supported Democratic nominee George McGovern only as intro-
duction to the rebuttal group. O’Neill’s group was created by the 
Nixon Administration during Dewey Canyon III. At the time, Viet-
nam Veterans for a Just Peace consisted of just a desk in the White 
House and one pro-war veteran (Hunt 1999, 90). It was still a very 
small group when the Christian Science Monitor presented it in July 
1971 as a counterpoint to VVAW (Rubin 1971). White House aide 
Charles Colson was busy trying to get newspapers interested in an 
anti-Kerry article and creating pro-war front groups. The latter effort 
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still hadn’t yielded much by the time of the Republican Convention. 
A Concerned Veterans for Nixon breakfast in July 1972 mustered 
only fifty guests (Hunt 1999, 90, 199).        
Network television news stories of the Silent March to the 1972 
Republican Convention and a month-long series of related protests, 
collectively known as the Last Patrol, were scant and uneven. NBC 
carried no story. ABC devoted four minutes and ten seconds to con-
vention coverage the day of the Silent March, but only a few seconds 
to the vets. A package by Gregory Jackson mentions the earlier clash 
at Miami Beach High School with guardsmen, noting that the vets 
call the guardsmen “brothers,” but the police “pigs.” Viewers briefly 
see two vets in wheelchairs. Jackson relays that six vets who scaled 
the walls were arrested. Coverage then goes directly to Lem Tucker’s 
field report that lumps all protesters together as non-delegates. His 
theme was whether the mass arrests would lessen the tension. No 
veterans are seen or heard. The ABC reports had an anchor tag about 
Students for a Democratic Society protesters outside an event hosted 
by First Lady Pat Nixon and about the two people who crashed the 
event.
CBS had a two-minute Robert Schackne package. Like Tucker, 
Schackne showed and referenced burning parade bunting, presum-
ably lit by protesters. Unlike Tucker, he referenced a burning flag, but 
that is not shown on camera. He also referenced the mass arrests, 
praising them as a textbook case in how it should be done. The vets 
are mentioned in passing as participating in an earlier march and are 
seen only in one overhead extreme long shot. 
Considering the significance of the Last Patrol, lack of coverage 
can be viewed as signifying a lost opportunity on the part of the net-
works and other news organizations. To reinforce this point, a more 
detailed description of the event is in order in the next chapter. One 
also should note that the New York Times followed a pattern similar 
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to the network newscasts in their VVAW coverage. Dewey Canyon 
III earned 209 paragraphs of coverage: 78 on the campsite contro-
versy, 38 on the medals tossing, 41 on other activities, 21 on vets at 
various hearings about the war, 21 in a profile of Kerry, and 7 in a 
guest column by Jan Barry, accompanied by an editorial cartoon. 
In addition, the paper carried six photos of VVAW events. Only the 
three paragraphs on Al Hubbard’s admission of lying about his rank 
could be considered negative press. Last Patrol coverage was dramat-
ically diminished, just forty-two paragraphs in the New York Times. 
Incidentally, one prominent news organization after Dewey Can-
yon III still clung to dismissive attitudes about antiwar veterans. 
Newsweek’s general protest articles and its sidebar article on VVAW 
are particularly instructive on press difficulties with disgruntled vet-
erans. Newsweek insisted that VVAW was “peaceable and not very 
political” and that the group “carried a moral and symbol freight in 
the demonstrations far beyond its claimed total of 11,000 members” 
(“Demonstrations” Newsweek, April 26, 1971). 
Newsweek further argued that the demonstrations were predict-
able, benign, and overshadowed by the actions of Congress:
In any earlier year, the presence of these antiwar 
Viet vets might have given great extra impetus to 
Congressional doves. But in the spring of 1971, the 
Congress had acquired its own momentum. Wash-
ington greeted the cadre of fired up, outspoken 
veterans—a number of them wearers of the Purple 
Heart, a few of them amputees—with comparative 
nonchalance. Indeed, about the only controversy the 
vets could generate centered around the question of 
where they would be allowed to bivouac while in the 
Capital (“Once More” Newsweek, May 3, 1971). 
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While Newsweek congratulated VVAW as poignant and “a pro-
vocative new voice against the war,” the reporter could not conceive 
that VVAW represented a constituency beyond those present. “Given 
the fact that 3 million GI’s have served in Vietnam since 1964,” the 
magazine reported, “the numbers are trifling” (“Once More” News-
week, May 3, 1971). The press and television finally had discovered 
the VVAW, but it’s clear that a few laggard news organizations still 
didn’t know what to make of them.
The documentary Vietnam: A Television History, a companion 
piece to Stanley Karnow’s book, has a good four-minute segment on 
Dewey Canyon III at the close of its sixth volume, Homefront USA. 
The documentary shows one unidentified VVAW member explain-
ing to onlookers that he went to Vietnam because his government 
asked him to do so, that his politics changed because of what he saw, 
but that he remains non-violent, believes in the system, and is vis-
iting his U.S. Senator. Incredulously, he relays that the House Un-
American Activities Committee ranks VVAW as the third greatest 
threat to internal security, behind the Weathermen and the Black 
Panthers (Deane 1983). 
John Kerry’s eight-millimeter films of his experience in the Me-
kong Delta appear in the documentary, as does an audio excerpt of 
his testimony. Kerry also explains Dewey Canyon III in clear terms: 
“People did not listen to the veterans of the war. The press itself had 
difficulty in perceiving of a group of Vietnam veterans being op-
posed to the war. And it was a story of profound importance—why 
the war itself was wrong, and why we were not going to be successful, 
and why we have to recognize that. We just felt that story had to be 
told, and the only way to tell it was to take it to Washington in that 
form” (Deane 1983).
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Highlights
The leadership of VVAW clearly learned from the relatively light 
coverage of Winter Soldier in Detroit. The next big demonstration, 
Dewey Canyon III, was visually striking, easy to cover, and filled 
with dramatic images.
The Supreme Court unwittingly aided the VVAW cause by drawing 
attention to the campsite. The confrontation over this question only 
added to news coverage. This act was at odds with the Nixon Admin-
istration policy of publicly ignoring the vets while privately keeping 
close track of them.
The connection to another breaking story, the Calley conviction for 
the My Lai atrocities, also added to the news appeal of Dewey Can-
yon III.
John Kerry’s gripping congressional testimony and the event where 
vets tossed away their medals clearly were the high water marks of 
VVAW activities and are the historical fragments most likely to be 
remembered.
Network news attention slumped after Dewey Canyon III, paral-
leling decreased New York Times coverage. Some gripping protest 
events, notably the Last Patrol’s Silent March at the 1972 Republican 
Convention, occurred. But these events went nearly uncovered be-
cause they conflicted with the news theme that the war was “winding 
down.”
5
Reconstructing the Last Patrol  
On August 22, 1972, a group of twelve thousand Vietnam Veterans 
Against the War lined up for a Silent March in Miami Beach, Flori-
da. They formed platoon-like neat rows of four, with three disabled 
vets in wheelchairs taking the lead. Some of the veterans had come 
three thousand miles in long convoys for this moment in the Miami 
sun, a chance to tell their commander-in-chief that his Vietnam War 
policy was wrong (Truscott 1972a).  
 
The Silent March.  
Photo Courtesy of VVAW.
They left the VVAW campground in Flamingo Park and marched 
the four miles up Collins Avenue, a six-lane boulevard through the 
heart of the hotel district and a Jewish retirement community. Their 
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goal was the Hotel Fontainebleau, Republican convention headquar-
ters (Truscott 1972a; Thompson 1973, 387-88). The vets wore battle 
fatigues, helmets, and combat boots. Some were on crutches and a 
few carried full-size plastic M-16s (Thompson 1973, 387; Vonnegut 
1972). By all accounts of both observers and participants, the march 
had an eerie silence to it, punctuated only by the thump of leather on 
asphalt and the rattling of an open canteen top. All the “stop, start,” 
“fast, slow,” and “right, left” commands were given as hand signals of 
platoon leaders walking to the side of the main column (Thompson 
1973, 387).  
 Miami Beach’s senior citizens watched tight-lipped as the march-
ers passed before their hotel porches (Thompson 1973, 387). A few 
onlookers cheered, and one or two saluted (Truscott 1972b). The 
Republican delegates, five hundred heavily-armed police, and the 
shipboard partiers on the Wild Rose of Houston at a nearby marina, 
all accustomed to noisy encounters with other protesters, stood si-
lent as the vets approached (Thompson 1973, 388; Camp, 1972; Mar-
kowitz and Camp 1972).  The platoon leaders directed the marchers 
into a tight semicircle, blocking all three northbound lanes of Col-
lins Avenue. For five tension-filled minutes, the two groups stared at 
each other, the police clearly off balance. One of the VVAW platoon 
leaders then spoke through a bullhorn, “We want to come inside” 
(Thompson 1973, 388).  
Conflict was avoided when Rep. Pete McCloskey, a Republican 
from California, shoved his way through the police line. McCloskey 
arranged a meeting between a few VVAW leaders and the Republi-
can liaison with hotel management, the only Republican leader the 
vets would get to see. The vets assured McCloskey that they didn’t 
want to charge the hotel; they only wanted to be turned away in front 
of the nation’s press and TV cameras (Thompson 1973, 390; Valen-
tine and Taylor 1972; Associated Press 1972b).
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McCloskey and a few VVAW leaders addressed the crowd, which 
became increasingly difficult because two Army helicopters now 
hovered overhead. The only one who could be heard above the din 
was an ex-Marine sergeant from San Diego, Ron Kovic, one of the 
wheelchair-bound vets (Thompson 1973, 392).  He spoke in a hoarse 
holler, frequently interrupted by cheers:
And we’re smelly, and we’re a little dirty now, but 
it’s for a reason: because for the last week and a half 
we have traveled from across the United States of 
America, because we feel it is our obligation to tell 
the American people that these people are liars. . . . 
You have lied to us too long, Mr. President. Too many 
babies have been burned. Too many lives have been 
lost. You might have taken our bodies, but you have 
not taken our minds. (Truscott 1972a) 
This account of the Silent March was pieced together through 
the reports of observers and a handful of nontraditional journalists 
working for alternative publications. As mentioned earlier, network 
TV news coverage of the Last Patrol was minimal. Only CBS and 
ABC covered the event, and they spent most of their time on the 
Yippies, Zippies, and other protesters and only a few seconds on the 
antiwar veterans. 
Novelist Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., covering the convention for Harper’s, 
correctly anticipated the dearth of news coverage:
If the police don’t act immediately, and if the hu-
manitarians behave in a manner that is dignified or 
beautiful or heart-breaking, there is still something 
nice people can do.
They can ignore the humanitarians.
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This is what the nice people did when one of the most 
honorable military reviews in American history took 
place on the afternoon of August 22, 1972, in front of 
the Hotel Fontainebleau. This date will not go down 
in history, because nice people do not want it there. 
(Vonnegut 1972)
The Silent March was the climax of the Last Patrol, but certainly 
not the only newsworthy portion. However, other Last Patrol events 
captured relatively little news attention, press or broadcast, relative 
to what had happened barely more than a year earlier during Dewey 
Canyon III.
Most Last Patrol events did not require much digging by the 
press. The Last Patrol’s plans included a number of press opportuni-
ties as well as visually striking and tense confrontations that should 
have brought news attention. The eastern branch of the Last Patrol 
passed through Boston and New York and camped one night on the 
suburban outskirts of Washington, D.C. (Huth 1972; “Large Auto 
Convoy” New York Times, July 30, 1972).
Later, the patrol leafleted Fort Bragg, North Carolina, revealing 
their peaceful intentions to the two thousand riot-trained soldiers 
of the 82nd Airborne Division, who would later confront them in 
Miami Beach (Nordheimer 1972a).
The eastern branch met the midwestern branch in Fort Pierce, 
Florida. Concerned about snakes in the swampy terrain, some of the 
vets slept on the hoods of their cars (Zastrow 1984).
About thirty vets at Fort Pierce set out on a March Against Mur-
der, walking seventeen or eighteen miles a day to Miami Beach. 
More vets and other supporters joined them along the way. When 
the group reached Miami Beach, 137 miles later, they numbered 
65 walkers and 285 in trailing vehicles (United Press International 
1972c).
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 The western branches started from Portland, San Francisco, and 
Los Angeles. The Portland and San Francisco groups met in Salt 
Lake City. The Los Angeles group passed through Houston, camped 
in Louisiana, and met the other western branches in Georgia (Kovic 
1976, 158, 161; “Large Auto Convoy” New York Times July 30, 1972). 
 The first wave of the patrol, a caravan of 130 cars, buses, trucks, 
and jeeps, many sporting flowers and peace signs, rolled over the 
bridge leading into Miami Beach with horns blowing, headlights 
burning, and flags waving. The caravan stretched for a mile and a 
quarter. The vets drove through every red light and stop sign on the 
way, shouting to the well-wishers who greeted them. Yippies and 
Zippies hugged them and dumped handfuls of joints into their cars 
(Kovic 1976, 160-161; Lindquist 1984; Davis 1984; Zastrow 1984). 
Another forty-five vehicles, part of the western branch held up by 
a series of uneventful weapons checks, rolled into town a few hours 
later to a similar reception, with the March Against Murder arriving 
moments after that (Lindquist 1984).
  
 
The Last Patrol’s arrival in Miami. 
Photo courtesy of VVAW.
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The vets in the first part of the convoy looked at the main Flamin-
go Park campsite, a walled-in stretch of grass already occupied by 
other demonstrators, and instantly moved to maintain VVAW iden-
tity. They established their camp a quarter-mile south in a corner of 
the park secluded by tall hedges. One vet said their deployment was 
“just like a perimeter back in Nam” (Truscott 1972a). 
The Last Patrol’s first hours in Flamingo Park were marred by 
violence. A group of twenty-two American Nazis had forced Carol 
Kitchens of the Miami Women’s Coalition from a low truckbed that 
served as a speaker’s platform. They tore the microphone from her 
and shoved her to the edge of the stage. A few minutes later, fights 
erupted between the Nazis and forty VVAW members in a human 
corridor who were trying to keep other members of the crowd from 
mobbing the Nazis. The two-minute fist fight injured seven Nazis, 
four vets, and two CBS cameramen before the VVAW established 
order in the area (Winfrey 1972; Associated Press Wirephoto 1972a; 
Baxter 1972; Baxter and Camp 1972; Zastrow 1984; Lindquist 1984).
Later, some elderly Jewish residents of the community came to 
Flamingo Park to say thanks to the veterans. After the fight, the vets 
realized the need to maintain security from counter-demonstrators 
and FBI infiltrators. The VVAW earned praise from the police for 
forming “human walls” to separate the angry groups. Using elabo-
rate walkie-talkie communication, VVAW patrols also provided es-
corts for female demonstrators and turned in dope dealers and the 
holder of a private cache of arms (Zastrow 1984; Cunningham 1972; 
Wheat 1972; Bellows 1972).  
The VVAW planned one protest activity per day. On Monday, 
August 21, while the delegates took care of convention business, the 
VVAW marched on Miami Beach High School where a thousand 
National Guardsmen were headquartered (Associated Press 1972h). 
The vets chanted to the beat of a drum, “Hey, hey, ho, ho, Tricky Dick 
has got to go,” and “One, two, three, four; we don’t want your racist 
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war.” In the 85-degree heat, several barefoot vets walked gingerly on 
the asphalt (Dillin 1972a; Associated Press 1972j; Kifner 1972a).  
National Guard officers ordered the shades and curtains drawn 
inside the high school, so few guardsmen saw all of the “guerilla the-
atre” depicting a guardsman defecting to the VVAW. A few guards-
men sneaked a peek, grinned, and flashed a peace sign or obscure 
gesture. Some vets tried to climb to the flat roof of the two-story 
building, but after a brief scuffle, retreated from the helmeted, flak-
jacketed guardsmen. Seven of the vets tried to climb up again and 
were arrested (Baxter 1972; Associated Press 1972k; Zastrow 1984).
On Tuesday, the Silent March occurred, followed by a demo-
cratic and seemingly interminable VVAW meeting, chaired by Peter 
Zastrow, about what to do Wednesday, the evening Richard Nixon 
would accept his party’s nomination. Some VVAW members joined 
the protest outside Convention Hall; others went to Gainesville and 
Tallahassee to protest (B. Davis 1984; Zastrow 1984; Elder 1972a).
Ron Kovic, however, had gotten into Convention Hall on the 
press pass of a TV producer from California. Kovic worked his way 
to the front of the hall only to scuffle with convention security work-
ers. The scuffle drew the attention of CBS’s Roger Mudd, who inter-
viewed Kovic live for about two minutes—enraging White House 
Press Secretary Ron Ziegler (Kovic 1976, 164-166; Barrettt 1973). 
Kovic then found fellow wheelchair-bound vets Bobby Wheeler 
and Bill Wieman, who had obtained passes from Congressman Mc-
Closkey. They locked their wheelchairs and waited for the right mo-
ment (Kovic 1976, 166). Nixon was five minutes into his acceptance 
speech when the three vets began shouting, “Stop the bombing! 
Stop the war!” (Quinn 1972). Angry delegates screamed and spat on 
them. Security guards wheeled them to a side door, locking the vet-
erans outside and the reporters inside the hall. The vets hugged each 
other and cried (Kovic 1976, 168; “Antiwar Veterans” Miami Herald, 
August 24, 1972). 
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Highlights
The story of one of the most dramatic VVAW events, the Last Patrol’s 
Silent March to the 1972 Republican National Convention site, had 
to be reconstructed not from major media coverage, but from the 
accounts of participants and a handful of observers from alternate 
media outlets.
 
News media seemed to revert to VVAW coverage patterns more rem-
iniscent of events before Dewey Canyon III. Most events received 
little attention outside of the local newspaper. VVAW stayed non-
violent and kept its own identity, but journalists took the course of 
least resistance by lumping them together with Yippies and Zippies 
in “last gasp of war protest” stories.
6
A Summer of (Largely Ignored) 
Discontent  
If paragraph count can be used as a rough guide, the New York Times 
gave Dewey Canyon III five times the attention it gave the Last Patrol. 
To be certain the Times’ comparatively skimpy coverage of the Last 
Patrol was not an aberration, the author decided to examine further 
its coverage and that of eight other newspapers: the Washington Post, 
like the Times an elite paper-of-record, widely circulated, and fre-
quently a leader for other news organizations; the Los Angeles Times, 
an elite west coast newspaper covering a city from which a branch of 
the Last Patrol departed; the Miami Herald, located at the site of the 
1972 Republican Convention, the Silent March, and other Last Patrol 
protests; the Tallahassee Democrat, home newspaper to the site of the 
trial of six members of Vietnam Veterans Against the War on charg-
es of planning violent disruptions of the Republican National Con-
vention; the Wall Street Journal and the Christian Science Monitor, 
national newspapers with reputations for news analysis; the Chicago 
Tribune, a large-circulation Midwestern newspaper and hometown 
newspaper to several VVAW leaders; and the Cincinnati Enquirer, a 
Gannett newspaper serving a city where several Last Patrol leaders 
resided and through which a branch of the patrol passed.
For the purposes of this analysis, the Last Patrol is defined as be-
ginning with the announcement of the event on July 29, 1972, and 
ending with the last day of the Republican National Convention on 
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August 23, 1972. In addition to analyzing newspaper coverage of the 
Last Patrol, the author also surveyed magazine coverage of events 
within that period.
The New York Times was the only surveyed newspaper to report 
on the announcement of the Last Patrol (“Large Auto Convoy,” July 
30, 1972). The Times also carried a sixteen-paragraph advancer story 
filed from Fayetteville, North Carolina, near Fort Bragg. It told the 
tale of one of the convoys moving toward Miami, a story that in-
cluded some local arrests. It closed with one arrested vet asking the 
MP to turn on the blue dome light to add authenticity to the arrest, 
making the effort seem sad, nostalgic, and outdated (Nordheimer 
1972a). The only convention “solo” story about antiwar vets was a 
five-paragraph wire service account of the four vets, three in wheel-
chairs, who got into the convention hall and shouted at Nixon dur-
ing his acceptance speech (United Press International 1972b).
The VVAW got two paragraphs deep into a story about the bi-
zarre carnival of Jesus Freaks, Yippies, Zippies, and assorted causes 
that made up the Miami Beach Tent City (Semple 1972). Curiously, 
the same story appeared with only minor changes in the next day’s 
edition but without byline or headline; that version had one more 
brief mention of the vets. The VVAW standoff with National Guards-
men at Miami Beach High School got three paragraphs, two in the 
lead plus a photo, in a broad convention wrap story. In reporting that 
story, John Kifner (1972a) apparently lost all institutional memory 
about the group, referencing “a contingent of about 800 that calls 
itself Vietnam Veterans Against the War.” VVAW also was men-
tioned in four paragraphs in a mass-arrests story (Kifner 1972b), two 
paragraphs in a soldiers-arriving-for-security story (Kifner 1972c), 
a one-paragraph story about a VVAW member and a radio reporter 
initiating a lawsuit after being stripped of convention press creden-
tials (Associated Press 1972a), and a mention in the news summary 
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index. The New York Times did a long story on post-traumatic shock 
and Vietnam Veterans (Nordheimer 1972b) but missed entirely the 
drama of the VVAW’s Silent March in Miami.
Other newspapers had similarly spotty coverage. The Washing-
ton Post carried five paragraphs, a wire service story, and otherwise 
ignored the Tallahassee Six (Associated Press 1972d). The eastern 
branch of the Last Patrol was covered by a Post staff writer when 
the group camped in the Maryland suburbs of Washington (Huth 
1972). With that exception, the Washington Post treated the VVAW 
as just another remnant of a dwindling protest era, carrying a col-
umn by Joseph Kraft proclaiming the death of the war protest era 
(Kraft 1972). The face-off between Guardsmen and VVAW at Mi-
ami Beach High School was not covered by the Washington Post. 
The Silent March was limited to five paragraphs beginning with the 
twenty-fourth paragraph of a general protest article under the head-
line “Police Hold 200 Protesters in Mass Arrests.” No veteran was 
quoted, and not a single veteran grievance was mentioned (Valentine 
and Taylor 1972).  The Washington Post also carried a staff report on 
the ejection of the three veterans heckling Nixon (Quinn 1972) and 
a note about the low-turnout Veterans for Nixon event (“50 Vietnam 
Vets,” August 24, 1972).
The Los Angeles Times ran an extensive article by Jack Nelson on 
William Lemmer and the Tallahassee Six (Nelson 1972a). The pa-
per also carried a long feature profiling the lives and treatment of 
wounded Vietnam veterans, including Ron Kovic (Langguth 1972). 
It ran two wire service reports on the trial in Gainesville (Associated 
Press, 1972e; Associated Press, 1972f). Los Angeles Times coverage of 
events in Miami was uneven. The paper carried a brief wire report on 
the arrival of the vets, with emphasis on the vets in what the reporter 
dubbed “the so-called ‘March Against Murder’” (United Press Inter-
national 1972c). The heckling of Nixon was covered by an unnamed 
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staff reporter, but the Silent March was missed (“Crippled Veterans,” 
August 24, 1972). The paper also carried a brief piece on the low-
turnout Veterans for Nixon event (United Press International 1972a). 
Staff writer David Lamb (1972) put together an intriguing front-page 
feature comparing three young men, a delegate, a policeman, and a 
VVAW protester. The National Guard incident was buried in two 
passing references on an inside page and in a general protest article. 
The article noted eight arrests but never gave the number of dem-
onstrators or quoted anything beyond the marching chants (Nelson 
1972b).
Though the Tallahassee Democrat’s number of VVAW articles 
is impressive, the newspaper displayed an amazing lack of curios-
ity about the trial taking place in its own city. The Democrat ran a 
series of brief wire accounts, mostly on inside pages, about the Tal-
lahassee Six (Wire Reports 1972). Only one brief report apparently 
came from a local reporter (“Vets Against War,” August 10, 1972). It 
and two other VVAW stories (Wire Report 1972; Moore 1972) were 
dropped in later editions. The local reporter’s account of the return 
of the accused vets to the Leon County Jail ran without a byline and 
was dropped in a later edition for photos of Panacea’s Junior Wom-
en’s Club collecting trash at Silver Lake campground. No follow-up 
story appeared on the VVAW charge that their Tallahassee lawyers 
had members’ phones tapped (Associated Press 1972g).  
The Democrat took its convention coverage from wire accounts 
that put brief VVAW accounts in larger protest compilations. Demo-
crat staffers may have been following the editorial stereotyping of 
their editor, Malcolm Johnson, who dedicated one of his front-page 
columns to a convention protest preview: “They will be led by ‘unem-
ployed Vietnam Vets’ (dare not inquire for what reasons they are job-
less),” he wrote. “This appears to be most of the noisy ragtag groups 
gathering at Miami Beach to promote every cause from boycotting 
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lettuce-eating to elevating homosexuality to total respectability” 
(Johnson 1972). 
The Miami Herald, a Knight-Ridder paper (like the Democrat) 
with a conservative editorial bent, offered clearly the best coverage of 
the Last Patrol. Though it did not cover every trial development, the 
Herald did confirm that a decision was made in Washington to time 
prosecution moves to the publicity-opportunity times of the Demo-
cratic National Convention, and eventually the Republican National 
Convention as well. This revelation came in an illustrated feature 
article about the Tallahassee Six. The author profiled each of the six 
vets. The story, which began on the front page below the nameplate, 
was continued on, and occupied all of, an inside page (Elder 1972b). 
The Herald also ran stories on the clash with the Nazis, the ar-
rival of the March Against Murder, the VVAW security patrols, the 
Silent March, the heckling of Nixon, and carried a piece compar-
ing Ron Kovic and John Todd, a pro-Nixon veteran. Almost all of 
these articles ran in the local news section. One ran atop the classi-
fied section. The paper provided local and state news that, aside from 
a few problems like two different misspellings of Ron Kovic’s name, 
was done well. In fact, local Miami coverage of VVAW filled three 
VVAW clipbooks (B. Davis 1984).
The Last Patrol didn’t quite make it as national news. The Wall 
Street Journal had no VVAW stories during this period, though it 
did run a long feature story on various domestic community service 
projects being completed by the Green Berets (Kramer 1972). The 
Christian Science Monitor editors attached the headline “Is anyone 
listening?” to a protest article including information about the march 
on Miami Beach High School (Dillin 1972a). Apparently people were 
not listening. That was the paper’s only reference to the VVAW or a 
Last Patrol event. Likewise, The Cincinnati Enquirer carried a brief 
wire story of the same incident, one paragraph on the Silent March 
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in a general protest article, a feature on life in Flamingo Park, and 
otherwise ignored the Last Patrol, following the general line of an 
Associated Press article carried by the Enquirer on the death of the 
protest era (Associated Press 1972h; Wheat 1972; Associated Press 
1972c). The Monitor, however, did run a piece praising Miami Beach 
Police Chief Rocky Pomerance, contrasting his Miami tasks with 
those done by Nixon (Waugh 1972).
Chicago Tribune coverage was true to the conservative editorial 
tradition of the paper. One article stressed protester plans to disrupt 
the convention but noted how a deal had been struck with Pomer-
ance. As long as protesters told of actions beforehand, arrests were to 
be done without physical violence. VVAW was mentioned as one of 
six participating groups. The reporter listed protest events, including 
“war crimes” [reporter’s quote marks] featuring actress Jane Fonda 
(Moreau 1972a).
Fonda is mentioned derisively several more times in the Tribune, 
the only newspaper analyzed that covered the Celebrities for Nix-
on event at the Doral Hotel. Jimmy Stewart, Ethel Merman, former 
Miss America Mary Ann Mobley, as well as TV stars Chad Everett, 
Dennis Cole, and Gary Collins, all attended. The GOP claimed that 
four hundred celebrities would be announcing support for Nixon. 
John Wayne was there and said he hadn’t heard of Flamingo Park 
or the denunciations of him there. Actress Terry Moore offered to 
buy Fonda a one-way ticket to Red China, though when pressed, she 
could not name any unpleasant thing Fonda had said. Actor Glenn 
Ford retorted, “You know why I’m here, and that’s all I have to say.” 
The chair he was sitting in slipped off the platform edge, and he tum-
bled over backward (Moreau 1972b).
The Tribune carried a photo with no story, showing Ron Kovic and 
Bill Wieman in their wheelchairs at the front of the Silent March; 
Kovic is carrying a U.S. flag hanging upside down. The caption reads 
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only, “Viet Nam veterans march near the convention hall in protest 
of the war” (Associated Press Wirephoto 1972). The only VVAW-
centered Tribune story stressed the arrest of eight vets in the con-
frontation with guardsmen at Miami Beach High School. Seven peo-
ple were arrested for trespassing and one for indecent exposure after 
“disrobing during the march and doing acrobatic flips.” The article 
mentioned a scuffle with a pro-war preacher and that a sit-down at 
Convention Hall did not happen because the pavement was too hot. 
Protests by women’s groups and Cubans got some attention. The last 
paragraph in the story focused on a Fonda press conference (Moreau 
and Sneed 1972).  Journalistic tendencies to stress conflict, to tie to 
other groups, and to denounce indirectly through association with 
controversial speakers all played out in the Tribune coverage.
The author also searched all magazines listed in the Readers’ 
Guide to Periodical Literature, 1972. Several categories were checked. 
The most productive were: “National Conventions, Republican”; 
“Vietnamese War, Protests, demonstrations, etc., against”; and 
“Vietnam Veterans Against the War.”
Major U.S. magazines largely ignored the Last Patrol. Time de-
voted six pages of text to the 1972 Republican Convention. One of 
the six articles dealt with protesters; two of the twenty photos were 
of the demonstrators. References to the Last Patrol were incidental. 
“Moments before Nixon proclaimed that the nation’s Viet Nam veter-
ans should be given ‘the honor and respect they deserve and they’ve 
earned,’ three such veterans in wheelchairs shouted ‘Stop the bomb-
ing!’—and were summarily escorted from the hall by convention 
security personnel,” reported Time (“New Majority,” September 4, 
1972).
The protest story, “The Last Jamboree,” noted, “Of the 4,000 or so 
demonstrators who did show up, only the Viet Nam Veterans Against 
the War remained well disciplined throughout. . . . Al Hubbard, a 
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V.V.A.W. leader, walked off in a huff. ‘If trashing is the thing, if as-
saulting delegates is the thing, then we will have no part of it’” (Time, 
September 4, 1972).
Newsweek devoted fifteen pages to the 1972 Republican Nation-
al Convention, including nine articles approaching the convention 
from various angles. The convention cover story included an illus-
tration, an editorial cartoon, and nineteen photos. The VVAW again 
were treated as bit players in a protest carnival. Newsweek described 
the restraint of Miami Beach Police Chief Rocky Pomerance “against 
the occasional sorties yippies, zippies, SDSers, Vietnam Veterans 
Against the War and associated antiwar groupies from their base in 
Flamingo Park” (“New Majority,” September 4, 1972). 
Peter Goldman’s (1972) convention diary for Newsweek portrayed 
Flamingo Park as a counterculture carnival and tourist attraction 
full of “peace people, hippies, yippies, zippies, Viet vets, trashers, 
feminists, homosexuals and even a black self-help group incon-
gruously for Richard Nixon.” The diary included a drawing of two 
wheelchair-bound vets looking sleepy and bored. 
U.S. News and World Report spread its cover story on the conven-
tion over twenty pages, including full texts of the Nixon and Agnew 
acceptance speeches. One of the ten articles was entitled, “How Pro-
testers Lost the ‘Battle of Miami Beach.’” None of the four photos 
showed a Vietnam Veteran. The only reference to the Last Patrol was 
a begrudging compliment: “In contrast with some protesters—who 
harangued and jostled Convention delegates, set fire to flags and 
bunting and screamed obscenities—about 1,200 Vietnam Veterans 
Against the War staged a silent, well-disciplined ‘protest march’ near 
the Convention’s headquarters hotel, the Fontainebleau” (September 
4, 1972).
Mademoiselle ran a convention account (Cunningham 1972) that 
mentioned the VVAW role in patrolling the Flamingo Park protest 
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camp. With two exceptions, judging by the Reader’s Guide to Peri-
odical Literature, the remainder of U.S. major magazines ignored 
both the Last Patrol and the Tallahassee Six. Saturday Review ran 
two articles by Lucian Truscott IV (1972a; 1972b) examining the 
Silent March and the VVAW in great detail. Harper’s ran the Kurt 
Vonnegut (1972) piece and a wide-ranging article on the informer 
William Lemmer and how the FBI had used him (Donner 1972).
Television news, also, seemed to ignore the Last Patrol. Bill 
Knowles (2009) was a television news writer and producer in 1972, 
one of many ABC newsmen who went to Miami Beach for what he 
termed a “Nixon coronation.” His network was scaling back its gav-
el-to-gavel coverage in favor of “unconventional convention” cover-
age, though that did not include much coverage of demonstrators. 
Knowles recalls the demonstrators not being too close to the conven-
tion center; it had been turned “into a heavily secured compound.” 
As he remembers it, the press and television were focused on—and 
trying to make sense of—the Watergate burglary and related items 
like the break-in of the psychiatrist’s office of antiwar activist Dan-
iel Ellsberg. The antiwar issues were being presented by opposition 
presidential candidate George McGovern.
ABC, CBS, and NBC, as the tallies and descriptions of network 
stories presented earlier indicate, were looking elsewhere when the 
Last Patrol took place. The rapid decline in media attention, print 
and broadcast, to VVAW between Dewey Canyon III and Last Patrol 
is particularly telling and will be considered in the next chapter. 
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Highlights
New York Times coverage can serve as a good benchmark for the 
declining coverage of VVAW. That paper gave five times the column 
inches to 1971’s Dewey Canyon III than to 1972’s Last Patrol.
Stories about the VVAW’s Last Patrol at the 1972 Republican Con-
vention rarely stood alone. More often, VVAW received a few para-
graphs in larger stories about the convention and/or the protests.
The conservative editorial bent of the Tallahassee Democrat and 
the Chicago Tribune was reflected in both the quantity and focus of 
VVAW coverage. Another conservative paper, the Miami Herald, of-
fered the best Last Patrol coverage. Of course, convention protests 
were a local story for that newspaper.
The VVAW rarely broke through the general news meme that the war 
was in decline. Newspapers and magazines often treated the VVAW 
as a noble group, but a lingering remnant of an outdated concern.
7
Featured then Forgotten  
News coverage of VVAW eventually waned. The four leaders of 
Vietnam Veterans Against the War (Barry Romo, Bill Davis, John 
Lindquist, Peter Zastrow) who were interviewed for this research 
all claimed that news attention to them peaked during Dewey Can-
yon and slumped into nearly nothing by the time of the Last Patrol. 
Analysis using the Vanderbilt Television News Archive and articles 
from periodicals confirms that claim. The findings from this study 
are in line with what has been found in other social-movement-re-
lated research. Several studies have shown that the mainstream news 
Kelly Daugherty and 
Barry Romo on the “Legacy 
of GI Resistance” panel at the 
2008 Winter Soldier event.
Photo Courtesy of VVAW.  
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organizations have a tendency, despite initial attraction to the un-
usual, to uphold the status quo (Donahue, Tichenor, and Olien 1973; 
Olien, Tichenor, and Donahue 1989; Lazarsfeld and Merton 1948).
Threats to the dominant ideology or even to policies maintained 
by the societal and political elite often are disparaged or ignored. 
News coverage of dissent increases and expressions of opposition be-
come voiced only during times of intense controversy and within the 
context of a particular idea or policy. If a majority of the elite is in 
agreement regarding an idea or policy, then the opposition experi-
ences a “blackout” or vilification (Cagan 1978; Kahn and Goldenberg 
1991; Morris 1973). Bennett’s indexing hypothesis (1990) looks at this 
point in the inverse, namely that elite conflict leaves an opening for 
mediated attention to discordant social movements. Bennett’s claim 
does not square with idealist, materialist, or constructionist views of 
social movements, but fits nicely with Sidney Tarrow’s (1998) con-
cept of political opportunity structure, the synthesis of social move-
ment theories with the cultural meta-narrative.
The network coverage of VVAW generally followed along the lines 
predicted by Bennett’s indexing hypothesis, and the decline in cov-
erage followed well what one would expect from Patricia Hipsher’s 
(2007) understanding of heretical social movements. The attention 
paid to Dewey Canyon and the subsequent decline in VVAW cover-
age fit well into Jules Boykoff’s point (2006) about the news media 
penchant for the novel, Andrew Rojecki’s (2002) observation about 
“evolving sympathy,” and findings from Kevin DeLuca and Jennifer 
Peeples (2002) about symbolic violence.
For all this general support regarding past work on social move-
ments, this research found some patterns at odds with the specific 
claims regarding elite consensus. A review of available polling data 
from that era is particularly instructive. 
The American National Election Study in 1964, 1966, 1968, and 
1970 asked what Americans should do now in Vietnam. In 1964, 
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almost half the respondents said we should “take a strong stand” 
while 38 percent opted for “keep trying to get a peaceful settlement.” 
Only 13.5 percent of the respondents said “pull out entirely.”  
By 1966, however, the figures for Strong Stand and for Peaceful 
Settlement were nearly identical (44.6 and 44.2 percent); Pull Out 
was just 11 percent. In 1968, after the Tet Offensive, Strong Stand 
fell to 37 percent; 41 percent hoped for Peaceful Settlement, but Pull 
Out doubled to 22 percent. Pull Out achieved a plurality by 1970 
with 36.7 percent, 36.2 for Peaceful Settlement, and 27.1 clinging to 
Strong Stand.
Public opinion showed a brief surge in war support in reaction to 
the January 1968 Tet Offensive, but the change did not last long. A 
Gallup poll found that two weeks after Tet, 61 percent called them-
selves “hawks” on the war, wanting to step up the U.S. military ef-
fort. In December, the figure was 52 percent. Seven in ten favored 
continued bombing of North Vietnam, up from 63 percent in Octo-
ber. However, in one sign of wavering, more than six in ten thought 
the war would end in a compromise. Only two in ten thought the 
war would end in a decisive U.S. victory. A Harris poll found a post-
Tet jump in war support, from 61 to 74 percent, but six weeks later, 
support had fallen to 54 percent. In March, Gallup found almost half 
the respondents saying the U.S. had made a mistake by getting in-
volved in Vietnam, doubling the percentage who said so in August 
1965 (Zaroulis and Sullivan 1984, 155-156).   
CBS News polls also documented the dramatic shift. In 1969, 
only one in four respondents favored immediate withdrawal of all 
American troops; 67 percent opposed. By May 1970, the percentage 
favoring immediate withdrawal was up to 36 percent, and opposition 
slumped to 58 percent. By the end of the next month, the numbers 
had swung even more, 47 percent choosing immediate withdrawal 
and 49 percent opposed. Further, of those who opposed immediate 
withdrawal, only 29 percent said “stick it out in Vietnam, and do 
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whatever is necessary to win.” Nearly two-thirds wanted a gradual 
withdrawal, letting South Vietnam take on more of the fighting. 
Among all respondents, 53 percent thought “we are in a war in Asia 
that we can’t get out of,” while four in ten disagreed (Chandler 1972, 182).
One should caution that these shifts in public opinion were not 
necessarily because of the efficacy of antiwar protests or because the 
change in public opinion moved Congress. Doug McAdam and Yang 
Su (2002) found that extreme tactics by protesters had some limited 
effect in attracting media attention and even in moving public opin-
ion but that extreme measures produced something of a backlash in 
influencing the House and Senate to not vote on war matters. Large, 
peaceful demonstrations were linked with more congressional vot-
ing on war items, but actually correlated with a depressed likelihood 
of pro-peace outcomes. Hawks like Senator Bill Brock (1971), a Re-
publican from Tennessee, caricatured antiwar protests as “partisan 
caterwauling” and “crying wolf” against what he argued were valu-
able tactics like bombing Cambodia and Laos. Brock twisted the 
protests into impediments to the return of POWs and a negotiated 
settlement to what even he was calling a “tragic war.” 
Certainly by 1969, despite congressional hesitation, Vietnam War 
consensus had broken down, if not outright shifted to a new posi-
tion. It’s hard to see, however, that the breakdown overall was elite-
driven. The researcher cross-tabulated the American National Elec-
tion Study (SDA 2008) results with education levels and discovered 
that people with only grade school educations were the leading war 
opponents. College-educated respondents were the strongest war 
supporters. These findings are consistent with past research (Hahn 
1970; Hamilton 1968; O’Brien 1974; Lunch and Sperlich 1979). Bruce 
Franklin (2008) points out that “every study of class composition of 
the antiwar movement has concluded that opposition to the war was 
inversely proportional to both income and education.”  
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The same pattern held true in a 1972 exit poll during the Florida 
primary (Meyer 1972). Overall, 79 percent of respondents opted for 
“mostly agree” with the statement “The U.S. government should be 
moving faster to get out of Vietnam.” This sentiment, once again, 
was strongest among those in the lowest income (87%) and the least 
educated (86%) groups. The highest income group (71%) and the col-
lege educated group (75%) actually were the slowest to decide against 
the war. 
Slowly growing disillusionment with the war also may be found 
among respondents to an April 1973 poll of business and military 
elites, specifically among executive vice-presidents of major United 
States corporations and military officers attending the five war col-
leges (Russett and Hanson 1977). Not surprisingly, military elites 
thought it was correct for the U.S. to send combat troops to Vietnam: 
434 to 171. Business elites tilted in the opposite direction: 210 to 299. 
Some 286 said they’d held their current position since the beginning 
of the war, but almost as many (264) picked a year between 1965 and 
1972 when their opinion formed or changed.
At least in this case study, elites were not driving the breakdown 
of consensus. Rather, they were trailing a lower class that had en-
dured the bulk of the draft, danger, and death of the war. 
By 1968, U.S. public consensus about the Vietnam War already 
had fractured. Polling in April showed identical percentages: 41 per-
cent calling themselves hawks, and 41 percent doves (Gallup 1968a). 
In February, 49 percent thought the U.S. made a mistake by sending 
troops to Vietnam, compared to 42 percent who disagreed (Gallup 
1968b). Two polls in September found the “mistake” percentage had 
risen to 54 in 1968 (Gallup 1968c), then to 58 percent in 1969 (Gallup 
1969a).
When VVAW was presenting media-savvy antiwar protests, 
the problem no longer could be called elite consensus for the 
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war—consensus had broken down, and the breakdown was not led 
by elites. Instead, the VVAW ran smack into backlash and issue 
avoidance stemming from the cognitive dissonance and angst the 
war was generating.
By the time Dewey Canyon III hit Washington, 62 percent of poll 
respondents thought the U.S. would have to reach a compromise war 
settlement with the Communists (Louis Harris 1971a). Some 58 per-
cent thought the war morally wrong (Louis Harris 1971b). Sixty-six 
percent wanted their congressman to vote for a proposal to bring 
all U.S. troops home by the end of the year (Gallup 1971a). The pub-
lic, however, clearly resented the drumbeat of events—especially the 
coverage of events forcing those conclusions.
Antiwar protesters never were popular during the Vietnam War. 
In 1968, two-thirds of respondents disagreed with the proposition 
that the demonstrators in Chicago had their protest rights taken 
away unlawfully (Louis Harris 1968), and 56 percent approved of the 
way Chicago Police dealt with the young people protesting the war 
(Gallup 1968d). Some 71 percent agreed that the “country would be 
better off if there was less protest and dissatisfaction coming from 
college campuses” (National Opinion Research Center 1968).
 In 1969, some 77 percent of poll respondents disapproved of pub-
lic protests against U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Further, 62 per-
cent thought public protests hurt our chances of reaching a peace 
settlement with North Vietnam; only 13 percent thought the protests 
helped. When presented with Nixon’s characterization of a silent 
majority with war opponents as a vocal minority, respondents opted 
to think of themselves as Silent Majority as opposed to Vocal Mi-
nority, 74 to 21 percent (CBS News 1969; Chandler 1972., 165-183). 
Eighty-four percent of white “Middle American” adult respondents 
thought demonstrators on college campuses had been dealt with too 
leniently; the same percentage thought the same of black militants 
(Gallup 1969b).
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One 1969 study of adult men posed the question, “Tell me if you 
think about these [nine-item list] as violence. I don’t mean if they 
lead to violence, but if you think of them as violence in themselves.” 
Thirty-eight percent thought of student protest as intrinsically vio-
lent (Survey Research Center 1969). A 1970 survey of women found 
65 percent of respondents somewhat or strongly opposed to the ac-
tions and goals of student protest (Louis Harris 1970a).  
In 1970, 37 percent of the respondents thought protests against 
the Vietnam War should be declared illegal (Louis Harris 1970b). 
Roughly a quarter thought protests hurt our ability to deal with the 
Communists (Gallup 1970). Harris (1969) phrased the question in 
terms of “people who picket against the war in Vietnam” and found 
59 percent calling these actions more harmful to American life; 
only 18 percent said more helpful. When Nixon polled in advance 
of Dewey Canyon III and other April 1971 protests, 65 percent of 
respondents disapproved of the demonstrations (Opinion Research 
Corporation 1971b).   
Blaming the messenger also took place. Six in ten said the “press 
and TV (television) should never have reported statements by the 
soldiers because all the publicity about My Lai [massacre] can only 
hurt our cause in Vietnam” (Louis Harris 1971c). Among 310 re-
spondents who had heard about the Pentagon Papers, nearly four in 
ten disapproved of the New York Times’ decision to publish the se-
cret, retrospective report on the deceptions and errors leading to the 
Vietnam War. Twenty-six percent thought the New York Times broke 
the law. Respondents split evenly on whether the Times had acted 
responsibly (Opinion Research Corporation 1971c). Of course, the 
press always makes a good scapegoat, especially when it tells people 
things they’d prefer not to hear, read, or see (Halberstam 2003, 126).
During the time VVAW and other protest groups were riddled 
with informants, the public still held a favorable inclination toward 
law enforcement. In 1971, 41 percent of the public thought the FBI 
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had not done enough in its investigations of political and protest 
groups. Further, 31 percent thought it had not done enough in “hav-
ing agents or informers pose as members of militant protest groups.” 
For both questions, only 14 percent said the FBI had gone too far 
(Gallup 1971b).
Protest remained unpopular in 1972. Half the respondents to one 
survey (Louis Harris 1972) thought presidential candidate George 
McGovern had too many ties to radical and protest groups; 31 per-
cent disagreed. Nearly half the respondents to a 1973 Harris survey 
thought student demonstrators who engaged in protests did more 
harm than good. In the same survey, 43 percent agreed with the 
rights-chilling statement “All protest meetings should be reviewed 
in advance by government authorities to be sure that what people are 
protesting is legitimate and they will not urge others to overthrow 
the system.”
TV news crews themselves were not particularly fond of protest-
ers. Roger Mudd (2008) reported that the cameramen hated all the 
tear gas and rock throwing and largely “were very hawkish at one 
point and resented the war protestors, as we all did.” 
TV News—and one could argue nearly all of journalism— 
arrived late to the story of antiwar veterans, well after consensus 
opinion barriers about the war had fallen, even as the public retained 
lingering doubts about protesters. VVAW, of course, was not a typi-
cal protest group, and its credibility was undeniable, even if belatedly 
discovered. Then, true to one of the more maddening conventions 
of journalism, news media dropped the story of VVAW almost as 
quickly as they had found the story. Like children with attention def-
icit disorder, newsrooms went off in search of something fresh, shiny, 
and new. Though many of the VVAW events after Dewey Canyon 
were just as large or dramatic, the VVAW was yesterday’s news—
in today’s slang, “been there, done that.” David Halberstam won a 
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Pulitzer Prize for his Vietnam reporting and later summed up this 
tendency, putting much of the blame on the medium of television 
itself:
As television made things grow larger much more 
quickly, it also had a tendency to let them die more 
quickly too, the roots were not as deep, more of the 
country was living on electronic sand rather than 
on real soil. The saturation point and the point of 
boredom came sooner. People were bored with an 
issue before it was solved, finished, or decided. Tele-
vision heightened the interest in the war in Viet-
nam, heightened for the first time the enthusiasm 
for it, probably quickened its demise, and left people 
saturated, long before the war was in fact over; it was 
over in people’s minds while it was still unfinished 
upon the battlefield. (1979, 407)
Longtime network TV news correspondent Marvin Kalb (2009) 
was kind enough to respond to the author’s inquiry about the decline 
in VVAW coverage. He wrote:
One difference was leadership. In 1971 John Kerry 
was a prominent leader. He was mainstream op-
position, smart, media savvy, brilliant talk before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His glow, 
which upset the White House profoundly, covered 
the protesters too. But Kerry left the group in the 
summer of ’71, after he and other leaders argued 
about tactics and philosophy. He thought they were 
turning too extreme, too ideological, in some cases 
too anti-American. When he broke with the group, 
other moderates followed his example. When the 
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group arrived at the GOP convention, I don’t re-
member them being as large as you say, but in any 
case they had lost much of their earlier luster—and 
relevance. Nixon was pulling troops out of South 
Vietnam, and he was in the midst of foreign sum-
mitry with Russia and China that won him credit 
and admiration. The VVAW was a kind of sideshow 
by then. Antiwar demonstrators didn’t cut it much 
anymore.
Peter Zastrow (1984), a Last Patrol participant who later served on 
the VVAW national board, said, “The press perceived us as becoming 
too radical and therefore somehow losing credibility.” Both Zastrow 
and John Lindquist (1984), another Last Patrol participant who later 
served on the VVAW national board, believe that, in retrospect, the 
FBI infiltration was partially successful in breaking up the south-
ern wing of VVAW. One also should add James Dickerson’s (1998, 
134) tally of U.S. Army counterintelligence units with code names 
such as Punch Block, Lantern Spike, Rose Bush, and Steep Hill. He 
claims those operations had more than fifteen hundred plainclothes 
agents who would dress in street clothes, sometimes pose as news 
reporters, and compile files on more than a hundred thousand citi-
zens, mostly for antiwar and civil rights activity. George Moss (2010, 
212) notes that during the Vietnam era, the FBI, Secret Service, IRS, 
Justice Department, and even the CIA—the latter in violation of its 
charter—all were investigating antiwar organizations and individu-
als. Scott Camil (2009) believes that after the Gainesville Eight trial, 
many members quit VVAW because of the large amount of govern-
ment infiltration and intimidation. Further, with the perception that 
the war was winding down, fewer people were doing the work of 
garnering media attention.
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In the literature reviews and interviews concerning VVAW ac-
tivities, it became apparent that the activities were viewed as a threat 
to the elite initiatives. Initially, the VVAW were the victims of a co-
ordinated and continuous government effort to harass and discredit 
the organization. The four veterans interviewed for this report all 
mentioned harassment of VVAW by the FBI, the Committee to Re-
Elect the President, and the Justice Department. The trial of The Tal-
lahassee Six, later the Gainesville Eight, was essentially a prolonged 
device to drain resources and create a negative public image.
 
 
1972 VVAW protest outside the Committee to Re-Elect the 
President offices in New York City. 
Photo courtesy of VVAW.
The FBI targeted VVAW in a program of surveillance and disrup-
tion of individuals and groups judged to be radical. The targeting 
often included an agent provocateur pushing the group to illegal acts 
(Doyle 1977; Gitlin 1980, 186-189). The national VVAW office identi-
fied twenty to thirty FBI agents in local chapters; many were women 
encouraged to befriend members. The most famous was Sarah Jane 
Moore, the troubled woman who later fired a gun at President Gerald 
Ford (Zastrow et al. 1997). 
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The other targets of COINTELPRO (Counter Intelligence Pro-
gram) activity included the Ku Klux Klan, the Black Panther Party, 
and Jane Fonda. One FBI agent wrote a book of regrets for his role in 
infiltrating VVAW, stating that VVAW was the protest group most 
committed to non-violence (Payne 1979, 84).
  Another informant, Mary Jo Cook, told the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence that the FBI advised her to gain the confidence 
of emotionally unstable members of VVAW by acting as a “big sister” 
for them. She came to regret what she had done and later testified:
The more I understood and defined VVAW/WSO 
[Winter Soldier Organization] as a process, the more 
I became aware that the FBI’s response to this pro-
cess was inimical. The picture painted for me by the 
FBI as a group of “crazies” was replaced by my expe-
rience of VVAW/WSO as an extended family, a com-
munity of people engaged democratically in a self-
help program. I became confused and then alarmed 
that a real involvement in the democratic process 
was not regarded as a positive thing. I resigned from 
the FBI in November 1974 certain that VVAW/WSO 
was a legitimate and valid organization. This resig-
nation was a matter of moral principles and patriotic 
duty. (Senate Select Committee 1975, 114)
Gary Dotterman (2007) tells how the VVAW eventually figured 
out “that the FBI had been paying a VVAW coordinator from Okla-
homa, Arkansas, and Kansas. He would try to provoke violence in 
the rank and file of the vets,” Dotterman wrote. “He would corner 
some vet, then talk about a need to collect weapons and train for a 
rebellion. He spoke to vets about how it might be a good idea to kill 
a senator and congressman.”
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The government’s effort to discredit the VVAW was coordinated 
with the Committee to Re-Elect the President. Both Attorney Gen-
eral John Mitchell and Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian 
had moved over to the committee by the time of the Last Patrol. 
Mardian regularly provided Justice Department Internal Security 
Division reports on VVAW to James McCord, even after Mardian 
supposedly had left the Justice Department (Kendrick 1974, 370-71). 
The threats of violence were somewhat self-fulfilling. FBI informers 
infiltrated VVAW meetings with the thought of provoking the group 
into illegal action (Kendrick 1974, 71; Zastrow 1984; Lindquist 1984; 
Pilisuk 1975). The FBI also planted agents in Flamingo Park and 
may have been responsible for the six mystery explosions that sent 
war-weary veterans into a frantic but fruitless search for the bomber 
(Lindquist 1984; Baxter 1972; Bellows 1972). In fact, VVAW pa-
trols, some of which included recovered drug addicts, caught a few 
people attempting to sell Quaaludes and heroin to the vets. Miami 
Beach police released the drug pushers because the pushers were FBI 
agents (Lindquist 1984).
The VVAW also had reason to suspect people who presented 
themselves as reporters. Herbert Gans (1979, 272), in compiling his 
own fieldwork and congressional investigations, concluded that dur-
ing the era of Vietnam War protests, some news executives allowed 
CIA agents to view network TV film outtakes and magazine report-
er notes. Local television stations also voluntarily supplied film out-
takes of antiwar protests to the CIA, FBI, or local police “red squads” 
to help them identify individual demonstrators. Sheldon Ramsdell 
(1997b) recalled people who were taking photographs and holding 
microphones, but recording only when vets were giving their names, 
addresses, and serial numbers. “We take a picture and escort him 
off. He would be very upset. It only happened two or three times, but 
once was enough.”
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That summer, the federal government had William Lemmer, a 
shadowy figure apparently sent to prompt VVAW to acts that would 
discredit the group, as its star witness. The New York Times found 
circumstantial evidence that he had been paid to inform on the 
VVAW (Kifner 1972d). The local police also had infiltrators Pablo 
Fernandez and Vincent Hannard trying to prompt the VVAW into 
some discrediting act. The head of the Miami Police Department’s 
special investigations section, Adam Limkowski, told the press 
“we were hoping for an overt act necessary to produce a charge of 
conspiracy.” VVAW did not take the bait (Lembcke 1998, 64-65). 
Watergate operative G. Gordon Liddy even had a plan to use in-
formants to identify the most effective protest spokesmen and kid-
nap them during the convention to keep them away from television 
cameras (Dean 1976, 81-87).  
With the government’s efforts to portray VVAW as a menace to 
the establishment, it is of no surprise, given the research on media 
coverage of social movements, that major news organizations ad-
opted a weary and wary attitude toward the group and its efforts. 
By not highlighting the activities of this group, news coverage was 
essentially “protecting” the establishment. If any mention was made 
of VVAW activities, the report generally represented the group as 
largely passive and inconsequential—a technique often used by the 
press to minimize the sense of threat posed by a group (Gamson 
and Wolfsfield 1993; Tichenor, Donahue, and Olien 1980). As seen 
in the news reports of the VVAW protest in Miami, the veterans 
were described as “well disciplined” and as “sitting quietly in pro-
test in the sun” (White 1973, 242).  The non-threatening character-
ization clearly comes across. 
Past observations regarding media and social movements claim 
that the only time voices of opposition are heard in the news is when 
conflict exists among the elite. If members of the elite cannot agree 
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on a particular policy stance, then the likelihood of seeing divergent 
views openly expressed in the news increases. By 1972, however, the 
Vietnam War themes adopted by the nation’s elite were that the war 
was coming to a close and that social protests against the war were 
in decline. These were themes also adopted by newsrooms across the 
country. 
In 1972, accredited correspondents in Vietnam numbered 295, 
down from a high of 637 during the Tet Offensive (Knightley 1975, 
398, citing Military Assistance Command, Vietnam). The remain-
ing correspondents were told by their editors to approach stories 
from the angle of the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces. The VVAW’s 
pointing out the reality that a record number of persons in Indochi-
na were being killed, maimed, or made homeless conflicted with the 
conventional wisdom that the Vietnam War was “winding down” 
(Knightley 1975, 398; Epstein 1973, 17, 250). The “winding down” 
theme had been in place at the networks for even longer. In March 
1969, the executive producer of the ABC Evening News, Av Westin, 
asked the correspondents to shift focus “from combat pieces to in-
terpretive ones, pegged to the eventual pull-out of American forces.” 
Much the same was happening at NBC. In November 1968, the exec-
utive producer told the staff that the story was now the negotiations, 
not the fighting. Combat footage still was sent for the evening news, 
but use dropped from three or four times a week to three times in a 
two-month period (Epstein 1973, 17-18). 
A number of factors contributed to this theme of the war “wind-
ing down.” For instance, during the protest march in Miami Beach, 
reporters found it easy perhaps to stereotype the VVAW as an insig-
nificant part of a dying cause. In fact, the war protest movement defi-
nitely was declining in the summer of 1972. The draft had ended, as 
had the ground combat role in Vietnam (Kraft 1972). Troop strength 
in Vietnam was down to 39,000 (“News in Brief” Los Angeles Times, 
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August 21, 1972). Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin had retired from 
street politics (Associated Press, 1972c). Other activists were busy 
working on the McGovern campaign. 
Furthermore, Miami Beach was far from the center of protest ac-
tivity and had few local radical groups (Kraft 1972, 23; Dillin 1972b). 
The original plan had been for a convention in San Diego, but the 
Nixon Administration eventually turned against that idea because 
of thousands of antiwar activists in Southern California (Magruder 
1974; Dean 1976, 52fn). When only five to ten thousand protesters 
showed up in Miami Beach, the news story became the decline in 
protest activity (“Beach Weighs Request” Miami Herald, August 2, 
1972). The ultraconservative National Review seized upon the small 
protest turnout and declared the protest a flop run by “disreputable 
drifters and spaced-out types.” National Review also chastised Rep. 
Pete McCloskey for distributing convention passes to a “war pro-
tester who seized this opportunity to heckle the President during 
his acceptance speech” (“Convention Notes” September 15, 1972). 
Through careful wording, the VVAW presence was not revealed; and 
Ron Kovic was not described as disabled or as a Vietnam veteran.
Repeatedly, VVAW made attempts to geographically and ideo-
logically separate themselves from other protesters, but journalists 
chose the course of least resistance and lumped VVAW into the “last 
gasp of war protest” stories. Ed Fouhy (2009), longtime CBS producer 
and bureau chief, covered the convention and participated in edito-
rial meetings before the live coverage; he does not recall the vets. He 
writes, “[T]here are so many demonstrations at political conventions 
it would have been difficult for the vets to stand out from the back-
ground noise at the ’72 GOP gathering in Miami. It may also have 
been that the police had so isolated demonstrators from the conven-
tion goers that I was not aware of their presence.”
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Two U.S. magazines complained about press tendencies to arbi-
trarily categorize VVAW.  John Osborne wrote in New Republic:
The tragedy for the country, though not for the 
Nixon people, was that the miscellaneous yippies, 
fags, dikes and extreme militants who monopolized 
the news during the first days of the convention ob-
scured the steady discipline of the Vietnam Veter-
ans Against the War and the main forces of dissent 
assembled by David Dellinger and Rennie Davis in 
the Miami Conventions Coalition. Watching the un-
kempt legions of the outraged and in some instances 
outrageous young at their work in the streets, I con-
cluded that they were driven to excess by a sense of 
their own futility. I was torn between admiration for 
the best of them and regret that they were so effec-
tively assisting the Nixon design. (1972)
Phil Tracy echoed the complaints for Commonweal, beginning 
with praise for the march on Miami Beach High School: 
The veteran’s protest parade on Monday was an 
exercise in dignified and justified outrage. The dis-
tance between that march and the marauding band 
of thugs who ran down Collins Avenue Wednesday 
night, slashing tires, disabling buses, breaking win-
dows and beating up those whose only crime was 
trying to get home from work on the wrong day is 
the distance between moral outrage and nascent fas-
cism. The bullies who pushed and shoved a middle-
aged couple on their way to vote for Nixon-Agnew 
were little more than brown shirts in blue denim. 
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Whatever the causes, whatever atrocities have made 
them that way, these punks were libidinally linked 
to the current status quo and mock what the veter-
ans marched for. (1972)
 Unfortunately, neither New Republic nor Commonweal saw fit to 
redress that imbalance with detailed accounts of the Last Patrol. The 
two only made passing references to VVAW events. Furthermore, to 
lessen the threat of the VVAW, instead of disparaging the veterans, 
as they had done with the other protesters, they portrayed the veter-
ans as passive. They described the veterans as being “dignified” and 
showing “steady discipline.” In other words, the veterans were safely 
contained. The novelty of their heretical social movement was gone. 
They weren’t a story anymore.
One key news expectation also worked against VVAW. With the 
nominations sewn up and the protest movement in decline, national 
news organizations went to Miami Beach working under the self-
fulfilling prophecy that they would get little news and much hoopla. 
The Los Angeles Times was so moved by the dearth of news from 
traditional sources that it ran an account headlined “Top Stories Run 
Gamut as Media Face Slow Day.” The story described what the morn-
ing TV news shows and other newspapers were highlighting “in the 
absence of a major event” (Witcover August 22, 1972). As that report 
hit the newsstands on the west coast, the vets, fresh from the Na-
tional Guard confrontation, began the Silent March.
Even the book publishing industry missed the importance of 
events such as the Last Patrol. For instance, in The Making of the 
President 1972, famed chronicler of presidential elections Theodore 
H. White failed to include accounts of the Last Patrol. He gives 
only passing mention to “lean, hard-muscled Vietnam veterans 
sitting quietly in protest in the sun on the street paving before the 
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Fontainebleau to protest the war.” This statement is the only refer-
ence to Last Patrol, VVAW, or Tallahassee Six that appears in the 
book.
Melvin Small (1987) cites boredom as the cause of waning media 
attention. He notes:  “After several years of spectacular and unprece-
dented mass marches and demonstrations, the media became bored. 
Media inattention was one of the reasons why the antiwar move-
ment came to an apparent halt in 1971.” The near daily and usually 
predictable activities were unable to sustain journalistic attention 
(Small 2002, 151; Spencer 2005, 65). 
Some thirty thousand Americans had been killed in Vietnam 
when Nixon entered office. Almost ten thousand more perished dur-
ing the first year of his presidency and another five thousand in the 
next three years. The war was drawing to its ignominious close and 
the eventual grim tally of 57,939 Americans dead or missing in ac-
tion (Karnow 1984, 2, 601; Kraft 1972). The VVAW clearly wanted to 
hasten that end. For the first time in American history, thousands of 
returned veterans were protesting a war still in progress (Lindquist 
1984; Davis 2007; MacPherson 2001, 55). Yet, through federal gov-
ernment commission and press omission, the VVAW simply flashed 
and faded as a news story on network TV and in the nation’s news-
papers and magazines.
News coverage of VVAW yields mixed results from what social 
movement theory would suggest. One could argue that these high-
credibility antiwar veterans threatened power elites. Certainly the 
organization threatened and worried the Nixon Administration, 
which responded with intense resistance, with actions ranging from 
legal harassment to manufactured countervailing groups. This lends 
support to Todd Gitlin’s observation (1980, 24) that an increase in 
coverage can lead to an increase in resistance in a battle to control 
and define the images key to the success of protest movements. 
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Daniel Hallin’s point about avoiding cognitive dissonance (for re-
porters, editors, and for that matter the public) and Warren Breed’s 
(1955) point about social conformity both are borne out repeatedly 
in historical accounts and in polling data from the era. 
The one area where social movement theory clearly was at odds 
with VVAW news coverage was in the McLeod and Hertog expec-
tation of a violence frame. This difference likely resulted from the 
VVAW’s stress on discipline and restraint, even when engaged in 
civil disobedience. VVAW avoided even the FBI and police efforts to 
entice it to violence, a point validated by the verdict in the Gaines-
ville Eight trial. VVAW tried its level best to separate itself from vio-
lent or chaotic groups. It largely succeeded in this regard, with the 
possible exception of the Last Patrol, where it was grouped together 
in a “last gasp of war protest” frame. 
Patricia Hipsher (2007) claimed that heretical social movements 
must be cast as aberrant. That point generally held true, but only 
after Nixon loyalists created an alternate group for easy media ac-
cess. It mattered little that VVAW was much larger than Veterans for 
a Just Peace. VVAW brought thousands of people to Miami for the 
Last Patrol, while Veterans for a Just Peace numbered fifty (B. Davis 
2007). TV journalists tended to put one “pro” sound bite against one 
“anti” sound bite and to stop analysis at that point in a superficial 
act of bogus balance. This journalistic convention made it easier to 
dismiss VVAW.
After Dewey Canyon III, covering the VVAW made no sense to 
journalists. The prominent frame was the ending of U.S. involve-
ment in the Vietnam War. The public and the journalists responding 
to that public were eager to get past the angst the war had gener-
ated. Antiwar veterans became a reminder of what the public wished 
would go away. The press and broadcast reporters saw no need to 
continue coverage or to find a fresh angle. 
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This variation in news coverage fits nicely with one of the ear-
liest observations about the limits and flaws of journalism. Walter 
Lippman (1922) wrote about how journalism was like a spotlight 
endlessly moving about, moving one development and then another 
out of darkness and into light. This spotlighting had some beneficial 
effects but was insufficient to read by or to make informed decisions 
by, or to build a body of knowledge upon. From the point of view of 
social movements, major media can be counted on only as a “fleeting 
friend” at most. 
Yet journalistic habit and Nixon Administration subversion alone 
cannot explain how the VVAW changed both in its internal dynam-
ics and its public face as the 1970s progressed. Bobby Muller, one 
of the wheelchair-bound vets who heckled Nixon, had some good 
insights on how things changed and what those changes meant. His 
activism began early. He was injured in Vietnam in 1969, losing the 
function of his legs. His hospital ward was the centerpiece of a Life 
magazine cover story, May 22, 1970, about “Our Forgotten Veter-
ans.” Muller became the ward spokesman as other media did follow-
up stories. “I stopped shaving,” he said. “I had a beard and long hair. 
If you’re going to treat me like an animal, all right, I’ll look like one.” 
Congressional hearings also drew attention to the national scandal 
(Muller 2007, 209).
VVAW members sought him out; they shared common experi-
ences and promoted a common cause. Though Muller never formal-
ly joined VVAW, he did a lot of media appearances for the group, for 
instance, on Dick Cavett’s and David Susskind’s shows. The opera-
tion didn’t require joiners or impose uniformity. Muller stated:
The thing that was beautiful about VVAW is that 
when we had a protest or we had a rally, you didn’t 
have to tell guys, “This is what you say.” You didn’t 
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have to tell them what the party line was. You just 
say, “Hey, what’s your experience brother?” Each 
guy would tell his story and it was just understood 
that the war was ridiculous. We never had guys on 
the other side of that issue. There were a handful, 
but they were political hacks that had gotten recruit-
ed by the right-wing elements (Muller 1997, 210).
For Muller, and likely many others, VVAW was not just an anti-
war statement; it was camaraderie, brotherhood, and therapy. Later, 
the group learned that many of their fellow vets shared their antiwar 
sentiments but did not feel comfortable expressing their views in the 
small, rural communities to which they returned. Their mood was 
more like “I don’t want to talk about it. Let’s get on with it” (Muller 
1997, 210-211).
These operational characteristics that made VVAW credible, sin-
cere, and effective, however, also made long-term sustained news cov-
erage difficult. VVAW members often disagreed on tactics or on who 
spoke for them (Nicosia 2001, 117, 127; Brinkley 2004, 365; Halstead 
1978, 610). Nicosia overstated the case when he blamed post-trau-
matic stress and quoted Jack Smith about “crazies” who “had taken 
too much incoming” as the cause of VVAW strife (Nicosia 2001, 117). 
The group had strong members who had strong opinions about goals 
and tactics. In the mid-1970s, the differences grew when members of 
a Marxist-Leninist group, the Revolutionary Union (later renamed 
the Revolutionary Communist Party) became active in VVAW. By 
1978, that tension led to a split where those splinter members created 
VVAW-AI [Anti-Imperialist] while the larger group carried on with 
the goals of peace, amnesty, and veterans’ care (Nicosia 2001, 312-
313; Moser 1996, 127).
125
F e A T U r e D ,  T H e N  F o r g o T T e N
Philip Caputo (1977), who later would write a best-selling book 
on Vietnam, noted that many vets both opposed the war and felt 
emotionally tied to it. He drifted into the antiwar movement, joined 
VVAW, and naively believed that his 1970 mailing of his campaign 
ribbons to Nixon would have an impact. The medals were returned 
with a curt letter from a staffer. “My grand gesture of personal pro-
test had been futile, as futile as the war itself,” he wrote.
Caputo, like Kovic, went to war with President Kennedy’s call to 
national service ringing in his ears. Both came from communities 
that unquestioningly supported their country’s call to war, and both 
believed they would be playing “cop” to communist “robbers” in an 
honorable fight. Both would write of their world of growing disillu-
sion, a world of naïve but good young men sanctioned to kill, to build 
body counts. These men sank to a brutish state in a hostile coun-
try, facing a relentless enemy in an increasingly nonsensical mission 
(Martin 1993). It is no wonder that so many veterans became silent, 
haunted. This silence made interviewing difficult even for reporters 
who bucked the mediated “war winding down” theme and the later 
“let’s not talk Vietnam; it’s too painful” attitude.
VVAW merits only one paragraph in Robert Mann’s tome about 
Vietnam, A Grand Delusion (2001, 680), and most of that mention 
concentrates on the “gaunt, fatigues-clad” Kerry testifying to a con-
gressional committee. A vet like Kerry was an easier “sell” to news-
rooms and to a public dubious about the war but despising long-
haired protesters. Kalb’s (2009) lauding of Kerry’s leadership shows 
how well Kerry played in newsrooms. The Newsweek coverage of 
Dewey Canyon contained a picture of Kerry with praise for both his 
heroic background and nonviolent protest technique.
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                           CLICK TO LISTEN 
Democracy Now: John Kerry in 2004 and during 
his 1971 senate testimony against the Vietnam War. 
Courtesy of Pacifica Radio Archives. Available from 
the Internet Archive at archive.org.
Journalists were attracted to Kerry as VVAW spokesman because 
of more than just his role as one member of the six-man executive 
committee at the time of Dewey Canyon III, his leadership skills, or 
even his speaking ability. Kerry, the patrician scion of a wealthy Bos-
ton family, volunteered for the Navy and for hazardous duty despite 
his reservations about the war. He was not some grungy, working-
class draftee who turned against the war, grew his hair long, and 
might have seemed menacing to middle America, or at least middle- 
and upper-class America. Further, as Herbert Gans (1979, 58, 127) 
found when he studied network news and two news magazines, jour-
nalists from these elite media outlets tend to have trouble crossing 
social barriers to find new sources. They rely on a small set of peers, 
friends, relatives, other media, and elite sources. Thus, disorders in 
affluent areas or elite institutions are more likely to receive coverage 
than disorders happening elsewhere.   
Television reporters of the time seem to have decided that Ameri-
can viewers were not ready to listen to the angry voices of their own 
frustrated working-class warriors but that they would accept care-
fully crafted words from a young man who could be an unthreaten-
ing guest at any dinner table. The irony is that, during this time, the 
working class who supplied the U.S. soldiers for the Vietnam War 
relied on TV news more than on other sources and used the medium 
more than the upper and middle classes did (Szymanski 1983, 334).
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In the days following John Forbes Kerry’s testimony before Con-
gress, he became a “media darling, and thus a bane of the Nixon 
Administration” (Brinkley 2004, 379). Articles about him appeared 
in Newsweek, the New York Times, and the Washington Post. An As-
sociated Press profile of Kerry appeared in more than a hundred 
newspapers. A Boston Globe reporter, Barbara Rabinovitz, visited his 
Waltham home and found their conversation interrupted by phone 
calls, television tapings, and quick gulps of ginger ale and choco-
late chip cookies. She noted that Kerry had put away the fatigues 
worn during Dewey Canyon III and was wearing “sports glen-plaid 
pants, wide orange and blue ties, and a blue shirt with the mono-
gram ‘JFK.’” A few weeks later, Morley Safer filmed a profile piece for 
60 Minutes. Safer was impressed by Kerry’s thoughtful reflections 
and range of interests. “I was knocked out,” Safer recalled, “I never 
heard somebody so articulate during all my days covering Vietnam” 
(Brinkley 2004, 379).  The 60 Minutes broadcast set off a second wave 
of mediated interest (Brinkley 2004, 381).
Of course, there are several inherent problems in having a one-
man Rolodex for antiwar veterans. Kerry quickly became the focus 
of personal attacks from the other side. White House tapes verify 
that on April 28, 1971, President Nixon and aide Charles Colson 
had a phone conversation about the twenty-seven-year-old veteran 
who had turned against the war. They derided him as a phony and 
even exchanged some false information about where he slept during 
Dewey Canyon. Colson then wrote a secret memo about the need to 
“[d]estroy the young demagogue before he becomes another Ralph 
Nader” (Brinkley 2004, 378). The media attention to Kerry also mag-
nified real differences and petty jealousies with other VVAW mem-
bers. Kerry stuck with the group through the summer of 1971, but 
when he parted ways with VVAW, yet another factor was in place for 
the dramatic decline in coverage by the time of the Last Patrol.   
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Highlights
News treatment of VVAW generally followed the patterns suggested 
by various authors describing social movements and news media.
One notable exception was the notion that VVAW attention rose in 
response to fragmented elite consensus. Public opinion data show a 
breakdown of consensus about the war long before the media discov-
ered VVAW. Furthermore, the greatest war opposition came from 
lower, not upper, classes.
The war itself grew increasingly unpopular over time, but public 
disapproval of antiwar protesters remained fairly high and steady 
throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Declining coverage can be explained by many factors: excessive news 
reliance on Kerry (who by 1972 had left VVAW), disagreements 
within the organization, an extensive government effort to discredit 
VVAW, and a news tendency to think “we’ve done our antiwar vet-
erans story.”
       
8
A Broader Meaning 
As time passed after the fall of Saigon, Vietnam Veterans faced me-
dia frames that weren’t particularly desirable. Antiwar veteran Tim 
Pluta (2009) observed that coverage of Vietnam veterans “tend[s] 
to be at the extremes of the range of the many vets from that time. 
There are either stories of the drug addict, alcoholic homeless vet or 
the vet made good that got into politics. The vast majority of vets that 
fall in between appear to have slipped through the cracks of media 
interest and thus from the minds of much of the general public that 
is led and informed by media reports.”
The news media’s dichotomous Vietnam Veterans frames also 
showed up in one public opinion poll during the late 1970s. The Vet-
erans Administration (1979), working with Lou Harris and Associ-
ates, asked the public whether certain characteristics applied more 
to “the average young veteran who happened to serve anywhere in 
the Armed Forces during the Vietnam era,” or “to the average young 
person who didn’t happen to serve during that time,” or equally to 
both. The “equally to both” option achieved a plurality for all ques-
tions, and a majority for most. Nevertheless, the public opinion re-
sults revealed some differences in public perception of Vietnam-era 
veterans versus non-veterans.
Veterans outpaced their non-veteran cohort in public perception 
of certain admirable characteristics. Only 9 percent of respondents 
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called vets more unpatriotic, but 30 percent would apply that term 
comparatively to non-veteran civilians of the same age. Respondents 
were three times, 18 percent to 6 percent, more likely to say that the 
non-vets rather than the vets had lost respect for the family. Regard-
ing “spoiled, expect things given to them,” 31 percent put that more 
squarely on the non-vets versus only 7 percent for Vietnam veterans. 
Only one in twenty would attribute being selfish and self-centered 
more to the vets, but nearly one in four said that about non-veterans. 
Further, 22 percent of respondents thought failure to keep tradition 
and an excess interest in changing things should apply more to non-
vets; only 13 percent said more to vets.
Equal groups of 16 percent of respondents thought vets and non-
vets willing to take active roles regarding issues and politics, but the 
public by nine percentage points thought the vets less willing to rebel 
or protest (27 to 18), and by ten percentage points (20 to 10) less likely 
to take part in school and community affairs. Neither group stood 
out for public scorn for loose morals; only 11 percent for non-vets, 9 
for vets. 
The image of the Vietnam veteran as noble but troubled and 
tormented war remnant comes through in this survey. The public 
rated assertiveness and being outspoken as roughly even between 
the vets and non-vets, but by five percentage points (20 to 15), the 
public chose non-vets as better able to get a job, and by four per-
centage points better at holding a job. Though the vets scored better 
than non-vets concerning their discipline and willingness to work to 
get ahead, the public was three times more likely to attribute drink-
ing problems, four times more likely to attribute drug problems, and 
nearly five times more likely to attribute suicide attempts to Vietnam 
veterans as opposed to non-veterans of the same era. The public also 
by five percentage points was more likely to think of the non-vets 
rather than the vets as knowing what they want and having clear 
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goals, and 13 percent more likely to attribute being well educated, 
trained, and prepared for a job to the non-veterans.
Resurrecting History 
Similar to media coverage, the historical record failed to adequately 
depict the reality of the war. The powerful documentary Two Days 
in October (Kenner 2005), based on the David Maraniss book They 
Marched into Sunlight (2003), tells the story of two events, both oc-
curring on October 17 and 18, 1967. One was a massive protest at the 
University of Wisconsin, Madison. The demonstrators wanted Dow 
Chemical, maker of napalm, not to be allowed on campus to recruit. 
Madison Police brutally evicted the student protesters who had been 
occupying a campus building. At the same time, forty miles north-
west of Saigon, the U.S. Army’s 1st Division, the Black Lions, suf-
fered devastating losses in an ambush. Major Jim Shelton survived 
the ambush and was astonished to see the military brass try to spin 
it into a victory. “Who’s to tell what really happened if that’s the way 
history is written,” he lamented (Kenner 2005).
Diaries, letters, oral history, news clippings, and documentary 
footage all are useful in rescuing the stories of soldiers, protesters, 
and protesting soldiers from the safe stereotypes of popular culture 
and mythology-resurrecting revisionism. Yet we should not allow 
social movements like those antiwar veterans’ groups to be relegated 
to dusty, forgotten corners of the public record.
Historian Barbara Tuchman (1984) reminds readers—and his-
torical records like the Pentagon Papers confirm—that ignorance 
was not really a factor in the American tragedy in Vietnam. The 
problem was one of refusing to accept the conclusions of mounting 
evidence that the goal was unobtainable, the cost disproportionate 
to American interest, and the ultimate effect damaging to America’s 
reputation and disposable power in the world.
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One certainly can find historical obfuscation not only of that un-
comfortable conclusion but also about antiwar protests and antiwar 
veterans. W. D. Ehrhart (2008) on January 18, 1982, delivered re-
marks to students at the George School, Newtown, Pennsylvania. He 
expressed concern that the lessons of the Pentagon Papers had been 
ignored, that those responsible for the Vietnam deceits still had high 
positions in the establishment, and that then-president Ronald Rea-
gan referred to Vietnam as a noble cause.
Two recent books on Vietnam aimed at young readers make 
sloppy errors or misleading suggestions regarding VVAW. The Eye-
witness Books series’ Vietnam War (S. Murray 2005) contains a Mi-
ami Beach photo of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War march-
ing behind a banner at the Last Patrol. The caption declares, “Many 
antiwar veterans threw away their medals in protest.” This caption 
implies a simultaneous event, not one that had happened a year ear-
lier. Further, the book points out, on the left margin, that one plac-
ard is a VVAW symbol and that a nearby flag is North Vietnamese. 
Other flags are not identified, and it’s not clear who, on the edge of 
the march, is carrying it. A more straightforward account appears 
in The Vietnam Antiwar Movement in American History (McCor-
mick 2000). This book has one paragraph on VVAW, an account of 
the medals event at the Capitol. Unfortunately, the date is wrong, 
and the text states, “They threw down the Congressional Medals of 
Honor they had won in combat” (McCormick 2000).  A more accu-
rate phrase would have read: Bronze Stars, Purple Hearts, and other 
medals and ribbons. 
The media path traveled by the VVAW had unique moments but 
also historic parallels. Newsreels were the prime visual medium of 
1932, but camera crews rarely showed up at the Bonus March camps, 
though cameramen were told to cover any outbreak of violence. Fox 
and Hearst cameramen had specific orders from New York head-
quarters to shun the vets. Paramount carried only one short item; 
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Pathé  carried two. Still photo coverage was better, and some vets 
supported themselves selling still photos as postcards. The Bonus 
March vets created a newspaper, B. E. F. News, that claimed street 
sales of fifty thousand and out-of-town sales of twenty-five thousand. 
As with VVAW in Miami Beach, the veterans’ camp had a number of 
police spies and informers (Dickson and Allen 2004).
The VVAW serves as an important historic link between the Bo-
nus Army and a later protest group, the Iraq Veterans Against the 
War. Indeed, VVAW members have appeared with Iraq Veterans at 
several peace conferences and forums. Veteran and peace activist 
Tim Pluta (2009) wrote to this author, “There are some younger folks 
that are beginning to research and interview Vietnam era vets with 
what I would consider a more open and broad-minded approach. 
Perhaps the lessons learned will be learned by this next generation 
rather than ours.”
Disturbingly, however, the media patterns have been eerily simi-
lar. Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans held their own Winter Soldier 
testimony in 2008. Much like the original Winter Soldier hearings, 
the event largely went ignored by the nation’s news media.
 
 
The Winter Soldier event returns, this time regarding Iraq and Afghanistan.
Photo courtesy of VVAW.
F o U N D ,  F e A T U r e D ,  T H e N  F o r g o T T e N
134
 
CLICK TO VIEW VIDEO
Journalist Aaron Glantz on his Project Censored Award for covering
Winter Soldier 2008. Courtesy of Link Media, Inc. 
Available from the Internet Archive at www.archive.org.
Bill Davis, one of the many VVAW quoted in this book, died on 
September 4, 2007. David Cline, also quoted, died eleven days later. 
Their deaths are a reminder that although many of these brave young 
men died in Vietnam, many others lived to face their mortality much 
later in life. Many of these anti-warriors are old men now. Years ago 
they thought of themselves as John Wayne, headed off to heroic bat-
tle in service of noble cause and country. Harsh reality taught them 
otherwise, and they said so. “In scores, if not hundreds of novels, 
memoirs, poems, films, plays, and works of criticism about the Viet-
nam War, John Wayne is parodied, debunked, reviled, rejected, and 
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Bill Davis, Chicago Veterans Day 2004. 
Photo courtesy of VVAW.
 
CLICK TO VIEW VIDEO
Bill Davis and Peter Zastrow, VVAW Veterans Day Event, Nov. 11, 2003, in Chicago. 
Courtesy of VVAW. 




Photo courtesy of VVAW.
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CLICK TO VIEW VIDEO
Dave Cline at the VVAW 25th anniversary event, May 30, 1992, in New York City. 
Courtesy of VVAW.
The vets defied convention and the odds, finding creative ways, 
anywhere and everywhere, to tell their stories to people not quite 
ready to hear them. Then, as convention and consensus cracked in 
April 1971, the world became ready to see and hear. So in the same 
city where the American quagmire in Vietnam began in deceit and 




CLICK TO VIEW VIDEO
This student documentary is a good summary.  
Courtesy of VVAW.
F o U N D ,  F e A T U r e D ,  T H e N  F o r g o T T e N
138
For a brief moment, the television lights swung in their direction, 
and the vets were ready. The lights quickly swung elsewhere, but the 
vets continued to fight against the war, against future wars, and for 
veterans’ care. Their narrative is a part of our national story, a narra-
tive that intersects so many other story lines—a paranoid president 
and his Watergate scandals, post-traumatic stress and other injuries 
suffered by our veterans, the parallels to the folly that is the Iraq War, 
the lies and lingering resentments of the “swift boat” veterans (an ad 
hoc political group that in 2006 misrepresented and attacked Kerry’s 
war record), the inconclusive national effort to reconcile ourselves to 
our history in Vietnam, and the superficial tendencies of our news 
media that still manage to stumble upon something profound.
Hunter S. Thompson (1971), the self-described “gonzo journalist” 
who later caught and relayed the drama of the Silent March, seemed 
to catch part of the meaning, even though at the time, he was remi-
niscing of San Francisco in the middle 1960s:
   
It seems like a lifetime, or at least a Main Era—the 
kind of peak that never comes again . . . a very spe-
cial time and place to be a part of. Maybe it meant 
something. Maybe not, in the long run . . . but no 
explanation, no mix of words or music or memo-
ries can touch that sense of knowing that you were 
there and alive in that corner of time and the world. 
Whatever it meant. . . . History is hard to know, be-
cause of all the hired bullshit, but even without be-
ing sure of “history” it seems entirely reasonable to 
think that every now and then the energy of a whole 
generation comes to a head in a long fine flash, 
for reasons that nobody really understands at the 
time—and which never explain, in retrospect, what 
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actually happened. . . . There was madness in any 
direction, at any hour. . . . You could strike sparks 
anywhere. There was a fantastic universal sense that 
whatever we were doing was right, that we were win-
ning. . . . And that, I think, was the handle—that 
sense of inevitable victory over the forces of Old and 
Evil. Not in any mean or military sense; we didn’t 
need that. Our energy would simply prevail. There 
was no point in fighting—on our side or theirs. We 
had all the momentum; we were riding the crest of 
a high and beautiful wave. . . . So now, less than five 
years later, you can go up on a steep hill in Las Ve-
gas and look West, and with the right kind of eyes 
you can almost see the high-water mark—that place 
where the wave finally broke and rolled back.
If you look closely, you can see a similar high water mark, on the 
Capitol Mall from April 1971, courtesy of the VVAW. Frank Toner, 
a former Catholic altar boy in Middletown, New York, turned disil-
lusioned soldier and VVAW member, wrote during a reunion gath-
ering, “We have seen the positive impact a small group of people can 
have when they work together to promote brotherhood and sister-
hood. . . . Just a few thousand people can wake up the consciousness 
of a nation and help end a war. We know, we did it” (Barry 1997c).
The men who triumphed in Vietnam now are gray-haired, and 
many of their lives have taken intriguing turns. Art Blank, a psy-
chiatrist who served in Vietnam and who, in 1982, joined the Vet-
erans Administration to run the Vet Center program, estimates that 
roughly 10 percent of the 567 Vet Center leaders were in VVAW. 
Many times, these men help their fellow Vietnam Vets who are suf-
fering from delayed stress—an estimated 500,000 to 700,000 people, 
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a quarter of those who served in Vietnam, half of those who saw 
heavy combat (MacPherson 2001, 191, 236). Many VVAW members 
also took up the cause of amnesty for those who faced punishment 
for war resistance (Halstead 1978, 704).
Ron Kovic grew disaffected with VVAW, but also disaffected with 
what the Vietnam lies say about society. He and director Oliver Stone 
were nominated for an Academy Award for the Born on the Fourth 
of July screenplay, and both won the Golden Globe. Kovic also was 
profiled in a book series chronicling the lives of the physically chal-
lenged (Moss 1994). Bobby Muller went on to form Vietnam Veter-
ans of America. Muller had survived a landmine blast in Vietnam 
unscathed, only to be paralyzed later by wounds from enemy gun-
fire. He went on to become a leader in an international group work-
ing to ban landmines, a group that, in 1997, won the Nobel Peace 
Prize (Clines 1997). 
            
 
Bobby Muller (left) and Barry Romo (right) at a 2008 version of 
  Winter Soldier for Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Photo courtesy of VVAW.
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John Kerry made his mark in the U.S. Senate and secured the 
2004 Democratic Party presidential nomination. He endured seven 
million dollars worth of attack ads from a group calling itself “Boat 
Veterans for Truth.” The spurious claims of these ads tried to cast 
doubt on whether Kerry had actually earned the Bronze Star he won 
for rescuing an imperiled Green Beret (Schorr 2007). 
“Swift boat” ads may be found here, Living Room 
Candidate, Museum of the Moving Image. Link is 
http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/2004.
Yet the run-of-the-mill VVAW member is in many ways still 
fighting—fighting not the war itself, nor the battle to end it. Now 
their fight is one of fact versus fiction, a struggle for the historical 
memory of their social movement.
   
John Zutz (1998) pointed out, 
“The image of the Vietnam vet 
in the early 1970s was strongly 
antiwar. There is no place in the 
American memory for the factu-
ally accurate image of vets throw-
ing their medals back at Congress. 
Their image had to be changed if 
the United States wanted to go to 
war again.”  
 
             John Zutz, March 2008. 
                   Photo courtesy of VVAW.
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S. Brian Willson (2000) worried about the effort to reframe the 
loss of Vietnam into a noble cause, one better served in the future 
by using proxy forces and high-tech weapons. Such a reframing 
would lose important lessons about the lies and hubris. One long-
time member of Veterans for Peace, David Taylor (2009), argues that 
mainstream media are too corporate to challenge government calls 
to “support the mission,” even if that mission is supported by claims 
as bogus as the Gulf of Tonkin incident or the many lies leading to 
the Iraq War.
 
CLICK TO VIEW VIDEO
VVAW member Joe Miller’s closing remarks at the VVAW’s 40th anniversary 
event, Aug. 4, 2007, in Chicago. Miller relays his Gulf of Tonkin experience and 
gives his perspective about factors that led to the war. 
Courtesy of VVAW.
Lembke (1999) also put it well:
Remembered as a war that was lost because of por-
trayal at home, Vietnam becomes a modern-day 
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Alamo that must be avenged, a pretext for more war 
and generations of more veterans. Remembered as a 
war in which soldiers and pacifists joined hands to 
fight for peace, Vietnam symbolizes popular resis-
tance to political authority and the dominant im-
ages of what it means to be a good American. By 
challenging the images of the betrayed Vietnam vet-
eran, we reclaim our role in the writing of our own 
history, the construction of our own memory, and 
the making of our own identity.
The lingering VVAW struggle must be to preserve the nuggets 
of truth in the historical record and in some of the news coverage 
against the simplifications and distortions of popular culture. Those 
who struggle against power also struggle against common percep-
tions. Heretical, but significant, social movements like VVAW go 
through stages of treatment by the larger society. Initially, the groups 
operate undiscovered. When finally they emerge and protest, they 
are ignored or dismissed as simply not possible. Later the dismissal 
switches to an assertion that they are wholly unrepresentative of any 
larger phenomenon or group. 
If the group continues to grow, it is stereotyped, the represen-
tations emphasizing some irrelevant characteristic or minor par-
ticipant. If they continue to challenge power, some least-threatening 
leaders or messages are adopted within the power structure. Then 
with the passage of time, the group message is distorted to favor 
establishment themes, until the bulk of historical popular memory 
forgets them entirely.
Such a fate should not be allowed to happen to VVAW. The rea-
sons, by now, should be obvious, but perhaps were best summarized 
that summer of 1971 by Pentagon analyst turned antiwar activist 
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Daniel Ellsberg (“Pentagon Papers” Time, June 28, 1971): “To see the 
conflict and our part in it as a tragedy without villains, war crimes 
without criminals, lies without liars, espouses and promulgates a 
view of process, roles and motives that is not only grossly mistaken 
but which underwrites deceits that have served a succession of Presi-
dents.” 
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Highlights
As time passed, an image of Vietnam veterans as noble but troubled 
ex-warriors emerged. This image was reinforced by both news cover-
age and popular culture entertainment.
Historically, one can see many similarities in news coverage of the 
1932 veterans’ Bonus Army, the VVAW of the 1970s, and today’s an-
tiwar Iraq/Afghanistan veterans.
VVAW thus represents an important resource for refuting popular, 
simplistic, and erroneous notions about antiwar veterans. The orga-
nization’s greatest struggle now is to preserve the genuine history of 
antiwar veterans from popular redefinition into a form less threaten-
ing to the status quo.

APPENDIX
Social Movement Theory as Applied to VVAW
Co-authored with Dr. Catherine Luther
This book looks at U.S. network television news coverage of Vietnam 
Veterans Against the War using social movement theory as a frame 
of reference. It critically analyzes how the organization and its activi-
ties during the early 1970s were represented by the news reports. 
Roberta Garner and John Tenuto (1997, 1) define social movement 
theory as “the project of creating a unified and coherent definition 
and explanation of social movements and related phenomena. Social 
movements are usually defined as collectivities engaged in nonin-
stitutionalized discourses and practices aimed at changing existing 
conditions of society.”  These scholars compiled a guide to much of 
the research, and concluded that the theory has changed based on 
intellectual currents, changes in the phenomena themselves, and the 
volatile nature of such movements (Garner and Tenuto 1997, 1-6).
From 1945 to the early 1960s, social movements were analyzed 
as irrational psychological aberrations and were approached via psy-
choanalytic paradigms. From the mid-1960s until the late-1970s, 
researchers tended to be kinder to persons engaged in social move-
ments, viewing them as rational actors within social structures. 
Here, the paradigm shifts to organizational structures and resource 
mobilization. From the late 1970s until now, however, analysis large-
ly has taken a deconstructionist approach. “According to these new 
intellectual currents,” writes Garner (1997, 6) in her introduction to 
Social Movement Theory and Research, “all human phenomena are 
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socially constructed in ongoing processes of cultural discourse and 
interaction; hence there is no bedrock for human society, either in 
the individual or in social structures.”  
If social movements are perceived as socially constructed, it be-
comes crucial to understand which societal actors are taking part 
in the construction of their realities and in what manner. Several 
scholars (e.g., McLeod and Hertog 1999; Putnam 2002) have asserted 
that, over the past few decades, the mass media, especially the news 
media, have played  prominent roles in the contouring of images as-
sociated with social movement organizations.
This approach to social movements through their social construc-
tion will be less than satisfying to those in the field who prefer mate-
rialist approaches, especially examinations of resource mobilization. 
These past approaches contributed greatly to our understanding of 
social movements, especially in their recognition of the importance 
of elites. However, as Tarrow has detailed, many researchers and the-
orists recently have expanded the study of social movements to look 
at culture as an important “meta-narrative” in formation, operation, 
goals, symbols, and success of movements. He proposed the follow-
ing valuable synthesis:
People engage in contentious politics when patterns of 
political opportunities and constraints change and then, 
by strategically employing a repertoire of collective ac-
tion, create new opportunities, which are used by others 
in widening cycles of contention. When their struggles 
revolve around broad cleavages in society, when they 
bring people together around inherited cultural sym-
bols, and when they can build upon dense social net-
works and connective structures, then these episodes of 
contention result in sustained interactions with oppo-
nents—specifically in social movements. (1998, 19)
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This theoretical synthesis seems particularly descriptive of 
VVAW. The inherited cultural symbols were themselves—a coun-
try’s noble warriors. The dense social network was the powerful 
bond of those who have shared combat. The broad cleavage in society 
was the Vietnam War. The VVAW learned how to use and to gain at-
tention strategically for collective action. It became loosely affiliated 
with other war opponent groups, but maintained a separate identity, 
as part of a widening cycle of contention. The sustained interaction 
with opponents included a long-term struggle against the Nixon Ad-
ministration. The changing patterns of political opportunities and 
constraints included a vast and idealistic youth population dissat-
isfied with the “establishment” and a relatively new and powerful 
news medium—television. At times the political patterns worked for 
VVAW, at times against. 
Social Movements and the News Media
Research on social movements suggests that the type of coverage 
these movements receive from the news media often reflects the 
needs of political and economic elites. Viewed as a part of the power 
elites in society, mainstream media are said to grant legitimacy only 
to those movements that are believed to pose no threat to the status 
quo. Those movements that are seen as undermining the stability 
of the established political and societal consensus are portrayed as 
deviant and lacking legitimacy. 
In attempting to explain why journalists might assign deviant 
status to certain individuals or groups, Daniel Hallin (1986, 117, 
162) created a model of the modes of journalistic coverage. Hallin 
contends that journalists operate within three spheres of journalis-
tic coverage. The first is the sphere of legitimate controversy. Within 
this sphere, journalists attempt to be balanced and neutral in their 
coverage, mirroring the journalistic ideal of the watchdog model of 
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the press. The second is the sphere of consensus, in which journal-
ists do not remain objective, but rather serve as advocates of what 
are viewed as consensus values. The third sphere of journalistic cov-
erage is the sphere of deviance. Within this sphere, journalists act 
to silence or condemn those individuals or groups that are viewed 
as challenging political consensus. Through these models, Hallin 
argues that those individuals or groups, such as social movement 
organizations, that are striving to bring about change to the widely-
agreed-upon political or societal stances encounter much difficulty 
in having their voices heard by the mainstream press.          
Hallin’s assertions are sustained by a number of studies regarding 
news coverage of social protest. In one of the earliest works, Breed 
(1955), in his analysis of newsroom practices, found that members 
of the press tend to establish informal organizational policies that 
are mainly aimed at promoting social conformity. He writes that by 
avoiding coverage of social actions deemed to be nonconformist, or 
by assigning these stories to staffers who will provide a certain slant 
to the actions, newspaper editors are able to maintain the decep-
tion of societal equilibrium and tranquility. Gitlin’s (1980) study of 
anti-Vietnam war demonstrations showed that while the news me-
dia may at times concede to the need for certain reforms within the 
political system, it will disparage any movements that attempt to go 
against the system itself. He found that anti-Vietnam war demon-
strators were often negatively presented, not in a manner reflective 
of the actual demonstrators. 
McLeod and Hertog (1992; 1999), in several of their studies on 
social protests, found that demonstrators are often defined by the 
news media as being violent and criminal. The authors claim that 
journalists often use a violent crime narrative to set up a conflict 
scenario between protesters and law enforcement officers. Journal-
ists’ use of a conflict scenario in their coverage of social movements 
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has been found in other studies (e.g., Manoff and Schudson 1986; 
Semetko and Valkenburg 2000) as well. Conflict is said to boost the 
spectacle value of the coverage. By discussing the size of the protests, 
the presence of police, and clashes between police and protesters, 
newsworthiness of the protests is heightened. Newsworthiness is 
also heightened if protests are associated with issues already attract-
ing news attention. With the increase in social movement coverage 
due to perceptions of newsworthiness, however, resistance to those 
changes being called for by the social movements also tend to rise 
(e.g., Gitlin 1980; Altschull 1984; Parenti 1986; Loewen 1996). 
Justin Gustainis and Dan Hahn (1988) looked specifically at the 
social movements aimed at ending the Vietnam War, and asserted 
that those movements failed and that negative public reaction actu-
ally prolonged the U.S. role in the war. They argued that the pro-
testers and protest groups made rhetorical errors, such as identify-
ing with the counter culture and using immoderate protest tactics: 
violence, obscenity, and flag desecration. They argued that pro-war 
forces were very effective, with responses that tapped into the audi-
ence’s fear of communism and opposition to protests in general and 
protest violence in particular. These authors make an important con-
tribution, but one should note that only massive, noisy, and impolite 
protest garners mediated attention—and protesters must operate 
in that reality, and the smarter ones recognize and use that real-
ity. Antiwar veterans, as this book demonstrates, wisely recognized 
the need to maintain an identity separate from the general antiwar 
movement, a separate identity that takes advantage of their hard-
earned credibility.
It is impossible to determine precisely whether antiwar protest 
lengthened, shortened, or had no effect on the Vietnam War. There 
is no “control group” contemporaneous war done without protest for 
comparison. It seems likely that the war protests did some good by 
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breaking the “spiral of silence” (Noelle-Neumann 1984). People who 
had doubts about the war (or any war sub-point such as cost, fatali-
ties, congressional authorization, performance of South Vietnamese 
allies) had validation that they could express those doubts, even if at 
the same time they could express revulsion at the protesters bringing 
the message. 
The Gustainis and Hahn article makes a stronger contribution 
when it points out that U.S. news media got to the antiwar protest 
story late, generally gave such protests negative coverage, and cur-
tailed coverage when faced with criticism. CBS News, for example, 
never had antiwar protests comprise more than 20 percent of its 
overall Vietnam coverage (Hallin 1986, 192). Hodgson (1976) docu-
mented a decline in antiwar protest coverage following Vice Presi-
dent Spiro Agnew’s diatribes against television, press, and protest. 
Network executives, by nearly all accounts, certainly were quite con-
cerned and even fearful about what the comments threatened, rang-
ing from license challenges to FCC regulation (Schieffer 2003). NBC 
anchor and reporter John Chancellor admitted that, after the Agnew 
attacks, networks found themselves thinking “thrice not just twice” 
reaction pieces to presidential pro-war statements (Deane 1983).   
The major findings from research on press coverage of social 
movements may be summarized as follows: the news media have 
been found to often: deny the existence of the movement, ignore the 
movement as meaningless or irrelevant, dismiss the cause as hope-
less, stereotype the adherents as extreme or odd, create alternate and 
less threatening spokesmen, fragment the movement into compet-
ing groups, co-opt leadership, co-opt the least threatening ideas, 
prematurely declare the movement dead, recall the movement as an 
aberration no longer needed, and finally forget the movement ever 
happened.
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By the 1980s, VVAW protests continued, but coverage waned.  
Photo courtesy of VVAW.
As a social movement, VVAW presents an intriguing case study 
because it is essentially made up of two often counter-opposing com-
munities. As a veterans group, VVAW is part of a larger group that 
serves as a tribute to the nation and those who fought for the nation. 
At the same time, however, it is a group dedicated to the promo-
tion of peace and social justice. Adam Garfinkle explained well how 
the VVAW were perfectly positioned to break through the implicit 
dilemma of coverage described by Gustainis and Hahn. Garfinkle 
wrote, “The reason is simple: veterans were by definition patriotic. 
They were not draft-dodgers. They did not and never had rooted for 
the enemy. They were not spoiled students on elite college campuses. 
They did not have long hair, wear beads, or openly smoke pot. In 
short the very fact that they appeared respectable helped earn their 
views respect” (1995 197). 
Bob Ostertag noted, “By the early 1970s GIs opposed the war in 
proportionally greater numbers than students ever did, and at far 
greater risk to themselves” (2006, 118).  Active duty antiwar veterans 
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could face dishonorable discharges, transfers to more dangerous 
duty, or even jail, often on trumped-up charges.
Adding to the credibility of antiwar veterans is their role as wit-
ness/convert. One survey of 172 of two thousand veterans who went 
to a VVAW protest in April 1971, Dewey Canyon III, found that 
most of those vets had either supported or had no opinion about the 
war before going to Vietnam; but solid majorities reported undergo-
ing a drastic change in viewpoint while serving in Vietnam. Before 
the war, the respondents were evenly divided among self-described 
liberals, moderates, and conservatives. After Vietnam, 48.8 percent 
called themselves radical, 18.5 percent extreme radical, and fewer 
than 6 percent self-identified in the moderate to conservative range. 
Unsurprisingly, the vets listed personal experience in Vietnam with 
the Vietnamese, other GIs, and other Americans as the leading 
sources in forming their new attitudes (Mowlana and Geffert 1971).
  
An unidentified veteran, laden 
with medals, listens to speakers 
at the VVAW war protest event, 
Dewey Canyon III. 
Photo courtesy of VVAW.
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Despite the unwillingness of many people to accept the fact, a 
majority of Vietnam era veterans opposed the war. In 1977 and 1979, 
Ellen Frey-Wouters and Robert S. Laufer surveyed 326 Vietnam 
veterans, 341 Vietnam-era veterans, and 592 non-veterans. The re-
searchers reported that few American GIs went to war with antiwar 
attitudes, but while they served in Vietnam “a plurality of veterans 
were participating in a war they clearly opposed or to which they had 
a variety of confused responses that amounted to less than full sup-
port for the American involvement. Upon return home, opposition 
to the American role in the war often intensified. At the time of our 
interviews, a majority of Vietnam veterans agreed that we should 
have stayed out of the conflict” (1986, 87).
Time of service mattered. Most pre-Tet veterans supported the 
war; most post-Tet U.S. veterans did not. Branch of service also mat-
tered. Only 23 percent of Marines opposed the war, but pluralities 
of army and navy veterans did. Combat itself was not a significant 
 
Active Duty GIs and Ex-POWs supporting VVAW. 
Photo courtesy of VVAW.
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factor in war opposition, but those directly exposed to “abusive vio-
lence” report that this violence affected their view of the war, almost 
always in the direction of opposition (Frey-Wouters and Laufer 1986, 
79-87, 387-408).
Hipsher (2007) argues that VVAW can be regarded as a “hereti-
cal social movement organization.” She includes it with such groups 
as Veterans for Peace, Iraqi Veterans Against the War, Catholics for 
Free Choice, and the Pro-Life Alliance of Gays and Lesbians. These 
groups form a special class of collective struggle because they ar-
ticulate positions and pursue goals contrary to what the larger com-
munity might presume is their identity group position. In the case 
of VVAW, the group was specifically created to contest the Vietnam 
War efforts of the U.S. and contradicted the position taken by the 
larger veteran community, similar to World War II vets in the Amer-
ican Legion, sympathetic to the U.S. cause. 
Based on past studies on social protest, one can assume that 
VVAW would have encountered scant news coverage of its early and 
vibrant demonstrations. The group would not have been covered ex-
tensively except when official reactions, such as arrests and trials, led 
reporters to the story. Because the demonstrators themselves were 
war veterans, the coverage might have been slightly different from 
the type of coverage provided to most social demonstrations. The 
very existence of large numbers of antiwar veterans might have led 
to a form of cognitive dissonance for much of the public and a good 
many reporters and editors.
By examining the major U.S. network television coverage of 
VVAW in its early years, this book attempts to provide insight into 
how the VVAW as a heretical social movement might have been cov-
ered and whether the coverage can be considered distinct from stan-
dard social movement coverage.   
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Highlights
Social movement theory suggests that as organizations grow more 
threatening to the status quo, mediated resistance also rises. This 
generally happened with VVAW.
The VVAW may be viewed as a heretical social movement, one whose 
views may run counter to public assumption of its position. In the 
case of VVAW, this led to enhanced credibility through personal ex-
perience with the Vietnam War.
News coverage of VVAW followed a pattern common to most so-
cial movements. News media miss the story, then downplay its sig-
nificance, then distort its message, then co-opt certain messages or 
messengers, then dismiss it as no longer needed, and finally forget it 
happened.
VVAW did not fall into the news trap experienced by other social 
movements, using violence to gain attention, only to have the vio-
lence swallow the message. VVAW stayed non-violent.
Unlike some other social movements VVAW success did not flow 
from a breakdown of elite consensus. It largely was a working-class 
phenomenon, gaining attention well after elite consensus about the 
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I n Found, Featured, then Forgotten: U.S. Network TV News and the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Mark Harmon provides an account of the veterans’ protests against the war and their depiction in the American 
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